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INTRODUCTION
One of the latest developments in products liability law is "public tort"
litigation.1 Public tort or government-sponsored lawsuits are actions by federal,
1. The term "public tort" appears to have been first used by Dean Thomas Galligan. See Thomas
C. Galligan, Jr., Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the Public Tort, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1019, 1022-23 (2001) (defining "public torts" narrowly as suits where plaintiff is a governmental entity
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state, or local government entities to recover the cost of public services provided
to persons who have been injured as the result of a defendant's alleged
misconduct. 2 The best known example is the tobacco litigation of the mid-1990s
in which more than forty states brought suit against the leading tobacco
companies to recoup the cost of providing health care services to indigent
smokers.3 Eventually, the tobacco companies agreed to pay the states more than
$200 billion and also consented to substantially restrict their advertising and
promotion activities.4 The tobacco industry is now defending itself against a
similar suit by the federal government. 5
Encouraged by the states' success against the tobacco industry, a number of
municipalities subsequently brought suits against handgun manufacturers to
recover for some of the costs of handgun-related violence.
6  Although
government plaintiffs suffered some early defeats, more recent efforts by
municipalities have had considerable success persuading courts to allow them to
seek to hold firearms manufacturers liable under an expanded theory of public
nuisance. 7 The latest target of government lawsuits is the paint industry.
8 The
state of Rhode Island and a number of local government entities are currently
seeking to recover damages to pay for lead-based paint removal and the cost of
health care.9 If government plaintiffs eventually prevail against handgun and
lead paint manufacturers, they will certainly bring public tort actions against
other product manufacturers as well. Prospective defendants include purveyors
of alcohol and fast food and prescription drug companies.
10
Legal scholars disagree sharply about the value of public tort litigation.
One group strongly approves of government-sponsored lawsuits, arguing that the
existence of Medicaid and other welfare programs should not enable profit-
making enterprises to shift the social costs of their commercial activities to the
government." However, other commentators have expressed severe
filing suit against a person for damages caused by that person's allegedly tortious behavior).
2. Id
3. See infra Part I.A. for a discussion of some of the suits brought against tobacco companies.
4. Michael DeBow, The State Tobacco Litigation and the Separation of Powers in State
Governments: Repairing the Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 563, 568-69 (2001).
5. Jonathan Turley, A Crisis of Faith: Tobacco and the Madisonian Democracy, 37 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 433,457-58 (2000).
6. Brent W. Landau, Note, State Bans on City Gun Lawsuits, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 623, 624
(2000).
7. See infra Part I.B for a discussion of lawsuits against handgun manufacturers.
8. See infra Part I.C. for a discussion of suits brought against lead paint manufacturers.
9. Amber E. Dean, Comment, Lead Paint Public Entity Lawsuits: Has the Broad Stroke of
Tobacco and Firearms Litigation Painted a Troubling Picture for Lead Paint Manufacturers?, 28 PEPP.
L. REV. 915,915 (2001).
10. Richard L. Cupp, Jr., State Medical Reimbursement Lawsuits After Tobacco: Is the Domino
Effect for Lead Paint Manufacturers and Others Fair Game?, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 685,690 (2000).
11. See generally, Galligan, supra note 1 (suggesting that public tort suits are a device that can
force defendants to consider the costs of their activities); David Kairys, The Origin and Development
of the Governmental Handgun Cases, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1163 (2000) (noting the role of handgun
manufacturers in violent crimes); Timothy D. Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for
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reservations about public tort litigation, citing doctrinal, economic, and
separation of powers concerns. 12 This Article examines the history of public tort
lawsuits and concludes that the social, political, and economic costs outweigh the
benefits of this type of litigation.
Part I of this Article looks at the history of government-sponsored lawsuits
against tobacco, handgun, and lead-based paint manufacturers. Part II evaluates
various liability theories that government plaintiffs have relied upon, including
negligent entrustment, strict liability for engaging in abnormally dangerous
activities, fraud and conspiracy, unjust enrichment, public nuisance, parens
patriae, and violation of federal RICO provisions. This part concludes that
public nuisance now appears to be the most promising of these liability theories.
Part III analyzes a number of potential statutory and doctrinal limitations
on liability such as statutory prohibitions on municipal lawsuits, standing
requirements, duty and proximate cause, the economic loss rule, and the
municipal cost recovery rule. Part IV considers the adverse effects of public tort
litigation on governmental and legal institutions. Part IV also examines the
impact of such lawsuits on product manufacturers and other sectors of the
economy. Finally, the Article identifies a number of steps that could be taken to
control public tort litigation in the future.
I. SuITS AGAINST PRODUCr MANUFACTURERS
So far, most government-sponsored lawsuits against product manufacturers
have targeted those who produce cigarettes, handguns, and lead paint. At this
time, while government entities have won a substantial victory against the
tobacco industry, they have been less successful in their efforts against handgun
manufacturers, and the battle against the lead paint industry is just beginning.
Crime-Related Injuries: Defining a Suitable Role for the Tort System in Regulating the Firearms
Industry, 65 MO. L. REV. 1 (2000) (advocating a role for the tort system in regulating the gun
industry); Frank J. Vandall, The Legal Theory and the Visionaries That Led to the Proposed $368.5
Billion Tobacco Settlement, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 473 (1998) (examining the different ways that Congress
may decide to use the tobacco settlement money); Frank J. Vandall, O.K. Corral I: Policy Issues in
Municipal Suits Against Gun Manufacturers, 44 VILL. L. REV. 547 (1999) (addressing the legal liability
of gun manufacturers for damages from gun violence).
12. See generally DeBow, supra note 4 (claiming that state's suits against the tobacco industry
will one day be looked at as one of the worst developments in American public law in the twentieth
Century); William H. Pryor Jr. et al., Report of the Task Force on Tobacco Litigation Submitted to
Governor James and Attorney General Sessions October 2, 1996, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 577 (1997)
(claiming that suits by the Federal government harm state law with no net financial effect); Turley,
supra note 5 (stating that tobacco litigation circumvents the legislative system and is based on dubious
claims); Ed Dawson, Note, Legigation, 79 TEx. L. REv. 1727 (2001) (arguing that lawsuits used to pass
laws undermine separation of powers principle and are unnecessary); Bryce A. Jensen, Note, From
Tobacco to Health Care and Beyond-A Critique of Lawsuits Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1334 (2001) (concluding that tobacco litigation forces the judiciary into the role of
policymaker).
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A. Suits Against the Tobacco Industry
After a long struggle, the states ultimately forced the tobacco industry to
offer them a generous settlement. These lawsuits not only put billions of dollars
into the pockets of state governments (and their lawyers), but they also served as
a model for subsequent public tort litigation.
1. The Mississippi Lawsuit
Mississippi was the first state to sue the tobacco industry. 13 The complaint,
which was filed by Attorney General Mike Moore on May 23, 1994,14 named as
defendants seventeen companies and organizations, including thirteen cigarette
manufacturers, a public relations firm, and the Tobacco Research Institute.
15
The state's legal advisors were astute enough to realize that a traditional
subrogation claim against the tobacco companies would probably fail and,
therefore, reformulated a number of traditional causes of action for use in their
pending litigation.16  These included restitution, indemnity, and public
nuisance.1 7 Under each of these theories, the state sued in its own right and
independently of any claims by individual smokers;
18 consequently, it could
avoid assumption of risk and other defenses that might be applicable to those
who smoked even though they knew that cigarettes were harmful.
1 9
The state originally filed its suit in the Jackson County Chancery Court.
20
The defendants were initially able to have the case removed to federal court, but
it was eventually remanded back to the Mississippi chancery court.
21 On
February 21, 1995, the court issued an order which struck the defendants'
affirmative defenses.22 However, in the summer of 1997, the parties reached a
13. Tiffany S. Griggs, Comment, Medicaid Reimbursement from Tobacco Manufacturers: Is the
States' Legal Position Equitable?, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 799,805 (1998).
14. David S. Samford, Note, Cutting Deals in Smoke-Free Rooms: A Case Study in Public Choice
Theory, 87 KY. L.J. 845, 892 (1999).
15. Raymond E. Gangarosa et al., Suits by Public Hospitals to Recover Expenditures for the
Treatment of Disease, Injury and Disability Caused by Tobacco and Alcohol, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
81,136 (1994).
16. Frank J. Vandall, The Legal Theory and the Visionaries That Led to the Proposed $368.5
Billion Tobacco Settlement, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 473, 478-82 (1998). Besides Moore and Lewis, the team
included Richard Daynard, Susan Nial and physician Ray Gangarosa. Id.
17. William H. Pryor Jr., A Comparison of Abuses and Reforms of Class Actions and
Multigovernment Lawsuits, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1885, 1906 (2000).
18. Cliff Sherrill, Comment, Tobacco Litigation: Medicaid Third Party Liability and Claims for
Restitution, 19 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 497, 497 (1997).
19. Karen E. Meade, Comment, Breaking Through the Tobacco Industry's Smoke Screen: State
Lawsuits for Reimbursement of Medical Expenses, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 113, 137 (1996).
20. See Moore ex rel. Mississippi v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Miss. Ch. Ct. Jackson County
filed May 23, 1994). See also Mark D. Fridy, Note, How the Tobacco Industry May Pay for Public
Health Care Expenditures Caused by Smoking: A Look at the Next Wave of Suits Against the Tobacco
Industry, 72 IND. L.J. 235, 246 (1996) (noting the strategy of suing in a court of equity).
21. Fridy, supra note 20, at 246.
22. Id. at 247-48.
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settlement under which the tobacco companies agreed to pay the state $3.6
billion.
23
2. The Florida Lawsuit
Florida 24 and Massachusetts 25 avoided the problems associated with
subrogation claims by enacting statutes that allowed them to bring direct actions
against cigarette companies. 26 The Florida statute, which amended existing
legislation known as the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act ("MTPLA"), 27 was
passed in April 1994 and became effective on July 1st of that year.2 8 Although
MTPLA did not change substantive liability rules, 29 many of its provisions were
designed to improve the state's chances of recovering against the tobacco
industry for smoking-related Medicaid costs. First of all, the statute declared
that the state's cause of action was independent of the tort claims of individual
smokers.30 In addition, the statute permitted the state to sue for aggregate
health care costs; therefore, it did not require the state to identify individual
Medicaid recipients31 and it allowed proof of causation and damages to be made
by statistical evidence. 32 Moreover, the Florida legislation prevented defendants
from asserting defenses such as of assumption of risk and comparative fault. 33
Furthermore, it also eliminated use of the statute of repose as a defense. 34
Finally, the statute expressly allowed damages to be apportioned on the basis of
market share liability, 35 while retaining the doctrine of joint and several
liability.
36
23. Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A Morality Play's Third Act: Revisiting Addiction, Fraud and Consumer
Choice in "Third Wave" Tobacco Litigation, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 465,469 (1998).
24. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910 (West 1998 & Supp. 2005). The original Medicaid Third-Party
Liability Act, enacted in 1978, provided that the state could bring subrogation claims to recover for the
cost of providing medical treatment to injured parties under the state's Medicaid program. Jonathan S.
Massey, The Florida Tobacco Liability Law: Fairy Tale Objections to a Reasonable Solution to
Florida's Medicaid Crisis, 46 FLA. L. REV. 591, 599 (1994) (noting that the original Medicaid Third-
Party Liability Act was codified in Fla. Stat. 409.266(3)(b) (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1991) and that third
party liability subsequently was provided by 409.2665 (Supp. 1990), which was renumbered to the
current version, 409.910 (Supp. 1994) in 1991).
25. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118E, § 22 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004) (providing that any person
who suffers a loss for which third party is liable and receives payment of monies from said third party,
shall repay the total of all public assistance benefits provided as a result of the loss by the department
of transitional services).
26. Ed Dawson, Note, Legigation, 79 TEx. L. REV. 1727, 1731 (2001).
27. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910.
28. Fridy, supra note 20, at 240.
29. Massey, supra note 24, at 603.
30. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(6)(a).
31. Id. § 40 9 .910(9)(a).
32. Id. § 409.910 (9).
33. Id. § 409.910 (1).
34. Id. § 409.910 (12) (h).
35. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910 (9) (b).
36. Id. § 409.910 (1).
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A Florida retail trade association and others promptly challenged the
constitutionality of the new law.37 They alleged that MTPLA violated the due
process clause of the United States Constitution and the access-to-courts
provision of the Florida Constitution.38 The plaintiffs also claimed that the
Agency for Health Care Administration ("Agency"), which was responsible for
enforcing the Act, was not properly structured. 39 The trial court upheld most of
MTPLA, but struck down several of the Act's key features.4° Both sides
appealed and in June 1996, the Florida Supreme Court in Agency for Health
Care Administration v. Associated Industries of Florida, Inc. upheld the validity
of MTPLA.41 Among other things, the Florida Supreme Court determined that
the Agency was not unconstitutionally structured.42 The court also concluded
that the legislature has the power to abrogate affirmative defenses 43 as well as
the statute of repose. 44 In addition, the court approved the use of statistical
evidence to prove causation in Medicaid recoupment actions.45 Furthermore,
the court upheld the use of market share liability and joint and several liability,
although it cautioned that the two doctrines can not be used together in the same
case.
46
However, the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Associated Industries was
not a complete victory for the state. In the first place, the court concluded that
the state was required to identify the recipient of each Medicaid payment it was
seeking to recoup.47 According to the court, a defendant would be unable to
argue that Medicaid payments to particular recipients were improper unless the
state revealed the identity of each recipient. 48 Secondly, the Florida court ruled
that the state could not sue under MTPLA, as amended in 1994, for any
Medicaid claims that accrued prior to that date.49 Rather, the state was required
to follow the less advantageous provisions of the pre-1994 version of MTPLA to
recover earlier Medicaid expenditures.
50
After the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Associated Industries, the
37. Sherrill, supra note 18, at 503.
38. Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239, 1296 (Ha.
1996).
39. Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So. 2d at 1296.
40. The trial court upheld the Act's provisions with respect to proof of causation, affirmative
defenses and market share liability. Fridy, supra note 20, at 244-45. However, the lower court agreed
with the plaintiffs that the Health Care Agency was unconstitutionally structured. Id. In addition, the
court ruled that the state could utilize MTPRA to recoup only those Medicaid costs that it incurred
after the Act's effective date. Id.
41. Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So. 2d at 1239.
42. Id. at 1248.
43. Id. at 1253.
44. Id. at 1254.
45. Id. at 1256.
46. Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So. 2d at 1256.
47. Id. at 1254.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1256.
50. Id.
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state filed an amended complaint against the tobacco companies.5' However, in
September 1996, the trial judge dismissed fifteen of the state's eighteen counts,
allowing only those counts to stand which were based on post-1994
expenditures. 52 Although the court eventually set a trial date for August 1997,
53
Florida and the tobacco companies settled the case in August 1997, before the
start of the trial.54 The settlement figure was reported to be $11 billion.
55
3. The Minnesota Lawsuit
In August 1994, the Attorney General of Minnesota filed suit against
various cigarette companies, alleging antitrust violations and consumer fraud. 56
More specifically, the state claimed that tobacco company executives conspired
to persuade the public, through advertising and other actions, that smoking was
safe when they knew of recent scientific studies that showed smoking to be
harmful. 57 Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota, a private health care
insurance provider, also joined the suit as a plaintiff.58  The defendants
challenged Blue Cross's standing to sue, but the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled
in favor of the insurance company.59 Furthermore, the United States Supreme
Court refused to overrule a Minnesota appellate court decision which gave the
state access to a database index of internal tobacco company records. 6° The state
later made available to the public more than 35 million pages of material that it
had obtained from the tobacco companies during discovery. 61 This was the only
case to actually go to trial, but the parties reached a settlement in May 1998, just
before the case was to go to the jury.62 Under the terms of the settlement, the
state received $6.1 billion and Blue Cross-Blue Shield received $469 million. 63
4. Other State Lawsuits
A number of other states filed lawsuits against the tobacco industry
between 1994 and 1998. West Virginia brought suit in September 1994, while
51. Sherrill, supra note 18, at 504.
52. Id.
53. Fridy, supra note 20, at 295.
54. Michael DeBow, The State Tobacco Litigation and the Separation of Powers in State
Governments: Repairing the Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 563,567 (2001).
55. Cupp, supra note 23, at 469.
56. Fridy, supra note 20, at 248.
57. Id. at 248-49.
58. Sherrill, supra note 18, at 511.
59. State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490,495 (Minn. 1996).
60. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Minnesota, 517 U.S. 1222 (1996).
61. Michael V. Ciresi et al., Decades of Deceit: Document Discovery in the Minnesota Tobacco
Litigation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 477, 486 (1999); Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions:
Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation,
34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 12 (2000).
62. Samford, supra note 14, at 897.
63. Id. at 898.
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Massachusetts followed in December 1995. 64 The West Virginia suit charged the
tobacco industry with fraud, unjust enrichment, and creating a public nuisance,
65
while Massachusetts based its claim on breach of warranty, conspiracy to
suppress information about smoking-related health risks, restitution, and unjust
enrichment.66 On March 28, 1996, Texas filed a suit against the tobacco
companies in federal court.67 Texas based its claim for damages on antitrust
violations, RICO, fraud, products liability, and restitution.68 The state of
Maryland also filed suit that year.69 The state accused the defendants of fraud,
breach of warranty, negligence, strict liability in tort, conspiracy, breach of
antitrust laws, and violation of state consumer protection statutes. 70 In addition
to Maryland and Texas, eleven other states filed suit in 1996 and another twenty
did so during the first six months of 1997.71 Thus, by mid-1997, almost forty
states had filed lawsuits against tobacco companies.
72
Not all of these lawsuits went smoothly for the plaintiffs. For example, a
West Virginia trial court judge dismissed most of that state's complaints because
the judge concluded that the Attorney General is not authorized to bring
common law claims (as opposed to statute-based causes of action) without the
permission of the Governor. 73 The Iowa Supreme Court upheld a lower court
dismissal of the state's unjust enrichment, fraud, and indemnity claims against
cigarette manufacturers. 74 Lower courts in Idaho, Illinois, and Washington also
dismissed some claims against the tobacco industry.
75
5. The Tobacco Settlements
By 1997, these lawsuits had begun to take their toll on the tobacco industry.
First, the financial markets began to exert considerable pressure on the industry
64. See DeBow, supra note 54, at 566 (detailing the filing dates of the suits against the tobacco
industry).
65. Fridy, supra note 20, at 249.
66. See Massachusetts v. Philip Morris, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 690 (D. Mass. 1996) (noting the claims
brought by Massachusetts).
67. Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
68. See Fridy, supra note 20, at 249 (noting the grounds for recovery in the Texas lawsuit).
69. See Ingrid Dietsch Field, Comment, No Ifs, Ands or Butts: Big Tobacco Is Fighting for Its Life
Against a New Breed of Plaintiffs Armed with Mounting Evidence, 27 U. BALT. L. REV. 99, 117 (1997)
(detailing the suit filed by the State of Maryland).
70. See id. at 117-19 (noting the 13 counts brought by the State of Maryland against the tobacco
industry).
71. See DeBow, supra note 54, at 566-67 (describing the growing momentum of suits against the
tobacco industry).
72. Maria Gabriela Bianchini, Comment, The Tobacco Agreement That Went Up in Smoke:
Defining the Limits of Congressional Intervention into Ongoing Mass Tort Litigation, 87 CAL. L. REV.
703,712 (1999).
73. Fridy, supra note 20, at 249.
74. See State ex rel. Miller v. Philip Morris, Inc., 577 N.W.2d 401 (Iowa 1998) (finding that the
States cannot recover damages under certain claims because the injuries were derivative and remote).
75. See Pryor, supra note 17, at 1913-14 (discussing the dismissal of various claims against the
tobacco industry).
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to resolve its legal problems.76 Second, with so many lawsuits in progress,
tobacco companies were forced to spend a great deal of money on litigation costs
because, unlike many private plaintiffs, the states were able to commit significant
financial resources to the litigation.
77
Moreover, as the lawsuits progressed, whistleblowers turned over a large
number of incriminating documents to the plaintiffs. For example, in 1994, a
paralegal employed by a law firm that represented the Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corporation, photocopied approximately ten thousand pages of
sensitive company documents and mailed them to Professor Stanton Glantz at
the University of California. 78 Brown & Williamson was unable to recover the
documents and they were eventually made public. 79 Additional material came to
light through the discovery process.80 As mentioned earlier, Minnesota made
available to the public millions of documents obtained through discovery. 81
Furthermore, Jeffrey Wigand, the former head of research and development at
Brown & Williamson, testified that the tobacco industry concealed information
about the health risks of smoking from the public for many years.82 Finally,
plaintiffs obtained evidence that tobacco companies not only knew that nicotine
was addictive, but that they may have manipulated nicotine levels in order to
keep smokers addicted to cigarettes.83  Consequently, tobacco companies
seriously began to consider the settlement option early in 1997.8
4
a. The Liggett Settlement
The first defection among the tobacco companies occurred in March, 1996,
when the Liggett Corporation offered to settle with Florida, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, and West Virginia.8 5  Under the terms of the
proposed settlement, Liggett agreed to pay these states $5 million plus a
percentage of its profits over a twenty-five year period.8 6 More importantly,
76. Peter D. Jacobson & Kenneth E. Warner, Litigation and Public Health Policy Making: The
Case of Tobacco Control, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 769, 777-78 (1999).
77. See Erichson, supra note 61, at 10 (noting that state plaintiffs did not suffer the resource
imbalance that hindered private plaintiffs); Bianchini, supra note 72, at 712 (finding that state plaintiffs
were well financed and had evidence against the tobacco industry).
78. Tucker S. Player, Note, After the Fall: The Cigarette Papers, the Global Settlement, and the
Future of Tobacco Litigation, 49 S.C. L. REV. 311, 322 (1998).
79. See Maddox v. Williams, 855 F. Supp. 406 (D.D.C. 1994) (detailing how the documents were
made public and the response by Brown & Williamson).
80. See Erichson, supra note 61, at 11-12 (noting private plaintiffs benefited from the information
accumulated during the government's discovery).
81. Id at 11.
82. Dietsch Field, supra note 69, at 121.
83. See Cupp, Jr., supra note 23, at 474 (discussing evidence available to plaintiffs in the mid-
1990's for use against the tobacco industry).
84. See DeBow, supra note 54, at 567 (noting that the alarm of the tobacco industry at the
growing number of lawsuits led to settlement discussions).
85. Sherrill, supra note 18, at 500 n.27.
86. Id at 500.
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Liggett also agreed to turn over any documents in its possession that might
incriminate other tobacco companies, to provide information about potential
witnesses, and to assist the states with respect to discovery proceedings in their
lawsuits against the tobacco industry.
87
b. The 1997 Proposed Settlement Agreement
On June 20, 1997, the tobacco companies reached a proposed settlement
agreement with forty states.88 Under the proposed settlement, the tobacco
companies agreed to pay the states $368.5 billion over a period of twenty-five
years to reimburse them for tobacco-related Medicaid costs.
8 9 It was understood
that the tobacco industry would make these payments by passing the cost of the
settlement on to smokers in the form of higher cigarette prices.
90 The tobacco
industry also agreed to the regulation of tobacco products by the FDA,
91 to
restrict the advertising and marketing of tobacco products,
92 and to accept
regulatory standards directed at minimizing involuntary exposure to second-
hand smoke. 93 Furthermore, the tobacco companies agreed to an incentive
program to reduce underage smoking over a ten-year period.
94 In return, the
proposed settlement protected liability of tobacco companies from most future
tort liability. For example, the proposed settlement disposed of all lawsuits
brought against the tobacco industry by state and local governments.
95 The
settlement also settled most pending class actions
96 against the tobacco
companies and prohibited the aggregation of claims in the future.
97 Although
the proposed settlement allowed lawsuits to be brought against tobacco
companies by individual claimants, it prohibited claims based on addiction or
dependency98 as well as claims for punitive damages.
99 Finally, the proposed
settlement placed an aggregate cap on the overall liability of tobacco companies
to individual plaintiffs to an amount equivalent to thirty-three percent of the
amount paid by them to the states each year.
1°°
Because the proposed settlement would have had a significant effect on
87. Player, supra note 78, at 330.
88. Bianchini, supra note 72, at 705.
89. Proposed Tobacco Industry Settlement of June 20, 1997, at http://stic.neu.edu/settlement/6-
20-settle.htm. (last visited Jan. 20, 2005) [hereinafter referred to as "Proposed Settlement."]
90. Proposed Settlement, Tit. VI. See also Samford, supra note 14, at 883 (noting the benefit to
the tobacco industry in the ability to pass along the cost of the settlement to tobacco users).
91. See Proposed Settlement, Tit. I (creating a new scheme of regulatory control over tobacco by
the Food and Drug Administration).
92. Id. Tit. I.
93. Id. Tit. IV.
94. Id. Tit. II.
95. Id. Tit. VIII.A.1.
96. Proposed Settlement, Tit. VIII.A.1.
97. Id. Tit. VIII.B.2.
98. Id. Tit. VIII.A.1.
99. Id. Tit. VIII.B.1.
100. Id. Tit. VIII.B.9.
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federal regulatory powers and would have also affected litigation in federal
courts, it was necessary for the parties to obtain Congressional approval for the
proposed settlement. 101 However, the bill that eventually reached the Senate
floor increased the amount of the settlement to $516 billion, beefed up FDA
regulation over tobacco products, and removed most of the tobacco industry's
protection against tort liability that had been agreed to in the proposed
settlement. 102 These changes completely undermined the compromise that the
parties had reached in 1997 and eventually caused the tobacco companies and
their allies to withdraw their support for the bill. 10 3 On June 17, 1998, the bill
died on the Senate floor when proponents of the settlement legislation were
unable to muster enough votes to break a filibuster by the bill's opponents.1°4
c. The 1998 Master Settlement Agreement
After Congress failed to approve the terms of the 1997 proposed settlement
agreement, the tobacco companies and the state attorney generals began a
second round of negotiations. 10 5 This produced a new agreement, known as the
Master Settlement Agreement, which was revealed to the public on November
14, 1998.106 Forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories
signed the settlement. 1° 7 Under the terms of this agreement, which did not
require Congressional approval, the tobacco companies agreed to pay the states
$206 billion over twenty-five years to reimburse them for the cost of treating
smoking-related illnesses under the Medicaid program. 08  The tobacco
companies also agreed to make additional payments to the states in perpetuity to
reimburse them for smoking-related Medicaid costs.10 9
The 1998 settlement was considerably narrower in scope than its ill-fated
predecessor. 110 Under the terms of the settlement, the states released the
tobacco companies from past and future Medicaid reimbursement claims."1
101. See Vandall, supra note 16, at 483-84 for a discussion of Congressional approval of the
proposed settlement and the influence of the tobacco industry on members of Congress.
102. Dawson, supra note 26, at 1733.
103. See Samford, supra note 14, at 887 (noting the tobacco industry began to work for the defeat
of the settlement).
104. kId at 845-46.
105. Dawson, supra note 26, at 1733.
106. Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries, 75
N.Y.U. L. REv. 354,371 (2000).
107. DeBow, supra note 54, at 568.
108. Bryce A. Jensen, Note, From Tobacco to Health Care and Beyond-A Critique of Lawsuits
Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1334, 1335 (2001).
109. See DeBow, supra note 54, at 568 (discussing the payments due to the states under the 1998
Master Settlement Agreement).
110. See W. Kip Viscusi, A Postmortem on the Cigarette Settlement, 29 CuMB. L. REv. 523, 523-24
(1999) (discussing the difference between the Proposed Settlement and the Master Settlement
Agreement). The text of the Master Settlement Agreement is available at http://www.naag.org.
111. See Viscusi, supra note 110, at 539 (noting the terms of the agreement).
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However, the settlement did not purport to affect lawsuits that might be brought
against the tobacco industry by individuals.112 In addition to the $206 billion to
be paid to the states, the tobacco companies also made a commitment to spend
$1.5 billion over five years to finance an anti-smoking education and advertising
campaign.1 13 Furthermore, the tobacco industry agreed to contribute $250
million over ten years to fund a foundation to reduce youth smoking.11 4 Finally,
the tobacco companies were required to pay the private attorneys who
represented the states $750 million per year for the first five years and $500
million per year thereafter forever.
11 5
The settlement also contained restrictions on the advertising and marketing
of tobacco products. For example, the settlement prohibited advertising and
marketing practices that targeted underage consumers. It also banned the use of
cartoon characters such as "Joe Camel." In addition, the tobacco companies
agreed to eliminate advertising on taxis, buses, and billboards. Furthermore, the
settlement outlawed sponsorship of concerts and sporting events, as well as the
use of company logos on clothing and other merchandise.
116
6. The 1999 Justice Department Lawsuit
President Clinton, in his 1999 State of the Union address, announced that
the federal government intended to sue the tobacco industry in order to recoup
some of the smoking-related health costs paid for by federal health care
programs such as Medicare. 117 A few months later, on September 21, 1999, the
United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") filed suit against the leading
tobacco companies and tobacco-related organizations in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia.1
8 The Government alleged that
since 1953 tobacco companies had conspired to mislead consumers about the
health risks of smoking.119 The Government sought damages for past and future
smoking-related health care expenditures and also sought equitable relief that
would have required the tobacco companies to disgorge its "unjust profits."'
20
The Government based its claim for damages and equitable relief on three
federal statutes, the Medical Care Recovery Act ("MCRA"),
121 the Medical
112. See DeBow, supra note 54, at 569 (noting this difference between the Master Settlement
Agreement and the 1997 settlement proposal).
113. Id. at 568.
114. Viscusi, supra note 110, at 539-40.
115. See DeBow, supra note 54, at 568 (listing the payments due to attorneys who represented
the states).
116. Id. at 569.
117. Jonathan Turley, A Crisis of Faith: Tobacco and the Madisonian Democracy, 37 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 433,457-58 (2000).
118. See United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D. D.C. 2000) (granting in part
and denying in part the tobacco companies' motions to dismiss). The government's original complaint,
dated Sept. 22,1999, is available at http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/cases/tobacco2/complain.pdf.
119. United States v. Philip Morris, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 134-35.
120. Id. at 138.
121. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-53 (2000).
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Secondary Payer Provision of the Social Security Act ("MSP"), 122 and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). 123 MCRA
permits the federal government to sue tortfeasors to recover the cost of treating
injured military personnel. 124 The trial court dismissed the MCRA claim
because it concluded that Congress did not intend this statute to authorize the
federal government to recover Medicare costs. 125 MSP allows the federal
government to sue health insurance companies, health care providers, and health
care recipients to recover health care costs that were paid by the government but
which should have been paid by the insurer. 26 - The trial court also dismissed the
government's MSP claim.127 Although this statute allows suits against ."non-
insurance entities," the court observed that this provision only applies to entities
which made payments under a formal "self-insured plan.' 128  The court
concluded that the defendants did not have self-insured plans and that payments
made pursuant to tort liability did not meet this statutory requirement. 129
The Government also asserted a RICO claim against the tobacco
companies, claiming that they had engaged in a pattern of mail and wire fraud in
order to conceal the health risks of smoking.' 30 The tobacco companies
acknowledged that some of their activities might have violated the provisions of
RICO, but disputed whether the court could order them to disgorge any profits
based on these alleged RICO violations.' 3' The tobacco companies argued that
disgorgement and injunctive relief were not necessary to prevent future RICO
violations because they had already agreed in the Master Settlement Agreement
to foreswear such conduct in the future.132 The trial court, however, ruled that
the government should be allowed to prove its case at trial and, therefore,
refused to dismiss the RICO claim.133
As the case proceeded, disgorgement remained a central point of
contention between the parties. The government made its disgorgement claim
more specific and sought to recover $280 billion that it alleged represented the
proceeds from cigarette sales made to the "youth addicted population" between
1971 and 2001.134 In 2004, after discovery was completed, the defendants moved
to dismiss the government's disgorgement claim. 135 The defendants argued that
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1
3 9 5
y (2000).
123. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2000); Dawson, supra note 26, at 1736.
124. Dawson, supra note 26, at 1737.
125. Philip Morris, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 138-44.
126. Dawson, supra note 26, at 1739.
127. Philip Morris, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 135.
128. Id at 135, 144-46.
129. Id. at 145-46.
130. Id at 136-38. See infra Part II.E for a discussion of the RICO laws.
131. Philip Morris, 116 F. Supp.2d at 147.
132. Id at 148.
133. Id at 151-52.
134. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 72, 74 (D. D.C. 2004), rev'd, 396
F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
135. Philip Morris, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 73-74.
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the economic model, which the government relied on to calculate the $280
billion disgorgement claim, was flawed because it failed to distinguish between
ill-gotten gains, which are subject to disgorgement under section 1964(a) of the
RICO statute,136 and legitimate profits, which are not.
137 The defendants also
contended that the holding in United States v. Carson
138 provided that only ill-
gotten gains that were being used "to fund or promote the illegal conduct, or
constitute capital available for that purpose" are subject to disgorgement.
139
However, the trial court concluded that Carson's limitation on the scope of
disgorgement is not consistent with section 1964(a) or the purposes of RICO.
1 40
The court also held that the accuracy of the government's economic model was a
question of fact that should be decided at trial.
141 Consequently, the court
denied the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment.
142
However, the defendants brought an interlocutory appeal and persuaded
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to
dismiss the disgorgement claim in February 2005.143 The circuit court rejected
the government's claim that section 1964(a) contains a broad grant of equitable
jurisdiction that includes the remedy of disgorgement and concluded that section
1964(a) only gives the courts such equitable powers as are necessary to prevent
future violations of RICO. 144  According to the court, remedies such as
divestment, injunctions against future criminal activity, and dissolution of the
enterprise are designed to prevent future wrongdoing.
145 Disgorgement, on the
other hand, is measured by the amount of prior unlawful gains and is awarded
regardless of whether the defendant is likely to commit other unlawful acts in the
future.146  Therefore, the court reasoned, disgorgement is "aimed at and
measured by past conduct.' 47
The circuit court also determined that disgorgement is not within RICO's
statutory grant of jurisdiction, nor any necessary implication of the language of
that statute. 148 In addition, the court pointed out that since RICO already
provides for a comprehensive set of remedies, it is unlikely that Congress
intended to authorize the courts to create additional ones.
149 Finally, the court
declared that disgorgement was an inappropriate remedy because it acts like a
criminal forfeiture penalty, but deprives the defendants of the benefit of the
136. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2000).
137. Philip Morris, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
138. 52 F.3d 1173 (2d Cir. 1995).
139. Philip Morris, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 74 (citing Carson, 52 F.3d at 1182).
140. Id. at 76-81.
141. Id. at 81-82.
142. Id. at 82.
143. United States v. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005).




148. Id. at 1199-1200.
149. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1200.
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shorter statute of limitations and the higher standard of proof required for a
criminal conviction. 150 For these reasons, the appeals court concluded that the
government's disgorgement claim should have been dismissed.
B. Suits Against Handgun Manufacturers
Encouraged by the states' success against the tobacco industry, 15t a number
of local governments brought suit against gun manufacturers to recover for gun-
related expenses. 152 The plaintiffs included New Orleans, Chicago, Bridgeport,
Miami-Dade County, Atlanta, Camden County, Philadelphia, Cleveland,
Cincinnati, Gary, Newark, San Francisco, Los Angeles, St. Louis, Seattle, St.
Paul, Minneapolis, and Detroit.15 3 Apparently, the plaintiffs thought that the
gun manufacturers would follow the lead of the tobacco industry and settle these
cases quickly. Instead, the handgun manufacturers chose to mount a determined
legal defense. So far, the results have been decidedly mixed.
1. New Orleans
The City of New Orleans brought the first suit in October 1998,154 suing
fifteen gun manufacturers, five local pawnshops, and three firearms trade
associations for the costs of police protection, emergency services, medical care,
lost tax revenue, and other losses attributable to gun-related violence. 155
Although the suit was brought in the City's name, it was actually financed and
litigated by the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence and by a group of trial
lawyers associated with the Castano Group. 156
In its complaint, the City alleged that the defendants' handguns were
defectively designed because they did not have locking devices to prevent
children from using them. 157 The City also claimed that handgun manufacturers
150. Id. at 1200-01.
151. Brent W. Landau, Note, State Bans on City Gun Lawsuits, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 623, 624
(2000). For a discussion of state suits against tobacco companies and the resulting settlements, see
Dagan & White, supra note 106, at 363-73. See also Fridy, supra note 20, at 240-55 (discussing the
success of several states in lawsuits against tobacco companies).
152. See generally Frank J. Vandall, O.K. Corral 11: Policy Issues in Municipal Suits Against Gun
Manufacturers, 44 VILL L. REV. 547 (1999) (analyzing economic and causation policy issues in cities'
suits against gun manufacturers); Doug Morgan, Comment, What in the Wide, Wide World of Torts Is
Going On? First Tobacco, Now Guns: An Examination of Hamilton v. Accu-Tek and the Cities'
Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry, 69 Miss. L.J. 521 (1999) (discussing a 1999 verdict against fifteen
gun manufacturers and the recent surge in similar lawsuits).
153. Jon S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, New Courtroom Strategies Regarding Firearms: Tort
Litigation Against Firearm Manufacturers and Additional Constitutional Challenges to Gun Laws, 36
Hous. L. REV. 1713, 1745-46 (1999); Morgan, supra note 152, at 533-37.
154. Landau, supra note 151, at 624-25.
155. Morgan, supra note 152, at 528-29.
156. H. Sterling Burnett, Suing Gun Manufacturers: Hazardous to Our Health, 5 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 433, 441 (2001); Brian J. Siebel, City Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Roadmap for
Reforming Gun Industry Misconduct, 18 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 247,263 (1999).
157.' Landau, supra note 151, at 625.
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failed to develop technology to "personalize" firearms so that they could not be
used by unauthorized persons. 158  Furthermore, the City argued that gun
manufacturers failed to warn consumers that a round might still be in a pistol's
chamber even though the magazine had been removed.
15 9
Shortly after suit was filed, the Louisiana state legislature passed a law
prohibiting municipalities from bringing claims against gun manufacturers or
dealers based on the design, manufacture, marketing, or sale of firearms.
16°
Another statute was subsequently enacted that declared that the manufacture of
firearms was not "unreasonably dangerous." 161  The City challenged the
constitutionality of these statutes, but its claim was rejected by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp.162 This effectively put an end
to the City's lawsuit.
2. Chicago
A few weeks after the New Orleans suit was filed, the City of Chicago
(along with Cook County) sued twenty-two gun manufacturers, twelve suburban
retail gun stores, and four distributors.163 The City sought $433 million for
police, medical, and welfare costs, as well as lost tax revenue, which they claimed
resulted from handgun-related violence. 164 The government plaintiffs also
sought to enjoin the defendants from engaging in activities which facilitated the
flow of illegal firearms into the Chicago area.
165
The City claimed that the defendants by their actions knowingly and
deliberately created a public nuisance in the City and in Cook County.
166
Specifically, the City alleged that the defendants knowingly designed,
manufactured, marketed, supplied, and distributed handguns in order to
facilitate their transport, sale, and use in Chicago in violation of the City's
restrictive gun ownership laws and enabling a black market in illegal firearms to
flourish in the City.' 67 The City also claimed that the defendants' advertising
emphasized features, such as destructive power, concealability, and resistance to
fingerprints, that were likely to appeal to gang members and other potential
criminals.
168
158. Jill R. Baniewicz, Note, Is Hamilton v. Accu-Tek a Good Predictor of What the Future Holds
for Gun Manufacturers?, 34 IND. L. REV. 419,437 (2001).
159. Morgan, supra note 152, at 529-30.
160. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1799 (West 2001).
161. Id. § 9:2800.60 (West Supp. 2005).
162. 785 So. 2d 1 (La. 2001).
163. Morgan, supra note 152, at 530.
164. Vandall, supra note 152 at 549.
165. John G. Culhane & Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Defining a Proper Role for Public Nuisance
Law in Municipal Suits Against Gun Sellers: Beyond Rhetoric and Expedience, 52 S.C. L. REV. 287,322
(2001).
166. Note, Recovering the Costs of Public Nuisance Abatement: The Public and Private City Sue
the Gun Industry, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1521, 1521 (2000).
167. Morgan, supra note 152, at 531-32.
168. Burnett, supra note 156, at 445.
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The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. 169 The court
apparently felt that the City should not be allowed to rely almost entirely on
statistical data to establish its public nuisance claim. 170 In addition, the court
suggested that the City might reduce the costs of gun-related violence by
enforcing its existing criminal laws more vigorously. 171 However, in November
2002, the public nuisance claim was reinstated by a state intermediate appellate
court.
172
The appellate court observed that the public possessed a right "to be free
from unreasonable jeopardy to it's [sic] health, welfare and safety," which the
City alleged was threatened by the defendants' conduct. 17 3 The court also
declared that a jury could conclude that the marketing practices of the
defendants unreasonably interfered with this right. 174 In addition, the court
rejected the defendants' assertion that they could not be held liable for harm
caused by the criminal misuse of its products. 175 Finally, the court held that the
defendants were subject to liability even though their activities were not
unlawful.
176
This decision, however, was reversed in November 2004 by the Illinois
Supreme Court. 177 In a unanimous opinion, the court declared that there is no
public right to be free from the threat of illegal conduct by others. 178 It also
observed that handgun manufacturers and distributors were engaged in a lawful,
and heavily regulated, activity and were not guilty of negligence. 179
Consequently, the court reasoned, even if a public right exists, the handgun
manufacturers and distributors had not unreasonably interfered with it.180 The
court acknowledged that the City's public nuisance claim was stronger against
retail gun dealers. 18' The court, however, found that the City had failed to
establish "proximate cause," which it defined as cause-in-fact and legal cause. 1' 2
In addition, the court concluded that the City's damage claim against these
defendants was barred by the economic loss rule 183 and the municipal cost
169. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98 CH 15596 (Il1. Cir. Ct. Sept. 15, 2000)




172 City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 785 N.E.2d 16, 31 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), rev'd, City of
Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Il1. 2004).
173. Chicago v. Beretta, 785 N.E.2d at 25.
174. Id. at 25-26.
175. Id at 26-27.
176. Id at 27-30.
177. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Il. 2004).
178. Chicago v. Beretta, 821 N.E.2d at 1126.
179. Id at 1124-25.
180. Id at 1116-27.
181. Id at 1127.
18Z Id
183. Chicago v. Beretta, 821 N.E.2d at 1139-43.
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On January 27, 1999, the City of Bridgeport, Connecticut filed suit against
thirty-five handgun manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and trade
associations. 185 In its complaint, the City set forth nine claims upon which
liability could be predicated. The first count was based on the Connecticut
Product Liability Act.186 The City contended that defendant manufacturers
failed to utilize existing technology to produce self-locking or childproof
handguns and, as a consequence of this failure, many citizens were killed or
injured by unauthorized handgun users. 187 In addition, the City alleged that the
gun manufacturers failed to warn consumers about the risk that minors could
gain access to handguns if they were not stored properly and that they failed to
inform consumers that some pistols could be fired even when the magazine was
removed. 188
The second count charged the defendants with unfair and deceptive
advertising in violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act
("CUTPA"). 189 The City contended that firearms manufacturers falsely claimed
that consumers could make their homes safer by purchasing handguns when in
fact such weapons actually increased the risk of injury in the home from
homicides, suicides, and accidents. 19° The City's third count, also based on
violation of CUTPA, alleged that the defendants engaged in unfair and
deceptive sales practices by selling excessive numbers of handguns, knowing that
many of them will be sold illegally and used to commit crimes.
191 The fourth
count was based on common-law public nuisance and declared that the
defendants' conduct contributed to the flow of illegal handguns into Bridgeport,
thereby causing injury to its citizens and their property.
192 The fifth count
alleged that gun manufacturers negligently failed to design safer products, that
they failed to provide adequate warnings and directions about handgun safety,
and that their advertisements induced consumers to think that handgun
possession would increase safety in the home.
193
Count six charged that the defendants manufactured and distributed more
handguns throughout the nation than they could have reasonably expected to be
acquired legally, thus creating, maintaining and supplying the illegal market for
184. Id. at 1143-47.
185. Morgan, supra note 152, at 532-33.
186. CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-572 (West Supp. 2004).
187. Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 112 (Conn. 2001).
188. Ganim, 780 A.2d at 112.
189. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-110a - 42-110q (West 2000).
190. Ganim, 780 A.2d at 112-13.
191. Id. at 113.
192 Id
193. Id. at 115.
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handguns. 194  In its seventh count, the City claimed that the manufacturers
conspired to violate the Products Liability Act and CUTPA, and to create a
public nuisance, by failing to design safe handguns, by failing to instruct about
handgun safety, by failing to warn about the risks of handgun ownership, and by
failing to prevent illegal handgun sales by retailers. 195 The eighth count alleged
that retailers conspired with criminals to promote illegal gun sales in the
Bridgeport area. 196 Finally, count nine claimed that the defendants had been
unjustly enriched at the City's expense as a result of its unlawful conduct. 197
The City sought compensatory damages to reimburse itself for the costs of
medical care, police investigations, emergency personnel, health care, human
resources, lost revenue, and other costs associated with illegal gun use. 198 The
City also requested punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and injunctive relief,
including a prohibition against distributing handguns without adequate safety
features and warnings, a ban on deceptive advertising, and an order requiring the
defendants implement measures to reduce the illegal secondary handgun market
in the Bridgeport area and requiring them to fund studies and programs on
handgun safety.199
The trial court dismissed the case for lack of standing2°° and this ruling was
affirmed by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Ganim v. Smith & Wesson
Corp.201 Relying on Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc.20 2 and Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,203 the court concluded
that the City could not recover for the economic costs of gun-related injuries
suffered by Bridgeport residents.2°4 Specifically, the court found that: (1) the
City's injuries were remote and indirect; (2) allowing the City to recover would
require the court to adopt complicated apportionment rules to prevent multiple
recoveries against the defendants; and (3) those who were directly harmed by
gun-related violence were more appropriate parties to litigate the issues raised
by the City in its lawsuit.20 5
4. Miami-Dade County
In January 1999, Miami-Dade County brought suit against twenty-six
194. Id. at 115-16.
195. Ganim, 780 A.2d at 116.
196. Id. at 116-17.
197. Id. at 117.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Ganim, 780 A.2d at 101-02.
201. Id. at 134.
202. 191 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff labor union, alleging conspiracy to defraud
the public, had no standing to sue tobacco companies).
203. 503 U.S. 258 (1992) (finding action was not supported under RICO because harm suffered
by plaintiff bore no connection to acts of defendant).
204. Ganim, 780 A.2d at 121.
205. Id. at 124-26.
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handgun manufacturers, three trade associations, and two retail dealers, seeking
to recover the costs it sustained as a result of gun-related violence.
2°6 The
County based its claim on theories of negligence, products liability, public
nuisance, and engaging in an ultra-hazardous activity.20 7 However, the trial court
dismissed the County's lawsuit and this ruling was affirmed by an intermediate
appellate court in February 2001.208
The appellate court rejected the negligence and product liability claims
because the County did not allege that the defendants' handguns were
defective. 20 9 The court also rejected the ultra-hazardous activity claim because
the defendants' conduct did not involve activities on their land which created a
high risk of harm to neighboring landowners.210 Finally, the court refused to
declare the sale of handguns to be a public nuisance, observing that the County
was trying to assume regulatory powers under the guise of abating a public
nuisance that had already been vested exclusively in the state by statute.
211
5. Atlanta
On February 4, 1999, the City of Atlanta filed an action against various gun
manufacturers, distributors, and trade associations. 212 The City contended that
the defendants' products were defective because they lacked adequate warnings
and safety devices.213 Shortly after this suit was filed, the Georgia Legislature
amended the state firearms regulation statute to prohibit lawsuits against gun
manufacturers, retail firearms sellers, and trade associations by any government
entity other than the state itself.214 The statute expressly applied to pending, as
well as future, lawsuits.215 Relying on this provision, the defendants sought writs
of mandamus and prohibition to prevent the trial court from hearing the case.
216
However, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the defendants were not entitled
to such extraordinary relief and must make use of the ordinary appeal process to
determine whether the statute precluded the City from proceeding with its
lawsuit.
217
206. Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., 778 So. 2d 1042, 1043-44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
207. Penelas, 778 So. 2d at 1044.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1044-45.
211. Id. at 1045.
212. Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 543 S.E.2d 16,18 (Ga. 2001).
213. Morgan, supra note 152, at 535-36.
214. See Smith & Wesson v. Atlanta, 543 S.E.2d at 18 (discussing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-184
(WESTLAW through end of the 2004 First Special Session)).
215. Id. (citing 1999 Ga. Laws, p. 2, §3 (not codified by the legislature) which provides that the
1999 amendment is applicable to any actions pending or brought on or after Feb. 9, 1999).
216. Id. at 19.
217. Id. at 20.
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6. Cleveland
The City of Cleveland filed suit in state court on April 15, 1999, against
various handgun manufacturers and trade associations. 218 The City's claims
included: (1) a design defect claim under Ohio's Products Liability Act;219 (2) a
common-law claim based on defective design; (3) a failure-to-warn claim under
the Ohio Products Liability Act;220 (4) an unjust enrichment claim; (5) a nuisance
abatement claim based on a municipal ordinance; (6) a common-law public
nuisance claim; and (7) a negligence claim against the trade association
defendants.221 Shortly thereafter, the defendants removed the case to a federal
district and moved to dismiss the complaint because the City's claims were
inconsistent with public policy, invalid under state law, and inconsistent with the
United States Constitution.2 22 However, in March, 2000, the federal district
court refused to dismiss the complaint. 223
The defendants contended that it would violate "public policy" if the case
went forward because the court would be forced to make judgments about the
production, design, and marketing of handguns that were essentially legislative
in nature.224 However, the court rejected this argument, declaring that it was not
"legislating," but instead merely enforcing existing state laws that were
applicable to all products. 225 The court employed similar reasoning to counter
the defendants' claim that the City's lawsuit constituted an attempt to regulate a
national industry in a manner that violated the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution. 226 In response, the court pointed out that the Commerce Clause
does not prohibit the City from protecting its legal interests just because the
defendants sold their products in a national market.227
The defendants also maintained that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that
their claims were barred by the "firefighter's rule. ' '228 As far as standing was
concerned, the court determined that the City met the constitutional
requirements because it had suffered a concrete and particularized injury, this
injury was traceable to the defendants' conduct, and the City's injury could be
redressed by a favorable decision of the court.229 Furthermore, the court held
218. White v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 816,819 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
219. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75 (Anderson 2001).
220. Id. § 2307.76.
221. White, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 819.
222. Id at 820.
223. Id. at 819.
224. Id. at 820-21.
225. See id at 821 (noting the application of products liability law to a wide range of products and
rejecting contention that the regulation of firearms exempts them from these laws).
226. See White, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 829-30 (indicating that the plaintiffs do not seek to enact new
regulations, but rather allege that the product is defective and unreasonably dangerous).
227. See id. at 829-30 (noting that products liability claims against firearms manufacturers are not
unique in their national scope and do not violate the Constitution).
228. Id. at 821-23. See Part III.E. infra for a discussion of the firefighter's rule and a related
doctrine, the municipal cost recovery rule.
229. Id. at 823-25.
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that while the firefighter's rule prohibits claims against landowners by municipal
employees, it does not bar claims by government entities against product
sellers.
230
The court concluded that the City was entitled to go to trial on each of its
substantive claims. The court disagreed with the defendants' assertion that the
City's claims were prohibited by the state products liability statute because they
sought to hold handgun manufacturers liable on an industry-wide, market share,
or alternative liability basis. 231 The court also rejected the defendants' argument
that City's lawsuit should be dismissed because -it sought to recover for purely
economic losses.232  The court concluded that dismissal on this basis was
improper because the City claimed that it suffered physical damage, as well as
economic losses, as a result of the defendants' actions.233 In addition, the court
refused to accept the defendant's proposition that it owed no duty of care to the
City.234 Furthermore, the court upheld the City's unjust enrichment claim on the
theory that the defendants benefited from expenditures by the City to pay for
the costs of handgun violence. 235 Finally, the court concluded that the City's
public nuisance claim would be allowed if it could prove that the defendants
negligently created the nuisance conditions.
236
7. Cincinnati
On April 28, 1999, the City of Cincinnati sued fifteen handgun
manufacturers, one distributor, and three trade associations in state court.
237 In
its complaint, the City invoked various theories of liability, including public
nuisance, negligent marketing, products liability, fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, unfair and deceptive advertising, and unjust enrichment.
238
The City sought injunctive relief as well as reimbursement for the increased
police, emergency services, health, and correction costs that resulted from
handgun violence.239 The trial court dismissed the City's complaint and an
intermediate appellate court affirmed its decision.24° However, in June 2002, a
230. See White, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 822-23 (distinguishing between prohibiting claims by individual
firefighters and police officers and the rule proposed by defendants that would prohibit any recovery
for the cost of governmental functions).
231. See id at 826-27 (indicating that plaintiffs allegations that each manufacturer makes and
distributes defective products differs from an argument for market share liability).
232. Id. at 828.
233. d.
234. See id. at 828-29 (indicating that it is for the jury to decide whether a plaintiff falls within the
defendant's duty of care).
235. See White, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 829 (stating that the allegations are sufficient for that stage of
the proceedings).
236. See id (noting that nuisance claims will "rise or fall" with negligence claims).
237. City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1140 (Ohio 2002).
238. Cincinnati v. Beretta, 768 N.E.2d at 1140 & n. 1. The City eventually abandoned the last
four theories in its complaint. Id.
239. Id. at 1140.
240. Md at 1140-41.
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closely-divided Ohio Supreme Court reinstated the City's lawsuit.24
Relying on the Restatement's broad definition of nuisance, 242 the court
upheld the City's public nuisance claim even though no injury to real property
was involved.243 Rejecting the narrower definition suggested by the defendants,
the court declared that "a public nuisance action can be maintained for injuries
caused by a product if the facts establish that the design, manufacturing,
marketing, or sale of the product unreasonably interferes with a right common to
the general public. ' '244 The court also rejected the defendants' contention that
they could not be held liable for public nuisance because they had no control
over their products when harm to the public occurred.245
The Ohio Supreme Court also upheld the City's negligence count. This
portion of the complaint alleged that the defendants had failed to exercise
reasonable care in "designing, manufacturing, marketing, advertising, promoting,
distributing, supplying, and selling their firearms. '246 This was essentially a
"negligent marketing" claim based on the assumption that the defendants'
marketing practices substantially contributed to the maintenance of an illegal
firearms market in the Cincinnati area.247 The intermediate appellate court had
declared that in the absence of a "special relationship," the defendants owed no
duty to protect the City against the criminal acts of third parties. 248 The Ohio
Supreme Court, on the other hand, concluded that the "special relationship" rule
was inapplicable because the City's charge was not that the defendants failed to
control the acts of third parties, but that they had committed various affirmative
acts in order to promote a market for illegal firearms. 249 Finally, the Ohio
Supreme Court ruled that the City could maintain negligence-based design
defect and failure-to-warn actions to recover for economic losses even though
such claims cannot be brought on a strict liability basis under the Ohio Products
Liability Act.250
8. Camden County
On June 1, 1999, the governing body of Camden County, New Jersey, filed
suit against twenty-one gun manufacturers and one distributor, alleging public
nuisance, negligent entrustment, and negligent marketing and distribution. 251
241. Id. at 1141.
242. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1).
243. Cincinnati v. Beretta, 768 N.E.2d at 1142.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1143 (indicating the creation of the alleged nuisance is a potential basis for liability).
246. Id. at 1144.
247. For a discussion of negligent marketing, see Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for the Sale
of Non-Defective Products: An Analysis and Critique of the Concept of Negligent Marketing, 53 S.C. L.
REV. 907 (2002).
248. Cincinnati v. Beretta, 768 N.E.2d at 1144.
249. Id.
250. See id. at 1146-47 (stating that common law claims for negligent design had survived the
enactment of the statutory scheme).
251. Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 245,
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Specifically, the County claimed that the defendants were facilitating illegal
handgun sales in Camden County by producing, marketing, and distributing
firearms in the area far in excess of the legitimate needs of the local
population. 252 The County sought damages for the cost of handgun-related
violence, punitive damages for the defendants' intentional and reckless conduct,
and an injunction to require the defendants to change their marketing and
distribution practices.253  The trial court, however, granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss.
254
On appeal, the County abandoned its other claims and relied solely on
public nuisance.255 In an opinion issued in November, 2001, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that the distribution of non-defective
products, lawfully placed into the stream of commerce, is not a public nuisance
under existing principles of state law.256 Furthermore, the court declared that
even if it were willing to expand public nuisance law beyond its traditional limits,
it would not do so in this instance because there was no evidence that the
defendants had any control over the actions of independent third parties whose
criminal conduct actually interfered with the rights of the public. 2
57 Accordingly,
the court affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
258
9. Philadelphia
In April 2000, the City of Philadelphia and five civic organizations brought
suit in state court against fourteen gun manufacturers alleging public nuisance,
negligence, and negligent entrustment. 259 The City sought to recover the costs of
criminal justice administration, police activities, emergency medical services, and
educational programs to the extent that these costs were attributable to
handgun-related violence. 26° The case was removed at the defendants' behest to
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania where it was
dismissed in December 2000.261 The district court concluded that none of the
plaintiffs' claims was valid.262 The court also ruled that the organizational
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue26 3 and that state law barred the city from suing
gun manufacturers.
264
249-50 & n.3 (D.N.J. 2000).
252. Camden v. Beretta, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 251.
253. Id. at 252.
254. Id at 267-68.
255. Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 538 (3d
Cir. 2001).
256. Camden v. Beretta, 273 F.3d at 540.
257. Id. at 541.
258. Id at 542.
259. City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415,419 (3d Cir. 2002).
260. Philadelphia v. Beretta, 277 F.3d at 419.
261. City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882,886-87 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
262. Philadelphia v. Beretta, 126 F. Supp. 2d. at 911.
263. Id at 896.
264. See id. at 889 (citing The Uniform Firearm Act, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6101 et seq.).
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On appeal, the Third Circuit rejected all of the plaintiffs' substantive claims.
In its review of the public nuisance claim, the court concluded that conventional
doctrine does not provide any basis for holding manufacturers of lawful, non-
defective products liable for interference with public rights caused by remote
purchasers of these products. 265 Furthermore, the court stated that a federal
court should not expand state law doctrines in the absence of supporting
decisions from state courts. 266 The court also rejected the plaintiffs' negligence
and negligent entrustment claims on proximate cause grounds because it
concluded that the alleged injuries were too far removed from the actions of the
defendants. 267 Finally, the court declared that gun manufacturers had no legal
duty to protect victims from illegal acts by third parties.268
10. Newark
In 1999, the City of Newark, New Jersey, brought suit against a group of
handgun manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and trade organizations. The
nine-count complaint alleged, inter alia, defective design, failure to warn,
negligent marketing, public nuisance, unjust enrichment, and violation of the
New Jersey Products Liability Act.269 The trial court dismissed the City's strict
liability and unjust enrichment claims, but allowed the negligence and public
nuisance claims to go forward.270
In 2003, the trial court's decision was affirmed by the appellate division of
the New Jersey Superior Court.271 The appellate court considered whether the
defendants could be held liable for maintaining a public nuisance even though
handgun sales did not involve an unreasonable use of real property, cause harm
to real property, or violate a statute or ordinance.272 The court also discussed
proximate cause, standing, and duty issues,273 as well as the potential
applicability of the municipal cost recovery rule.2 74 Relying on the Restatement
of Torts,275 the court concluded that an activity that causes physical or economic
harm to numbers of the public might constitute a public nuisance even though it
does not interfere with the use or enjoyment of private property.276 The court
also rejected the defendants' proximate cause argument, concluding that there
was a sufficient causal link between the handgun sellers' marketing practices and
265. See Philadelphia v. Beretta, 277 F.3d at 420-21 (indicating that public nuisance claims
traditionally encompass only interference connected with real property or public rights).
266. Id at 421.
267. 1d at 426.
268. Id. at 425.
269. James v. Arms Tech. Inc., 820 A.2d 27,34 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
270. James, 820 A.2d at 34.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 50-51.
273. See generally id. at 37-47.
274. See generally id. at 48-49.
275. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. h (1979).
276. James, 820 A.2d at 50.
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the continued existence of an illegal market for firearms
2 7 7 Furthermore, the
court determined that the defendants owed a duty to the City, notwithstanding
the absence of a special relationship between them.
2 78 Finally, the New Jersey
court declined to shield the defendants from liability under the municipal cost
recovery rule.279 In the court's view, the risk spreading policies that justify
insulating tortfeasors from liability for one-time accidents does not apply to
continuing activities that impose long-term costs on government entities.
2 80
11. Gary
In September 1999, the City of Gary, Indiana, brought suit against eleven
handgun manufacturers, one wholesaler, five retailers, and a number of "John
Doe" defendants in each of these three categories, seeking both damages and
injunctive relief.281 The City based its claim on public nuisance, negligent
marketing, deceptive advertising, and negligent design.
2  The City alleged that
these activities increased violent crimes and required it to pay more for crime-
related expenditures. 283 The complaint sought compensatory and punitive
damages, as well as injunctive relief.
2 4  The trial court dismissed the City's
complaint.2 85 The intermediate appellate court affirmed the lower court's
holding with respect to the negligence claims, but upheld the City's public
nuisance claim against retail dealers.
286 In December 2003, the Indiana Supreme
Court upheld the City's public nuisance claim, reinstated its negligent marketing
claim against the defendants, and held that the City could proceed with its
negligent design claim against the handgun manufacturers.
287
12. New York State
Although almost all of the government plaintiffs in the handgun lawsuits
were municipalities or counties, some states have recently begun to show an
interest in suing handgun manufacturers. For example, the Attorney General of
New York brought statutory and common law public nuisance actions against
handgun manufacturers in People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.
288 When
the trial court dismissed both claims, the state dropped the statutory nuisance
277. See id. at 37-44 (noting the relationship between the alleged practices of the defendants,
criminal use of guns, and harm to the city).
278. Id. at 47.
279. Id. at 49.
280. Id at 48-49.
281. City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1227-28 (Ind. 2003).
282. Gary v. Smith & Wesson, 801 N.E.2d at 1228.
283. Id at 1228.
284. Id.
285. Id at 1228-29.
286. City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 776 N.E.2d 368, 384,388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
287. Gary v. Smith & Wesson, 801 N.E.2d at 1249.
288. 761 N.Y.S. 2d 192,194 (App. Div. 2003).
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claim, but appealed the dismissal of its common law claim.289
As in other cases, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, by their design,
marketing, and distribution choices, knowingly supplied the illegal handgun
market, thereby increasing the number of firearms in criminal hands. 29°
Furthermore, the state contended that the defendants had the power to reduce
the black market, and the resulting harm from illegal handguns, by altering their
business practices.291 The State did not seek money damages, but rather sought
to compel the defendants to abate the alleged nuisance by changing the design
and marketing of their handguns.292
Relying on Hamilton v. Beretta USA Corp.,293 a negligent marketing case,294
the court rejected the state's claim that trace requests from the federal Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms ("BATF") would have informed the defendants
that their marketing policies were facilitating criminal activities. 295 The court
also held that the defendants did not owe a duty to the community at large to
market its products in a way that would minimize access to handguns by
criminals. 296 Next, the court determined that the manufacture and sale of
handguns by the defendants was not the proximate cause of harm to the public
caused by the criminal conduct of third parties. 297
In addition, the court concluded that common law public nuisance law
should not be expanded in order to cope with social problems like handgun
violence that could be addressed more efficiently by the executive and legislative
branches of government. 298 Finally, the court expressed concern that:
[G]iving a green light to a common-law public nuisance cause of
action today will, in our judgment, likely open the courthouse doors
to a flood of limitless, similar theories of public nuisance, not only
against these defendants, but also against a wide and varied array of
other commercial and manufacturing enterprises and activities. 299
Consequently, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of the state's common law public nuisance suit.a°  Late in 2003, the
New York Court of Appeals denied the state's request to review this decision.30 1
289. Spitzer, 761 N.Y.2d at 194.
290. Id. at 199.
291. Id
292. Id. at 194.
293. 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001).
294. Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d at 1059. For a discussion of the Hamilton case, see Ausness, supra
note 247, at 924-30.
295. Spitzer, 761 N.Y.S. 2d at 199-200.
296. Id at 200-01.
297. Id at 201.
298. Id at 202-04.
299. Id at 196.
300. Spitzer, 761 N.Y.S. 2d at 204.
301. People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 801 N.E.2d 421 (N.Y. 2003).
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13. The Smith & Wesson Settlement
As in the tobacco litigation, the federal government waited in the weeds
during the early stages of the handgun litigation, but it eventually entered the
fray in December 1999, when the Secretary of the Department of Housing &
Urban Development ("HUD") announced that he would file a class action on
behalf of local housing authorities unless gun manufacturers agreed to greater
regulation.3° 2 In response to this threat, Smith & Wesson entered into a
settlement agreement with HUD and a number of federal, state, and municipal
plaintiffs on March 17, 2000.303 Under the terms of the settlement, Smith &
Wesson agreed to redesign its handguns in order to make it more difficult for
small children to fire them.3°4 Smith & Wesson also agreed to develop safety
locks for its handguns and to place a secret set of serial marks on them in order
to make it more difficult for criminals to hide a handgun's identity.
30 5 Finally,
Smith & Wesson promised to sell handguns only to dealers and distributors who
agreed to a code of conduct designed to prevent retail handgun sales to
unauthorized users.
3°6
C. Suits Against Lead Paint Manufacturers
Although the handgun litigation has not yet run its course, some
government entities have already shifted their attention to lead paint
manufacturers. 3°7 About fifteen years ago, individual plaintiffs and local public
housing authorities began to sue lead paint manufacturers for personal injuries
and economic losses caused by the exposure of children to lead paint in
buildings. 308 The plaintiffs in these cases alleged that paint manufacturers
302. See Dawson, supra note 26, at 1727 (stating that Secretary Coumo announced the proposed
HUD lawsuit to increase pressure on gun manufacturers to accept additional legislation).
303. See Burnett, supra note 156, at 481-82 (explaining why Smith & Wesson entered into an
agreement and what the agreement entailed).
304. Id.
305. Dawson, supra note 26, at 1748-49.
306. Burnett, supra note 156, at 482.
307. See Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L
REv. 741, 770-71 (2003) (stating that Rhode Island and a number of counties and municipalities have
moved on from gun-related law suits to lead paint law suits).
308. E.g., City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112, 129 (3d Cir. 1993) (dismissing
proposed nationwide class action by cities and public housing authorities against lead paint
manufacturers); Hurt v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 806 F. Supp. 515, 536-37 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (dismissing
proposed class action by Philadelphia public housing residents against lead paint companies); Santiago
v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 782 F. Supp. 186, 195 (D. Mass. 1992), affd, 3 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1993)
(personal injury claim against lead paint manufacturers dismissed); LeBlanc v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,
551 N.E.2d 30, 35-36 (Mass. 1990) (holding that Massachusetts housing courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction over cases involving lead paint poisoning); Christopher v. Duffy, 556 N.E.2d 121 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1990) (denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint to include additional lead paint
manufacturers as Defendants six years after the original wrongful death suit was filed); Jackson v.
Glidden Co., 647 N.E.2d 879, 881 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (holding plaintiff's claim that manufacturers of
lead paint committed tortious acts that injured children was properly dismissed by the lower court
judge); Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 690 A.2d 169, 174-75 (Pa. 1997) (rejecting attempt by personal
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conspired to conceal information from the public about the dangers of exposure
to lead-based paint in order to preserve the existing market for such products.30 9
According to industry sources, these lawsuits were uniformly unsuccessful. 31 0
Recently, however, paint manufacturers have been targeted by a new
barrage of lawsuits. For example, in September 1999, plaintiffs attorney Peter
Angelos filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of all Maryland residents whose
homes were painted with lead-based paint.3" However, a Baltimore trial court
judge dismissed the case in December 2001.312 Another potentially significant
case involves a claim by the City of New York, the New York City Housing
Authority, and the New York City Health & Hospitals Corporation to recover
the costs the City had incurred as the result of the presence of lead paint in
public housing projects.313 This case began in 1989 and has stalled in the courts
for more than ten years. Although the City has been forced to abandon many of
its claims, the case is apparently still active. 314
A number of other lawsuits have been dismissed at the trial court level. For
example, in County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,315 a California
superior court judge dismissed a lawsuit brought against lead paint
manufacturers by six counties, the cities of San Francisco and Oakland, various
housing authorities, school districts, and a local redevelopment agency.316 These
entities sought to recover for the cost of medical care, educational programs,
inspections, and abatement. 317 The court concluded that the plaintiffs' action
was barred by the statute of limitations. 3t8 A trial court also rejected the public
injury victim to invoke market share liability, alternative liability and concert of action theories in suit
against lead paint manufacturers).
309. Amber E. Dean, Comment, Lead Paint Public Entity Lawsuits: Has the Broad Stroke of
Tobacco and Firearms Litigation Painted a Troubling Picture for Lead Paint Manufacturers?, 28 PEPP.
L. REV. 915, 933 (2001) (stating that the Rhode Island complaint alleged that Sherwin-Williams had
knowledge of the danger of lead paint prior to the manufacturing of lead paint).
310. One industry Internet website declares that paint manufacturers did not lose or settle a
single lawsuit during this period. Understanding Lead Pigment Litigation, http://www.leadlawsuits.
com/ (last visited, Feb. 23,2005).
311. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., State Medical Reimbursement Lawsuits After Tobacco: Is the
Domino Effect for Lead Paint Manufacturers and Others Fair Game?, 27 PEPP. L. REv. 685, 691 (2000)
(noting that in 1999 Peter Angelos filed two lawsuits against the lead paint industry, one of which was
a class action lawsuit filed on behalf of Maryland homeowners that had lead paint in their homes).
312 See Understanding Lead Pigment Litigation, Lead Pigment Litigation Information by State:
Maryland, at http://www.leadlawsuits.com/infobystate-MD.htm (last visited Feb 23, 2005) (stating that
a Baltimore City circuit court judge had dismissed the lawsuit in Young v. Lead Industry Association).
313. City of New York v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 597 N.Y.S. 2d 698, 699 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
314. See City of New York v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 713 N.Y.S.2d 345, 345-46 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)
(granting partial summary judgment to Defendant American Cyanamid, but affirming ruling that
further discovery was needed for other claims).
315. See Understanding Lead Pigment Litigation, Lead Pigment Litigation Information by State:
California, at http:llwww.leadlawsuits.com/infobystateCA.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) (explaining
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nuisance theory in City of Chicago v. American Cyanamid Co. 3 19 In that case,
the City of Chicago brought a public nuisance claim against paint manufacturers,
seeking to require them to abate the alleged nuisance. 20 Affirming the trial
court's dismissal, the intermediate appellate court declared that the city had
321
failed to show that the defendants were the cause-in-fact of the nuisance. In
322
addition, the court held that the city also failed to prove proximate cause.
However, the plaintiff fared better in City of Milwaukee v. NL Industries.323 The
City contended that lead-based paint manufactured by the defendants created a
public nuisance and sought to make them pay for the costs of abatement. 324 The
trial court concluded that the City had not established that the defendants had
created a nuisance and, therefore, dismissed the case. 325  On appeal, an
intermediate appellate court held that there were disputed issues of causation
326
that had to be resolved at trial. The court also declared that lead paint was a
community-wide health threat that could be abated most effectively by a public
327nuisance action.
Perhaps the most significant public tort lawsuit against the lead paint
industry involves the State of Rhode Island. In October 1999, the Attorney
General of Rhode Island filed suit against eight paint manufacturers. 328 The
complaint sought damages to pay for the cost of caring for victims of lead
poisoning and for the cost of removing lead-based paint in homes.329 Rhode
Island based its liability claim on public nuisance, products liability,
misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment. 330 Not surprisingly,
Rhode Island is represented in this lawsuit by one of the law firms that was
involved in the tobacco litigation.331 Since the Rhode Island lawsuit was filed,
more than forty other government entities and organizations have brought
similar suits against paint manufacturers.
332
On April 2, 2001, the Court dismissed all product liability claims, the claim
for equitable relief to children, and the unfair trade practices claim for pre-1970
conduct.333 However, the court refused to dismiss the State's claims for public
319. 823 N.E.2d 126 (I1. Ct. App. 2005).
320. American Cyanamid, 823 N.E.2d at 129.
321. Id. at 134.
322. Id. at 136.
323. 691 N.W.2d 888 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004).
324. NL Industries, 691 N.W.2d at 890-91.
325. Id. at 890.
326. Id. at 890-91.
327. Id. at 890.
328. Dean, supra note 309, at 915.
329. Id. at 915-16
330. Id. at 915.
331. See Jensen, supra note 108, at 1365 (stating that the Rhode Island Attorney General hired a
plaintiffs' firm that had experience with the tobacco litigation to help in the lead paint litigation).
332. Molly McDonough, Poisoned by Paint, 88 A.B.A. J. 42, 44 (July 2002) (stating that over
forty cities, counties and organizations have filed suits similar to Rhode Island).
333. See Understanding Lead Pigment Litigation, Lead Pigment Litigation Information by State:
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nuisance, unjust enrichment, indemnity, unfair trade practices, conspiracy, and
property damage. 334 The court divided the trial into three phases: Phase I would
determine whether the presence of lead-based paint in public and privately-
owned buildings constituted a public nuisance; if a public nuisance was found to
exist, Phase II would determine whether the defendants should be held liable for
creating it; and if the State's position was upheld, Phase III would determine
what sort of damages or equitable relief was appropriate. 335 The case went to
trial on the public nuisance claim in October 2002, but the jury was unable to
reach a verdict. 336 On June 19, 2003, the trial judge set a trial date of April 5,
2004 for a retrial of the state's public nuisance case. 337 As of this article's
publication, the trial date has been pushed to April 5, 2005.
338
II. LIABILITY THEORIES
Government entities have relied on a variety of legal theories in their efforts
to recover damages from product sellers. In some cases, their claims are based
on conventional applications of familiar doctrines such as failure-to-warn,
defective design, fraud, unfair trade, and conspiracy. However, government
plaintiffs have also tried to support their claims by expanding, or even distorting,
other liability theories such as unjust enrichment, negligent entrustment,
engaging in an ultra-hazardous or abnormally dangerous activity, parens patriae,
civil RICO, and public nuisance. This strategy has proved successful in a
substantial number of cases.
A. Unjust Enrichment and Restitution
Unjust enrichment occurs when someone receives a benefit under
circumstances where it would be unconscionable to allow him or her to retain
it.339 For example, it would be unjust to allow an individual to retain property
that he or she has obtained through force or fraud. 34  However, unjust
enrichment may be available when the defendant is innocent of wrongdoing as
when, for example, he or she obtains a benefit by mistake.341 Restitution is the
Rhode Island, at http://www.leadlawsuits.com/infobystate-RI.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005) (stating
that Judge Silverstein dismissed all claims except those claims for public nuisance, unjust enrichment,
indemnity, unfair trade practices for post-1970 conduct, conspiracy, and damages for state-owned
property).
334. Id.
335. Gifford, supra note 307, at 772-73.
336. Understanding Lead Pigment Litigation, Lead Pigment Litigation Information by State:
Rhode Island, at http://www.leadlawsuits.com/infobystate RI.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
337. Id.
338. Id.; Catherine Flahardy, Public-Nuisance Suits Keep Companies on the Defensive: Gun Suits
Start an Unnerving Trend in Corporate America, CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 2004, (Litigation),
at 20.
339. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmts. a-c (1937).
340. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF REsTrruInON § 1 cmt. c (1937).
341. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION Ch. 2 Introductory Note (1937).
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traditional remedy for unjust enrichment; it requires the defendant to return
property when it would be unconscionable to allow the recipient to retain it.
342
In the cigarette cases, government plaintiffs argued that cigarette companies had
imposed significant smoking-related health care costs on the states because they
were obligated to provide medical care for indigent smokers under the Medicaid
program.343 The states maintained that smoking-related health care costs should
be borne by the tobacco companies and that tobacco companies were unjustly
enriched to the extent that these costs were shifted to the states.
3"
Unjust enrichment and restitution have also played a prominent role in
government-sponsored handgun litigation. For example, in Ganim v. Smith &
Wesson Corp.,345 the City of Bridgeport contended that the defendants had
reaped enormous profits from the unlawful sale of handguns in the Bridgeport
area, while allowing the economic costs of handgun violence to fall almost
entirely on the City.346 According to the City, the defendants were unjustly
enriched at its expense. 347 The court, however, concluded that individual victims
of handgun violence, rather than the City, are the real injured parties.
348
The City of Cleveland's unjust enrichment claim in White v. Smith &
Wesson Corp.349 fared somewhat better. The City alleged that it had conferred a
benefit upon the defendants by paying for the costs of personal injuries caused
by poor handgun design and negligent marketing practices.
350  The court
observed that relief from unjust enrichment is not limited to situations where
money or property is actually transferred to another, but is also available where
another's expenditure saved the defendant from an expense or loss.
351
Accordingly, the court concluded that the City could recover under an unjust
enrichment theory if it could prove that its expenditures for handgun-related
injuries should have been paid for by the defendants.
352
B. Negligent Entrustment
Several municipal plaintiffs have sought to hold gun manufacturers liable on
a negligent entrustment basis. The traditional formulation of negligent
entrustment doctrine provides that:
It is negligence to permit a third person to use a thing or to engage in
342. See R. Zoppo Co. v. City of Manchester, 453 A.2d 1311, 1313 (N.H. 1982) (stating that
plaintiff is entitled to restitution if he shows unjust enrichment).
343. Jonathan S. Massey, The Florida Tobacco Liability Law: Fairy Tale Objections to a
Reasonable Solution to Florida's Medicaid Crisis, 46 FLA. L. REV. 591, 594-95 (1995).
344. Id. at 595.
345. 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001).
346. Ganim, 780 A.2d at 117.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 123.
349. 97 F. Supp. 2d 816,819 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss).




an activity which is under the control of the actor, if the actor knows or
should know that such person intends or is likely to use the thing or to
conduct himself in the activity in such a manner as to create an
unreasonable risk of harm to others.
353
The majority of negligent entrustment cases involve motor vehicles,354 but
some courts have imposed liability on the owners of other chattels such as
firearms. 355 The defendant's duty of care arises from his or her ability to
determine who may use the chattel.356 Thus, to be held liable, the defendant
must own or control the .chattel at the time the injury occurs. The negligent
entrustment doctrine is not usually applicable to negligent acts that occur once
title or control has passed from the defendant to the negligent user.357 Some
courts have expanded the negligent entrustment doctrine beyond its original
boundaries and apply it to situations where the defendant does not have legal
title or physical control over the chattel, but helps an unsuitable person to
acquire possession of it.358 For example, a number of courts have imposed
liability upon parents who have donated or purchased motor vehicles for the use
of their reckless or incompetent offspring.359 This has led some commentators to
suggest that the concept of negligent entrustment might be expanded even
further to support the imposition of liability upon retail sellers who sell
dangerous products, such as handguns, to clearly unsuitable people. 3
6°
Some municipal plaintiffs have also brought negligent entrustment claims
against handgun manufacturers and sellers. For example, Camden County
353. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 (1979).
354. See, e.g., Fogo v. Steele, 304 P.2d 451, 452 (Kan. 1956) (holding mother liable for giving
adult son, known to be reckless, permission to drive her automobile); Snowhite v. State, 221 A.2d 342,
355-56 (Md. 1966) (holding owner of gasoline truck liable for allowing known alcoholic to drive
vehicle).
355. See, e.g., McBerry v. Ivie, 159 S.E.2d 108, 111 (Ga. 1967) (holding parent liable for giving
shotgun to young child); Stoelting v. Hauck, 159 A.2d 385, 389 (N.J. 1960) (holding parents of teenage
girl liable for allowing her to play with handgun); Mazzilli v. Selger, 99 A.2d 417, 421 (N.J. 1953)
(holding parents liable for allowing nine-year-old child access to shotgun); LaFaso v. LaFaso, 223 A.2d
814, 819 (Vt. 1966) (holding grandfather liable for giving cigarette lighter to one-and-one-half year old
grandchild).
356. See Sampson v. W.F. Enterprises, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 333, 338 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (declaring
"[t]hat theory of liability [negligent entrustment] is applicable only when the defendant has a right of
control over the instrumentality entrusted").
357. See, e.g., Estes v. Gibson, 257 S.W.2d 604, 606-07 (Ky. 1953) (holding mother not liable for
negligence of adult son once title to automobile passed to son); Sikora v. Wade, 342 A.2d 580, 582
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (holding former owner of automobile not liable for negligent acts that
took place after he donated it to a 16-year-old friend of his son); Brown v. Harkleroad, 287 S.W.2d 92,
96 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955) (holding no liability for father who purchased motor vehicle for son known
to be an alcoholic and a reckless driver).
358. See, e.g., Vince v. Wilson, 561 A.2d 103, 106 (Vt. 1989) (holding a person may be liable for
negligent entrustment when they provide funding to buy a car to a known incompetent).
359. See, e.g., Kahlenberg v. Goldstein, 431 A.2d 76, 81 (Md. 1981) (citing cases holding parents
liable for giving reckless or incompetent offspring an automobile).
360. See Timothy D. Lytton, Halberstam v. Daniel and the Uncertain Future of Negligent
Marketing Claims Against Firearms Manufacturers, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 681, 689 (1998) (discussing the
doctrinal foundations of negligent entrustment claim raised by plaintiff in Halberstam).
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alleged that the manufacturers negligently failed to monitor the sale and
distribution of their products, thereby helping to sustain the illegal market in
handguns in the Camden area. 361 The federal district court did not consider
whether the manufacturers' conduct amounted to negligent entrustment, but
instead dismissed all of the County's negligence-based claims on standing and
proximate cause grounds. 362 On appeal, the County dropped its negligent
entrustment claim and elected instead to rely upon public nuisance 
theory.363
The City of Philadelphia also brought a negligent entrustment claim against
handgun manufacturers. 364 However, the trial court concluded that handgun
manufacturers have no duty to protect individuals against gun-related violence
by third parties.365 For good measure, the court also ruled that the harm suffered
by the City was too far removed from the defendants' conduct to satisfy the
proximate cause requirement for a negligence claim.
366 This reasoning was
affirmed by the Third Circuit on appeal.
367
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Indiana in City of Gary v. Smith
& Wesson Corp.368 recently adopted a more expansive version of the negligent
entrustment doctrine. The Indiana court stated that a custodian of firearms must
exercise reasonable care to ensure that such weapons do not fall into the hands
of unsuitable people.369 However, the court went on to declare that this duty
applies to all of the defendants, including manufacturers.
370 According to the
court, "[e]ach defendant is a custodian and owner of the weapon at the times
that defendant possesses it in the chain of distribution.
'" 371 It remains to be seen
whether other courts will be persuaded by the reasoning in the City of Gary
decision.
C. Abnormally Dangerous Activities
It has been suggested that those who engage in the manufacture and
distribution of inherently dangerous products should be subjected to strict
liability for carrying on an ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous 
activity. 372
361. Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 245,
252 (D. N.J. 2000).
362. Camden v. Beretta, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 255-64.
363. Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 538 (3d
Cir. 2001).
364. City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882, 898 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
365. Philadelphia v. Beretta, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 898.
366. Id. at 903.
367. City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415,422-26 (3d Cir. 2002).
368. 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003).
369. Gary v. Smith & Wesson, 801 N.E.2d at 1241-42.
370. Id. at 1242.
371. Id.
372. See John L. Diamond, Eliminating the "Defect" in Design Strict Products Liability Theory, 34
HASTINGS L.J. 529, 549 (1983) (contending that "strict liability clearly should be imposed on the
manufacturers of products that are abnormally dangerous in all uses and applications").
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This form of strict liability originated in Rylands v. Fletcher,3 73 an English case
decided by House of Lords in 1868, which found its way into many American
jurisdictions after its adoption by the First Restatement of Torts in the 1930's. 374
The rationale for imposing strict liability is to compensate those who are injured
when an enterprise engages in an activity that is inappropriate to its
surroundings or one that is so dangerous that injuries are likely to occur even
with the exercise of due care. 375
During the 1980's, a number of commentators argued that the manufacture
and sale of "Saturday Night Specials" and other cheap handguns should be
treated as an abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous activity.376 These efforts
were unsuccessful because most courts were unwilling to expand this form of
strict liability to activities that were not closely related to the use of land.377
These courts also concluded that handgun manufacture and marketing are
matters of "common usage" and, therefore, can not be treated as ultrahazardous
activities under the traditional doctrine. 378 In spite of this precedent, Miami-
Dade County invoked the ultrahazardous activity theory in its lawsuit against
handgun manufacturers and sellers.379  The court, however, rejected the
County's claim, concluding that strict liability was not appropriate unless the
defendants conducted an activity on their land that endangered nearby
landowners.380 Consequently, one may reasonably predict that other courts will
refuse to subject those who manufacture non-defective products to strict liability
for engaging in an ultrahazardous activity. 381
373. 3 L.R.-E & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
374. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1939) (imposing strict liability for ultra-
hazardous activities); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1979) (imposing strict liability
for abnormally dangerous activities).
375. See Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218, 222-23 (Wash. 1977) (arguing that risk of harm
from crop dusting cannot be eliminated by due care and that using pesticides adjacent to an organic
farming area is an activity conducted in an inappropriate place).
376. See, e.g., Andrew 0. Smith, Comment, The Manufacture and Distribution of Handguns as an
Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 369, 379 (1987) (introducing considerations in
support of strict liability in the context of manufacturing and distribution of handguns).
377. See Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1534 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that
Florida cases have imposed strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities which occur on the land);
Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326, 1328 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that California law considers an
activity ultra-hazardous if it involves a "risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others");
Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1268 (5th Cir. 1985) (concluding that because the marketing of
handguns is not a land-related activity, it does not fall under the Louisiana doctrine of ultra-hazardous
activities).
378. Moore, 789 F.2d at 1328; Caveny v. Raven Arms Co., 665 F. Supp. 530, 532 (S.D. Ohio
1987), affd, 849 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1988); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 774 (D. N.M.
1987), affd, 843 F.2d 406 (10" Cir. 1988).
379. Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., 778 So. 2d 1042, 1044 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
380. Penlas, 778 So. 2d at 1044-45.
381. See Charles E. Canti, Distinguishing the Concept of Strict Liability for Ultra-hazardous
Activities from Strict Products Liability Under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: Two
Parallel Lines of Reasoning that Should Never Meet, 35 AKRON L. REv. 31, 56 (2001) (pointing out
that most states require an injured plaintiff to prove a product is dangerous).
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D. Parens Patriae
Parens patriae is a doctrine that authorizes a state to protect the health,
safety, or welfare of its citizens.382 The concept of parens patriae originated as an
aspect of the royal prerogative which allowed the Crown to act on behalf of
persons who were unable to care for themselves or their property because of
minority, insanity, or mental incapacity.
3 83 In its modern guise, the doctrine of
parens patriae enables state officials to bring a civil action in order to protect a
state's sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests.
384 The doctrine of parens patriae is
useful in such cases because it enables the Attorney General to sue
independently of other state officials who may be charged with recoupment
Medicaid costs or other responsibilities.3
85 In addition, in a parens patriae action,
a defendant cannot raise affirmative defenses, such as assumption of risk, that
might be asserted against individual plaintiffs.
386 Furthermore, a state may seek
damages as well as injunctive relief in a parens patriae action.
387
The leading case in this area is Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel
Banez,388 which was decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1982. In
that case, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed a parens patriae action against
a number of Virginia apple growers, alleging that they had violated various
federal statutes by engaging in discriminatory employment practices against
Puerto Rican workers.389 The plaintiff claimed that the defendants' conduct had
injured its economy by undermining attempts to develop employment
opportunities in the mainland for its citizens in order to reduce unemployment in
Puerto Rico.39° The defendants responded that the Commonwealth lacked
standing to bring such an action because only a relatively small number of its
citizens were affected by the apple growers' alleged discriminatory practices.
391
The Supreme Court distinguished between sovereign interests, quasi-
sovereign interests, proprietary interests, and interests pursued by the state as a
nominal party.392 States could protect the first two interests through parens
patriae actions, but not the latter two.39
3 The Court identified two sovereign
382. Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847, 1850 (2000).
383. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Banez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982).
384. Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco
Litigation, and the Doctrine ofParens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1863 (2000).
385. See id. at 1875-76 (discussing the strength of the Attorney General's authority in Louisiana).
386. See id. at 1876-77 (noting the limitations on the scope of defenses to parens patriae actions).
387. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982, 987 (D. Haw. 1969) (noting the
limitations on the scope of defenses to parens patriae actions), rev'd on other grounds, 431 F.2d 1282
(9th Cir. 1970), affd, 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving
Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 596, 606 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that California law supports a claim for
damages in a parens patriae action).
388. 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
389. Banez, 458 U.S. at 597-98.
390. Id at 598.
391. Id. at 599.
392. Id at 601-02.
393. Id. at 601.
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interests: (1) the exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities within
its jurisdiction; and (2) the demand for recognition by other sovereigns,
particularly with respect to the integrity of its borders. 394  Quasi-sovereign
interests involve the interests a state has in the well-being of its citizens. 95
According to the Court, these interests fell into two broad categories. The first
included the health and well-being, both physical and economic, of its citizens;
the second involved the state's interest in not being denied its rightful status
within the federal system.396 The Court defined proprietary interests as those
associated with ownership of land or involvement in business ventures where a
state's interests are no different than similarly situated private owners. 397
Finally, the Court noted that when a state brought a suit solely to benefit the
interests of private parties, it has no sovereign or quasi-sovereign interest to
protect, but was merely a "nominal party" to the suit.398 Consequently, the
Court upheld the right of Puerto Rico to sue as parens patriae.399
Although parens patriae actions have not been very common in the past,
some states invoked this doctrine in tobacco litigation. 4°0 For example, in its
lawsuit against cigarette manufacturers, the State of Texas relied upon the
parens patriae doctrine to provide an independent basis for standing even though
a state statute seemingly provided an exclusive procedure for the reimbursement
of Medicaid claims. 4°1 A federal district court in State of Texas v. American
Tobacco Co. concluded that the state had identified a sufficient quasi-sovereign
interest to support an action against the manufacturers of tobacco products
based on the doctrine of parens patriae.4°2 The court observed that the state of
Texas was not a nominal party, but spent millions of dollars a year to provide
medical care to its citizens through the Medicare program.4 03 Consequently, the
health consequences of smoking had a direct impact on the economy of the state
and the welfare of its citizens. 4° 4
The District Court for the Eastern District of Texas' analysis in State of
Texas v. American Tobacco Company seems consistent with the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Snapp. In the past, courts have allowed states to bring
parens patriae actions to protect their citizens from flooding,405 air pollution,406
394. Banez, 458 U.S. at 601.
395. d at 602.
396. Id. at 607.
397. Id. at 601-02.
398. Id. at 602.
399. Banez, 458 U.S. at 609-10.
400. See Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 962-63 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (considering
whether Texas can maintain a parens patriae action); see also Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 384, at
1862 (observing that Louisiana also relied on the doctrine of parens patriae in its suit against the
tobacco industry).




405. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 373-74 (1923) (reviewing multiple parens
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water pollution,4°7 and other threats to public health and safety. Parens patriae
actions have also been brought to protect the economic interests of residents
from the effects of quarantine measures,4°8 price discrimination,
4 9 and similar
activities.410 It should be noted, however, that in each of these cases the
defendant's conduct was either tortious or illegal. This suggests that the doctrine
of parens patriae gives a state standing to sue, but cannot be used to create new
forms of substantive liability. Therefore, if a state wishes to bring a successful
parens patriae suit against product manufacturers, it will have to prove that the
products in question are defective or that the manufacturers engaged in
negligent marketing or some other some sort of tortious conduct. In addition,
since virtually all parens patriae suits have involved claims for injunctive relief, it
is questionable whether states may invoke this doctrine to support a claim for
damages.
411
E. MCRA, MSP, and RICO
Government plaintiffs have not limited themselves to common-law liability
theories, they have also relied on a variety of statutes. For example, in their
lawsuits against the tobacco industry, state officials in Florida, Maryland, and
Massachusetts benefited from recently-enacted statutes that relaxed proof
requirements and protected them against affirmative defenses that could have
been raised against individual litigants. 412 In its suit against tobacco companies,
the Department of Justice based its claims on three federal statutes, the Medical
Care Recovery Act ("MCRA") 413 the Medical Secondary Payer Provision of the
Social Security Act ("MSP"), 4 14 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO").
415
patriae actions in the interstate commerce context).
406. See, e.g., Georgia ex rel. Hart v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236-39 (1907)
(considering the discharge of noxious gas in Tennessee over plaintiffs land).
407. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 248 (1901) (considering pouring of sewage into the
Mississippi River to the detriment of Missouri); State of New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v.
Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 336 A.2d 750, 758-59 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (discussing
New Jersey's standing to pursue a parens patriae action for injunctive relief from water pollution which
causes injury to fish), rev'd on other grounds, 351 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976).
408. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1900) (deliberating on a parens patriae action taken by
Louisiana against the intentional obstruction by Texas by means of quarantine regulations).
409. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945) (considering a parens
patriae action filed by Georgia for discriminatory rates).
410. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 561 (1923) (concerning the natural gas
context in Pennsylvania and Ohio); State ex rel. Humphrey v. Ri-Mel, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 102, 104
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (concerning consumer fraud, deceptive trade practices and collection agency
practices).
411. Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REV.
741,784-85 (2003).
412. Ed Dawson, Note, Legigation, 79 TEx. L. REV. 1727, 1731 (2001).
413. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-53 (2000).
414. Id. § 1395y.
415. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2004).
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MCRA permits the federal government to sue tortfeasors to recover the
cost of treating injured military personnel. 416 In United States v. Philip Morris
Inc., the Government contended that under MCRA it could recover twenty
billion dollars per year for the past ten years as reimbursement for the cost of
treating smoking-related illnesses under its Medicare program.417 However, the
court concluded that the text of the statute appears to create a right of
subrogation, rather than an independent cause of action, on behalf of the federal
government.418 Furthermore, the statute seemed to be concerned solely with
injuries against military personnel and had never been invoked to recover the
cost of treating civilians under the Medicare program.419
MSP allows the federal government to sue health insurance companies,
health care providers, and health care recipients to recover health care costs that
were paid by the government but which should have been paid by the insurer. 420
It also permits suits against non-insurance entities when they were required to
pay for heath care costs under a "self-insured plan." However, the court in
Philip Morris found that nothing in the MSP authorizes the Government to sue
the tortfeasors who actually caused the underlying personal injuries.421
RICO was the third statute at issue in United States v. Philip Morris, Inc.422
RICO was enacted in 1970 in order to combat the infiltration of organized crime
into legitimate business enterprises. 423 The statute imposes criminal and civil
liability on any person who invests income from a pattern of racketeering activity
in an enterprise,4 24 acquires through a pattern of racketeering activity an interest
in an enterprise,425 conducts an enterprises' affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity,426 or conspires to do any of these things.427  An
"enterprise" includes "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity. '428 RICO defines "racketeering activity" as various
enumerated criminal acts including mail fraud, wire fraud, drug trafficking,
416. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-53.
417. See Sandra L. Gravanti, Note, Tobacco Litigation: United States Versus Big Tobacco-An
Unfiltered Attack on the Industry, 52 FLA. L. REV. 671,691 (2000) (discussing government's claims).
418. See Dawson, supra note 412 at 1737-38 (discussing the outcome of the motion to dismiss).
419. See id. at 1738-39 (same).
420. Id. at 1739.
421. See id. (discussing the outcome of the motion to dismiss).
422. 116 F.Supp.2d 131,135 (D. D.C. 2000) (discussing the RICO claim).
423. Beth S. Schipper, Civil RICO and Parens Patriae: Lowering Litigation Barriers Through
State Intervention, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 429, 431 (1983); Bryce A. Jensen, Note, From Tobacco to
Health Care and Beyond-A Critique of Lawsuits Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
1334, 1354 (2001). The State of Texas also brought a RICO claim against cigarette manufacturers. See
Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d at 969 (contending that cigarette companies engaged in wire
fraud, mail fraud, bribery, intimidation of witnesses, and obstruction of justice).
424. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
425. Id. § 1962(b).
426. Id. § 1962(c).
427. Idt § 1962(d).
428. ld § 1961(4).
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murder, arson, gambling, extortion, bribery, or embezzlement.
42 9 According to
the statute, a "pattern of racketeering activity" consists of two or more acts of
racketeering that occur within ten years of each other and which reflect
relationship and continuity in terms of purpose, results, participants, victims, or
methods, but which are sufficiently distinct so that they amount to more than a
single episode or an isolated occurrence. 43
0  Because at least two of these
offenses must be committed in order to make out a claim under RICO, they are
referred to as "predicate acts."
431
There are two types of civil remedies available under RICO, damages and
equitable relief. Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
RICO violation may sue for treble damages.
432 In addition, a court may grant
various equitable remedies, including restricting the defendants from engaging in
certain activities in the future and even dissolving or restructuring the
enterprise.433 A provision of RICO expressly authorizes the United States
Attorney General to seek equitable relief in appropriate cases.
434 The federal
government took the position that it may seek disgorgement of a defendant's
wrongful gains or profits as part of its claim for equitable relief.
In United States v. Philip Morris, Inc.,435 the federal government claimed
that the tobacco industry since 1953 had engaged in a conspiracy to mislead the
American public about the harmful characteristics of tobacco products, the
addictive nature of nicotine, and the possibility of developing safer and less
addictive tobacco products. 436 In particular, the government alleged that at a
meeting in New York City in 1953, tobacco company executives agreed to deny
that smoking was harmful.
437 According to the government, the tobacco
companies created two entities, the Council for Tobacco Research ("CTR") and
the Tobacco Institute ("TI"), in order to conceal and misrepresent the
relationship between smoking and health.
438 The government's complaint also
charged that tobacco companies withheld information from the Surgeon General
about the addictive qualities of nicotine and through the selective breeding and
cultivation of tobacco plants deliberately manipulated the nicotine levels in
cigarettes. 439 Furthermore, in the government's view, the tobacco industry
misled the public about the effectiveness of "low tar" cigarettes, suppressed
research about the development of less hazardous cigarettes, and aggressively
429. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
430. Id § 1961(5); see Dawson, supra note 412, at 1741 (describing what is necessary to show a
"pattern of racketeering activity").
431. Dawson, supra note 412, at 1740.
432. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
433. 1d § 1964(a).
434. Id. § 1964(b).
435. 116 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D. D.C. 2000).
436. United States v. Phillip Morris, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 136.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 136-37.
439. Id at 137.
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targeted their advertising campaigns at underage consumers.440
The government argued that tobacco companies committed mail and wire
fraud in order to conceal the health risks of smoking and that these acts
constituted racketeering activity for purposes of RICO. 441 Furthermore, the
government argued, these acts of mail and wire fraud extended over a period of
many years, thereby establishing a pattern of conduct. 442 Finally, according to
the government, the enterprise requirement was satisfied by tobacco companies'
joint funding of the CTR, which served as a spokesman for the industry. 443
Surprisingly, most of the defendants did not dispute that the facts alleged in
the complaint, if true, were sufficient to constitute a RICO violation.4"
However, one defendant, the Liggett Group, Inc., argued that the complaint
failed to sufficiently allege the existence of either an "enterprise" or a "pattern
of racketeering activity." 445 Liggett argued that the government had failed to
show that the tobacco industry conspiracy had sufficient structure or
organization to amount to an "enterprise." 446 However, the court declared that
an informal group of people working together to obtain money through criminal
activity can be characterized as an "enterprise" even though it had no formal
organizational structure. 447
Liggett also questioned whether the defendants had engaged in a "pattern
of racketeering activity." 448 The government claimed that various acts of mail
and wire fraud committed by tobacco companies constituted the "predicate acts"
that were necessary to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity.449  In
response, Liggett argued that these activities, if they occurred at all, injured
individual consumers, not the federal government. 450 However, the court
concluded that the requirements of mail and wire fraud were satisfied as long as
the defendants attempted to defraud someone, regardless of whether they
succeeded. 451  Apparently, the court felt that mail and wire fraud could
constitute predicate acts for purposes of satisfying RICO's requirements even
though the tobacco companies had no intent to injure the government.452
All of the defendants objected to the government's attempt to obtain
440. 1d at 137-38.
441. United States v. Phillip Morris, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 153.
442. Id. at 152.
443. Plaintiff's Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief at 67-75, United States v. Philip
Morris, 116 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D. D.C. 2000) (No. Civ. A. 99-2496 GK) (arguing that defendants' actions
constituted the "enterprise" definition under RICO) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/
cases/tobacco2/complain.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
444. United States v. Philip Morris, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 147.
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injunctive and other equitable relief.453 The government sought a permanent
injunction to prohibit the defendants from misrepresenting the health risks of
smoking in the future. 454 The government also requested the court to order the
tobacco companies to fund various anti-smoking campaigns, to disclose
documents relating to the targeting of children, and to make corrective
statements regarding the health risks of smoking and the addictive qualities of
nicotine.455 Finally, the government asked the court to order the defendants to
"disgorge" any profits that were derived from past racketeering activity.
456
The defendants claimed that injunctive relief directed at future wrongful
conduct was unnecessary because there was no reason to believe that they would
engage in such conduct in the future. 457 In particular, the defendants contended
that injunctive relief was not needed because the Master Settlement Agreement
with the states already prohibited the same sort of conduct.
458 The court
observed that it would grant injunctive relief if the defendants' past conduct
indicated a "reasonable likelihood of further violation(s) in the future."
459
According to the court, this involved a consideration of three factors enumerated
in SEC v. First City Finance Corp.:46° (1) whether the violation was isolated or
part of a pattern of conduct; (2) whether the violation was flagrant and
deliberate or merely technical in nature; and (3) whether the defendant will have
opportunities to violate the law in the future. 461 Applying these factors, the
court concluded that it must refuse to dismiss the government's claim for
injunctive relief at this stage in the proceedings.
462
Finally, the defendants claimed that even if the government alleged that a
likelihood of future illegal activity existed, civil RICO does not allow
disgorgement as a remedy.463 According to the defendants, disgorgement is akin
to a criminal forfeiture and, therefore, should not be allowed as a remedy in a
civil action.464 However, the court observed that the Supreme Court had already
held that a court could order disgorgement in a statutory action unless the
statute expressly foreclosed such a remedy, or "by a necessary and inescapable
inference," restricted a court's power to require disgorgement.
465 The court also
observed that several other courts had concluded that disgorgement was
453. ld at 147.
454. United States v. Philip Morris, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 147.
455. Id at 147 n.25.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 148.
459. United States v. Philip Morris, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 148 (quoting SEC v. Kenton Capital, Ltd.,
69 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D. D.C. 1998)).
460. 890 F.2d 1215,1228 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
461. United States v. Philip Morris, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 148 (quoting First City, 890 F.2d at 1228).
462. Id at 150.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id. (citing Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398-99 (1946)).
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permitted in a civil RICO suit.466
As the Philip Morris litigation progressed, disgorgement emerged as the
predominant issue. The government asked the court to order the defendants to
disgorge the proceeds from cigarette sales that were made to the "youth addicted
population" between 1971 and 2001.467 After discovery was completed, the
defendants moved to dismiss the government's disgorgement claim.468 The
defendants contended that the economic model that the government relied on to
calculate the $280 billion disgorgement claim was inaccurate because it failed to
differentiate between ill-gotten gains, which are subject to disgorgement under
section 1964(a) of the RICO statute,469 and legitimate profits, which are not.470
Relying on United States v. Carson,471 the defendants also argued disgorgement
is limited to ill-gotten gains that were being used "to fund or promote the illegal
conduct, or constitute capital available for that purpose."472 The trial court
rejected the approach of the Carson court and ruled that the accuracy of the
government's economic model was a question of fact that should be decided at
trial.47.3 Following the trial court's rejection of their motion for partial summary
judgment, the defendants undertook an interlocutory appeal. 474
On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
considered whether 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) authorizes courts to allow disgorgement
as a remedy in RICO violation cases. This statutory provision gives federal
district courts jurisdiction "to prevent and restrain violations of [RICO] by
issuing appropriate orders . . . . 475 The statute enumerates various remedies,
"including, but not limited to:" divestiture, imposing restrictions on future
activities or investments, and ordering the dissolution or reorganization of the
enterprise.47 6 The appeals court considered whether section 1964(a) allows
disgorgement generally, allows disgorgement only to prevent future violations of
RICO, or does not allow disgorgement at all.
The government argued that section 1964(a) contains a grant of equitable
jurisdiction that should be read broadly to permit disgorgement in RICO cases
whenever the court thought that it was appropriate.47 7 The government relied
on Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,478 which declared that when a statute grants
general equitable jurisdiction to a court, "all the inherent equitable powers...
466. United States v. Philip Morris, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 150-51.
467. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 72,74 (D. D.C. 2004).
468. Id. at 73.
469. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a).
470. Philip Morris, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
471. 52 F.3d 1173,1182 (2d Cir. 1995).
472. Philip Morris, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
473. Id. at 81-82.
474. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
475. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a).
476. Id.
477. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1197.
478. 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
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are available for the proper and complete exercise of that jurisdiction."
479 In
Porter, the Supreme Court upheld restitution as a remedy where the defendant
had violated the Emergency Price Control Act.480 However, the appeals court in
Philip Morris distinguished Porter, holding that restitution in that case was
directly related to carrying out the purposes of the price control statute, while
disgorgement does little to prevent or restrain future violations of RICO.
481
Accordingly, the court rejected the government's broad interpretation of section
1964(a). 482
The appeals court then concluded that section 1964(a) only gave the courts
such equitable powers as are necessary to prevent future violations of RICO.
483
While remedies such as divestment, injunctions against future criminal activity,
and dissolution of the enterprise are designed to prevent future wrongdoing,
disgorgement is awarded regardless of whether the defendant is likely to commit
other unlawful acts in the future. 484 Thus, disgorgement is "aimed at and
measured by past conduct."'485 The court also observed that RICO already
provides for a comprehensive set of remedies, and for this reason Congress
probably did not intend to authorize the courts to create additional ones.
486
Finally, the court expressed concern that disgorgement acts like a criminal
forfeiture penalty, but at the same time deprives the defendants of many of the
protections that defendants receive in criminal proceedings. For example,
RICO's criminal forfeiture provisions are subject to a five year statute of
limitations487 and notice provisions.488 In addition, there is a higher standard of
proof required for a criminal conviction.489 Finally, because the private parties
could also recover damages under section 1964(c) of RICO, the defendants
would suffer a duplicative recovery if the government was able to obtain
disgorgement under section 1964(a). According to the court, "[p]ermitting
disgorgement under section 1964(a) would therefore thwart Congress' intent in
creating RICO's elaborate remedial scheme."
490
F. Public Nuisance
A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with rights held in
common by the general public. 491 Government officials traditionally relied on
479. Porter, 328 U.S. at 398.
480. Id. at 398-99.
481. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1198.
482. Id. at 1199.
483. Id. at 1198.
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1200-01.
487. 18 U.S.C. § 3282.
488. Id. § 1963(1).
489. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1200-01.
490. Id. at 1201.
491. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
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the concept of public nuisance to stop individuals from harming the public by
either charging them with a crime or seeking injunctive relief against them.492 In
contrast, a private individual can sue under public nuisance if he or she sustains a
"special injury" that is different from that suffered by the public. 493
According to the Second Restatement of Torts, to bring a public nuisance
claim, the plaintiff must also show that the defendant's conduct was
unreasonable. 494 The Restatement identifies three factors that are relevant to the
issue of whether an interference is "unreasonable" and therefore a nuisance.
The first factor is whether the conduct significantly interferes with the public
health, safety, peace, comfort, or convenience.495 A second consideration is
whether a statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation prohibits the
defendant's conduct.496 Finally, a court may take into account "whether the
conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent long-lasting
effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect on
the public right. '497
In recent years, public nuisance has emerged as an increasingly popular and
effective liability theory for government plaintiffs.498 Just as public nuisance
suits have been brought against both cigarette and lead paint manufacturers, 499
they have also been directed at handgun manufacturers. 500 Municipalities have
focused on the distribution and marketing practices of handgun manufacturers,
claiming that manufacturers have distributed handguns in quantities that greatly
exceed the supply needed for legitimate sales, knowing that this conduct
contributes to the existence of an environment where criminals and other
unauthorized persons can easily obtain firearms.5 01 In the view of municipalities,
the market in illegal handgun sales and the violence that results from illegal
handgun use constitutes a public nuisance which can be abated by the courts.5° 2
492. Gifford, supra note 411, at 814.
493. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C. See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191,
1212 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding public nuisance claim by gunshot victims on the basis of special
injury); NAACP v. Acusport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 425, 499 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing public
nuisance claim by civil rights organization after finding that African-Americans suffered the same sort
of injuries from handgun violence as the rest of the public).
494. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B.
495. Id. § 821B(2)(a).
496. Id. § 821B(2)(b).
497. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(c).
498. Gifford, supra note 411, at 743.
499. See, e.g., William H. Pryor, Jr., A Comparison of Abuses and Reforms of Class Actions and
Multigovernment Lawsuits, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1885, 1906-09 (2000) (discussing public nuisance theory in
litigation against lead paint manufacturers); Amber E. Dean, Comment, Lead Paint Public Entity
Lawsuits: Has the Broad Stroke of Tobacco and Firearms Litigation Painted a Troubling Picture for
Lead Paint Manufacturers?, 28 PEPP. L. REv. 915, 915 (2001) (discussing public nuisance theory in
litigation against lead paint manufacturers).
500. David Kairys, The Origin and Development of the Governmental Handgun Cases, 32 CONN.
L. REv. 1163, 1163 (2000).
501. Id. at 1173.
502. David Kairys, The Governmental Handgun Cases and the Elements and Underlying Policies
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A number of issues have arisen in connection with government-sponsored
public nuisance actions against product manufacturers. Perhaps the greatest
controversy is whether liability for public nuisance should be limited, in the
absence of a violation of a statute or ordinance, to activities that occur on the
defendant's land or affect the use and enjoyment of public property. A second
issue is whether it is appropriate to hold a lawful commercial enterprise liable for
creating or maintaining a public nuisance. A third question is whether handgun
manufacturers can be held liable under public nuisance theory when they have
no control over handguns at the time they inflict harm upon the public. Finally,
there is some doubt about whether a government can sue product manufacturers
for damages under public nuisance or whether it should be limited to injunctive
relief.
1. The Scope of Public Nuisance
Product manufacturers contend that introducing public nuisance into this
area would only lead to instability because existing products liability doctrines
already govern the production and marketing of products. Accordingly, they
have urged courts to refrain from expanding the concept of public nuisance
beyond its traditional boundaries. This argument has persuaded some courts to
reject public nuisance claims against product manufacturers. The Third Circuit,
in Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., agreed
that public nuisance should be kept within existing confines and affirmed a lower
court's finding that Camden County had failed to establish a valid public
nuisance claim under New Jersey law.503 The appellate court determined that
New Jersey courts had maintained a strict separation between products liability
and public nuisance.5° 4 Moreover, the court declared, if governmental entities
are allowed to bring public nuisance actions against the manufacturers of lawful
products, nuisance law "would become a monster that would devour in one gulp
the entire law of tort. '50 5 The Third Circuit repeated these sentiments several
months later in City of Philadelphia v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp.5°6 Recently, a New
York appellate court reached the same conclusion in People v. Sturm, Ruger &
Co.507
However, other courts have relied on the Restatement of Torts to greatly
expand the scope of public nuisance. For example, in White v. Smith & Wesson,
a federal district court refused to dismiss the City of Cleveland's public nuisance
claim. 508 Having found that the City stated a cause of action in negligence based
on the defendants' manufacturing, distribution, and marketing practices, the
of Public Nuisance Law, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1175, 1179-80 (2000).
503. 273 F.3d 536,539 (3d Cir. 2001).
504. Camden v. Beretta, 273 F.3d at 540.
505. Id. (quoting Tioga Public School Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 921 (8th Cir.
1993)).
506. 277 F.3d 415, 421 (3rd Cir. 2002).
507. 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 197 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
508. 97 F. Supp. 2d 816,829 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
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court reasoned that City could make a parallel "qualified" public nuisance claim
as long as it alleged that the conduct that created the nuisance was negligent.
50 9
The Ohio Supreme Court also allowed a public nuisance claim to stand in
City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.510 In that case, the City alleged that
handgun manufacturers created a public nuisance by manufacturing, marketing,
distributing, and selling their products in a way that unreasonably interfered with
public health, welfare, and safety in the Cincinnati area.511  The handgun
manufacturers argued that public nuisance claims should be limited to actions
involving injuries to real property or to statutory violations involving public
health or safety.512  Relying on the Restatement of Torts, the court
acknowledged that private nuisances are concerned with unreasonable
interferences with the use and enjoyment of land, but that the scope of public
nuisance is much broader. 513  Specifically, the court declared that the
Restatement's broad approach permits the City to bring a public nuisance action
"for injuries caused by a product if the facts establish that the design,
manufacturing, marketing, or sale of the product unreasonably interferes with a
right common to the general public."
514
In James v. Arms Technology, Inc.,515 the defendant handgun manufacturers
also argued that state law limits public nuisance claims to statutory violations or
activities having "a nexus with, or a defendant's use or effect upon real
property .... "516 The New Jersey court, however, concluded that public
nuisance also includes "[a] continuing course of conduct that is calculated to
result in physical harm or economic loss to so many persons as to become a
matter of serious concern." 517 Accordingly, the court held that the City of
Newark could proceed with its public nuisance claim even though the
defendants' activities did not harm an interest in property.518
The court in City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp. broadly defined a
nuisance as "an activity that generates injury or inconvenience to others that is
both sufficiently grave and sufficiently foreseeable that it renders it unreasonable
to proceed at least without compensation to those that are harmed. '519 The
court also observed that the Restatement of Torts does not restrict public
nuisance to an interference with the use and enjoyment of land.520 This led the
509. White, 97 F.3d at 829.
510. 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1143-44 (Ohio 2002).
511. Cincinnati v. Beretta, 768 N.E.2d at 1141.
512. 1d at 1142.
513. Id (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 821B, cmt. h (1965)).
514. Id
515. 820 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
516. James, 820 A.2d. at 50.
517. Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 90 at 651-52 (5th
ed. 1984)).
518. Id.
519. 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1231 (Ind. 2003).
520. Gary v. Smith & Wesson, 801 N.E.2d at 1233 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
821 cmt. h (1977)).
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court to reject the defendants' contention that public nuisance should be
narrowly restricted to unlawful activities or interference with interests in land.
521
2. Legal Activities as a Public Nuisance
The government can abate specific activities which violate the law, such as
opium dens or houses of prostitution, as public nuisances. Arguably, this implies
that lawful activities cannot be classified as public nuisances, at least not
categorically. This sort of reasoning has led defendants in some cases to claim
that they cannot be held liable under public nuisance law for the normal
consequences of conducting a legal activity, particularly when the activity is
already subject to regulation by the government. For example, in James v. Arms
Technology, Inc., the defendants contended that the court should not declare the
manufacture or sale of a legal commercial product to be a public nuisance,
particularly if the manufacturer is already subject to substantial regulation.
522
Relying on the Restatement, the New Jersey court declared that the power of
the state to abate a nuisance has always extended to otherwise lawful conduct.
5 23
Furthermore, the court pointed out, while the manufacture and retail sale of
handguns is extensively regulated, the specific conduct alleged to constitute a
nuisance, namely the supplying of products for an illegal secondary market in
handguns, is not.
524
The Indiana Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in City of Gary v.
Smith & Wesson Corp.52 5 The intermediate appellate court in that case had
ruled that legislative authorization of the defendants' business insulated them
from liability for creating a public nuisance.526 The Indiana Supreme Court,
however, disagreed, declaring instead that the defendants might create a public
nuisance even though they complied with applicable firearms regulations.
527
Specifically, the court concluded that the handgun manufacturers could be held
liable under public nuisance law if they supplied disreputable dealers with
handguns knowing that they accounted for most of the illegal handgun sales in
the city.
528
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Ileto v. Glock Inc.529 also
rejected the argument that the defendants could not be held liable under the law
of public nuisance because the manufacture and sale of handguns is a legal
commercial activity.530 Unlike James and City of Gary, Ileto involved private,
rather than governmental, plaintiffs. These plaintiffs were all victims, or family
521. Gary v. Smith & Wesson, 801 N.E.2d at 1233.
522. James, 820 A.2d at 51.
523. Id. at 52 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. f (1977)).
524. Id.
525. 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003).
526. City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 776 N.E.2d 368, 379 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
527. Gary v. Smith & Wesson, 801 N.E.2d at 1234-35.
528. Id. at 1235.
529. 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003).
530. Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1194-95.
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members of victims, who were shot by a mentally disturbed individual.531 They
brought suit against a number of handgun manufacturers, distributors, and
dealers, alleging, inter alia, that the defendants' marketing and distribution
practices "knowingly created and maintained an unreasonable interference with
rights common to the general public, constituting a public nuisance under
California law.
532
The court in Ileto observed that a legal business could become a public
nuisance when it is operated in a manner that unreasonably infringed upon a
public right.533 , In this case, the plaintiffs' nuisance claim was not based on the
manufacture of handguns or the sale of such weapons to those who were legally
entitled to purchase them; rather, their claim was based on the allegation that the
defendants created an illegal secondary market for handguns by deliberately
oversaturating the gun market, knowing that the many of original retail
purchasers would resell their handguns to illegal buyers.534 According to the
court, the existence of this illegal secondary market made it more likely that
handguns would come into the possession of criminals and mentally unstable
individuals, thereby increasing the risk of the harm suffered by the plaintiffs. 535
3. Control Over the Instrumentality That Caused the Harm
A third problem with the public nuisance theory is the product
manufacturer's alleged inability to abate the alleged nuisance. Product
manufacturers maintain that they should not be held liable under a public
nuisance theory for the conduct of others unless they are able to exercise actual
control over the persons who have actually created the nuisance. At least one
commentator agrees, pointing out that if the purpose of a public nuisance action
is to put an end to an act that harms the public, this goal will not be achieved by
targeting a manufacturer or seller who has relinquished control of the product in
question.
536
The Illinois Supreme Court in City of Chicago v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp.537
rejected the notion that a public nuisance claim could never be brought against
handgun manufacturers for the lawful sale of a nondefective product.5 38 The
Illinois court also determined that it was possible to create a public nuisance by
conducting a lawful activity in an unreasonable manner.5 39 At the same time, the
court expressed reservations about imposing liability on the firearms industry
when the legislature had not declared the manufacture or sale of handguns to be
531. I&
532. 1d at 1194, 1198.
533. Id. at 1214.
534. Id. at 1214-15.
535. fleto, 349 F.3d at 1215.
536. Gifford, supra note 411, at 820.
537. No. 95243 et al., 2004 Ill. LEXIS 1665 (Ill. Nov. 18,2004).
538. Chicago v. Beretta, 2004 Ill. LEXIS 1665 at *50 (deferring to the legislature).
539. Id. at *47-49.
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a public nuisance.540  Furthermore, it declared that the manufacture and
distribution of handguns would not be considered unreasonable unless the
defendants violated specific government regulations or acted negligently.
541 In
this case, the court concluded that the City failed to prove that the defendants
had violated any law. 542 Moreover, the court determined that there was no
negligence because handgun manufacturers did not owe the City or its residents
any duty to protect them from handgun violence.
543
In Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp.,
the County argued that control is not essential to a public nuisance claim as long
as the defendant contributes to a condition which interferes with public rights.
544
However, the Third Circuit disagreed, finding that New Jersey law requires that
the defendant exercise some degree of control over the source of the nuisance.
545
The court traced the chain of causation starting with the sale of a handgun by the
defendant manufacturer to a federally licensed distributor. According to the
court, the distributor would then sell the firearm to a federally licensed retail
dealer, who would sell it to a lawful purchaser.
546 Finally, an unauthorized
person would acquire the weapon from the lawful owner (either by theft or by
purchase). 547 In the court's view, the nuisance would not come into existence
until the handgun came into the hands of a criminal user. The court also
concluded that causal connection between the manufacturer and the criminal
wrongdoer, which involved four transfers of possession, was simply too
attenuated to for the manufacturer to exercise any control over the on-site
actions of a remote third party.548 Furthermore, as the court pointed out, in
ordinary tort cases, there is normally no duty to control the actions of
independent third party tortfeasors.549 The court in Camden County concluded
that this "no duty" rule should apply in public nuisance actions as well.
550 A
short time later, the Third Circuit reaffirmed its reasoning with respect to the
control issue in City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.
551
A New York intermediate appellate court also concluded that a close
connection must exist between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's harm
in order for the plaintiff to prevail under public nuisance.
552 In that case, the
New York Attorney General argued that handgun manufacturers could be held
liable for public nuisance as long as they "create, contribute to, or maintain that
540. Id at 50
541. Id. at 58.
542. Id at 59.
543. Chicago v. Beretta, 2004 11. LEXIS 1665 at *64.
544. Camden v. Beretta, 273 F.3d at 541.
545. Id; see also Camden v. Beretta, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 245, 266.
546. Id




551. 277 F.3d 415,421 (3rd Cir. 2002).
552. People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192,200 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
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nuisance." 553 However, the court concluded that the plaintiff must prove duty as
well as causation. 554 In this case, it refused to hold the defendants liable because
the causal connection between the defendants' lawful activities and the State's
harm was too remote; furthermore, this harm was principally caused by the
intervening criminal conduct of third parties rather than by the defendants. 555
Other courts, however, have taken a different view. For example, in City of
Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., the court concluded that the defendants
created a nuisance by "marketing, distributing, and selling firearms in a manner
that facilitated their flow into the illegal market. ' 556 Thus, the court concluded,
the City could bring a public nuisance claim by alleging that the defendants
controlled the illegal secondary market in firearms by supplying it with firearms.
It was not necessary for the City to show that the defendants exercised any
control over "the actual firearms at the moment that harm occurred.'557
A New Jersey court employed similar reasoning in James v. Arms
Technology, Inc. In that case, the defendants contended that they could not be
held liable because they did not exercise control over those who caused the
nuisance.5 58 However, the court did not look to the acts of third parties which
directly caused the harm, but instead focused on the illegal secondary gun
market, which the defendants allegedly supplied.559 According to the court, "the
'instrumentality' defendants 'control[led]' [was] the creation and supply of this
illegal market. '560 Accordingly, the court rejected the defendants' "[lack of]
control" argument.
561
The defendants in Ileto v. Glock Inc. also argued that they could not be held
liable for maintaining a public nuisance unless they had physical control over the
guns at the time the plaintiffs were injured.562 Such control, the defendants
contended, is necessary to establish the requisite proximate cause for liability.5 63
The Ninth Circuit, however, held that California law does not require that the
defendants have actual control over the instrumentality at the time the harm
occurred. 564 The court also observed that the Ohio Supreme Court rejected a
similar argument in City of Cincinnati.565 It was sufficient, the court concluded,
that the defendants exercise control over the creation and supply of the illegal
secondary market for firearms; therefore, it was not necessary for them to
553. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
554. Id.
555. 1d at 201.
556. City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136,1143 (Ohio 2002)
557. Cincinnati v. Beretta, 768 N.E.2d at 1143.
558. James, 820 A.2d at 52.
559. Id.
560. Id.
561. Id at 53.
562. 349 F.3d 1191, 1212 (9th Cir. 2003).
563. Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1212.
564. Id.
565. Id. at 1212-13; City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002).
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control the actual use of the firearms that caused the plaintiffs' injuries.
566
Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court in City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp.,567 treated the control issue as an aspect of proximate cause. The court
acknowledged that there was some support for a control requirement, but only
when a plaintiff sought to abate a public nuisance.
568 According to the court, a
defendant would not be able to obey an order to abate a nuisance if he or she did
not have control over the cause of the nuisance or had no legal right to enter the
land where the nuisance was located. 569 However, lack of control would not
prevent retail sellers from paying damage claims for past wrongdoing.
4. Damage Claims
Since public nuisance actions are intended to enable the government to put
a stop to conduct that harms the public welfare, the government was limited to
bringing criminal prosecutions or seeking injunctive relief and were not allowed
to sue for damages. 570 However, in recent years, municipal plaintiffs have not
limited themselves to claims for injunctive relief in their public nuisance suits
against gun manufacturers, but rather have sought damages for the costs of gun
violence as well. For example, in City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson, Corp., the
City sought damages "as a party uniquely injured by the nuisance."
571
Specifically, the City claimed compensation for such things as the cost of
providing medical treatment for gunshot injuries, law enforcement, emergency
rescue services, security at public buildings, pensions, benefits, and jails.
572 The
Indiana Supreme Court agreed with the City's position, relying on an Indiana
statute 573 that allows damages to be awarded in a nuisance action.
574 Although
the court acknowledged that damages might ultimately be barred by such
doctrines as remoteness or proximate cause, it refused to dismiss the City's
damages claim at this stage in the proceedings.
575
G. Tentative Conclusions
At the present time, public nuisance and possibly RICO appear to be the
most promising liability theories for government plaintiffs. Unjust enrichment
and similar doctrines were commonly invoked against cigarette manufacturers in
the early days of public tort litigation,5 76 but they seem to have lost some of their
566. leto, 349 F.3d at 1213.
567. No. 95243 et al., 2004 IU. LEXIS 1665 (Ill. Nov. 18,2004).
568. Chicago v. Beretta, No. 95243 et al., 2004 111. Lexis 1665 at *81
569. Id. at *100-101.
570. Gifford, supra note 411, at 781-82.
571. Gary v. Smith & Wesson, 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1240 (Ind. 2003).
572. Id.
573. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-30-6-8 (West 2002).
574. Gary v. Smith & Wesson, 801 N.E.2d at 1240.
575. Id. at 1240-41.
576. See generally Cliff Sherrill, Comment, Tobacco Litigation: Medicaid Third Party Liability
and Claims for Restitution, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 497 (1997).
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popularity in recent years.577 Negligent entrustment was unsuccessful at first,578
but comments in one recent case suggest that this theory might still be used as a
basis for imposing liability on product manufacturers. 579  Strict liability for
engaging in an abnormally dangerous activity, on the other hand, seems to be
completely discredited as a result of a Florida intermediate appellate court's
utter rejection of it in Penelas v. Arms Technology, Inc.580 So far, very few
government litigants have relied on the doctrine of parens patriae,581 although it
may re-emerge if the states become more involved in litigation against lead paint
manufacturers. RICO is potentially a very useful theory for government
plaintiffs. However, its exact parameters will probably not be defined until the
federal government's RICO claims against the tobacco industry are finally
adjudicated.582 Public nuisance has now emerged as the most promising weapon
in the governmental arsenal. After some initial misgivings, 583 courts are now
more receptive to public nuisance actions against handgun and lead paint
manufacturers.5 84 Unless this trend is reversed in the near future, government
plaintiffs will make public nuisance the predominant liability in public tort cases.
III. POTENTIAL DEFENSES TO LIABILITY
Suits by government entities face a number of potential barriers. For
example, a number of states have enacted statutes that restrict or prohibit
municipalities from suing product manufacturers to recoup the cost of
governmental services. In addition, government plaintiffs must satisfy standing
requirements in order to sue. Finally, doctrines such as proximate cause, duty,
the economic loss rule, and the municipal cost recovery rule may enable product
manufacturers to escape liability.
A. Statutory Restrictions and Prohibitions
State legislation has often been used to either increase or limit the tort
liability of product sellers. As mentioned earlier, several states enacted statutes
577. See, e.g., White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816,829 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (discussing the
requirements under Ohio law for establishing a claim of unjust enrichment); Ganim v. Smith and
Wesson Corp. 780 A.2d 98, 117-20 (Conn. 2001) (describing the requirements for filing a claim of
unjust enrichment under Connecticut law).
578. Philadelphia v. Beretta, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 898; Camden v. Beretta, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 255-64
(negligent entrustment and other negligence-based claims dismissed on proximate cause grounds).
579. Gary v. Smith & Wesson, 801 N.E.2d at 1241-42.
580. Penelas v. Arms Technology, Inc., 778 So. 2d 1043,1044 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
581. See, e.g., Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 962 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that
the state had a sufficient interest to maintain an action regarding abuse of the Medicaid system).
582. See Philip Morris, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 152-55 (refusing to dismiss the RICO claim on
defendant's motion to dismiss).
583. Camden v. Beretta, 273 F.3d at 540; Sturn Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d at 201-02.
584. White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 829 (N.D. Ohio 2000); City of Gary v. Smith
& Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1233 (Ind. 2003); James v. Arms Technology, Inc., 820 A.2d 27, 50
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1143-44
(Ohio 2002).
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that relaxed the requirements for proving causation and abolished affirmative
defenses, thereby greatly increasing the prospects for recovering Medicaid costs
from tobacco companies.585 However, state legislation has played a very
different role in the case of suits against handgun sellers. As the result of
lobbying efforts by the National Rifle Association, a number of states enacted
statutes which prohibit or restrict municipal lawsuits against handgun
manufacturers, retailers, and their trade associations.
586 These statutes have
already derailed lawsuits against handgun manufacturers by New Orleans and
Atlanta.
In Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp.,87 handgun manufacturers argued that a
state statute prohibited the City of New Orleans from suing to recoup the
economic costs of gun-related violence. The trial court concluded that once the
City brought suit, it had a vested right in its cause of action which could not be
abrogated by subsequent legislation.
588 The trial court also found that the
statute was an unconstitutional special law and that it violated the constitutional
guarantees of due process and equal protection.
589 On appeal, the Louisiana
Supreme Court observed that the legislature had the power to give retrospective
effect to its enactments 590 and had expressly done so in this case.
591 Moreover,
because the City was a political subdivision of the state rather than a "person,"
the court ruled that it could not challenge the statute's retrospective effects as a
denial of due process or an impairment of contract.
592 Furthermore, the court
concluded that the statute involved issues of statewide concern and, therefore,
overrode any powers granted to the City by its home rule charter.
5 93 Finally, the
court determined that the statute was general in nature and, consequently, could
not be characterized as invalid special legislation.
594 The court's decision in
Morial effectively put an end to the City's attempt to obtain damages against
handgun manufacturers.
The Georgia Supreme Court also upheld a state statute which prohibited
municipal lawsuits against handgun manufacturers. Shortly after the City of
Atlanta brought suit against a number of handgun manufacturers, distributors,
and trade associations, the Georgia Legislature amended the state firearms
regulation statute to prohibit such lawsuits.
5 95 The statute expressly applied to
585. Ed Dawson, Note, Legigation, 79 TEx. L. REV. 1727, 1731 (2001).
586. Jon S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, New Courtroom Strategies Regarding Firearms: Tort
Litigation Against Firearm Manufacturers and Constitutional Challenges to Gun Laws, 36 Hous. L.
REV. 1713, 1753 (1999). For a listing of these states, see the NRA Institute for Legislative Action's
webpage at http://www.nraila.org/GunLawsDefault.aspx (last visited Feb 25,2005).
587. 785 So. 2d 1 (La. 2001).
588. Morial, 785 So. 2d at 8.
589. Id. at 8-9.
590. Id at 9 (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 809, 816 (La. 1992)).
591. Id. at 11.
592. Id.
593. Morial, 785 So. 2d at 14-17.
594. Id at 17-19.
595. See Smith & Wesson Corp. v. Atlanta, 543 S.E.2d 16, 18 (Ga. 2001) (discussing GA. CODE
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pending, as well as future, lawsuits. 596 Relying on this provision, the defendants
sought writs of mandamus and prohibition to prevent the trial court from
hearing the case.597 However, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the
defendants were not entitled to such extraordinary relief and must make use of
the ordinary appeal process to determine whether or not the statute precluded
the City from proceeding with its lawsuit. 598
B. Remoteness
As the Ohio Supreme Court observed in City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp.,599 remoteness is not an independent legal doctrine, but rather is
associated with the concepts of standing and proximate cause.6° ° Under the
standing branch of remoteness, a complaint may be dismissed if the harm
suffered by the plaintiff is wholly derivative of harm suffered by a third party;
under the proximate cause branch, a complaint will be dismissed if the plaintiffs
harm is only remotely related to the defendant's conduct. 601
The United States Supreme Court evaluated the remoteness doctrine in
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp. in 1992. 602 ' The Holmes case
involved a civil RICO action by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation
("SIPC") to recover money that it was required to pay the customers of several
brokerage houses which failed due to the defendant's stock manipulations. 603
SIPC is a non-profit corporation created by the Securities Investor Protection
Act of 1970604 to provide insurance to customers of brokers who become
insolvent. 6°5  Holmes and others had allegedly participated in a fraudulent
scheme to boost the market price of six companies by making unfounded
optimistic statements about their prospective eamings.606  This induced a
number of broker-dealers to purchase stock in these companies with their own
funds. Stock prices collapsed when the fraud was discovered and two of these
broker-dealers became insolvent.607 SIPC ultimately paid customers of these
broker-dealers $13 million and then sought reimbursement from Holmes.6° 8 The
trial court dismissed SIPC's claim on standing and proximate cause grounds, but
ANN. § 16-11-184 (2003) which reserves the right to bring suit against gun manufacturers exclusively to
the state).
596. Smith & Wesson v. Atlanta, 543 S.E.2d at 18.
597. Id. at 19.
598. Id at 20-21.
599. 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002).
600. Cincinnati v. Beretta, 768 N.E.2d at 1147.
601. Id. at 1147-48.
602. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
603. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 261.
604. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (2000).
605. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 261.
606. Id. at 262.
607. Id. at 262-63.
608. Id at 263.
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the federal appeals court reversed.
60 9
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court offered several reasons why
there must be "'some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious
conduct alleged."'61 First, the less direct the injury, the more difficult it would be
for courts to determine the proportion of the plaintiffs' damages attributable to
particular defendants' misconduct; second, allowing claims against remote
parties would require courts to adopt complicated apportionment formulas in
order to avoid multiple recoveries by plaintiffs; and finally, those who are more
directly injured could vindicate the law without the complications associated
with lawsuits by remote parties.611 The Court concluded by finding that the link
between the defendant's stock manipulation and the brokers' inability to pay
their customers was too remote to support SIPC's claim.
612
The Iowa Supreme Court relied on remoteness principles in State ex rel.
Miller v. Philip Morris, Inc.613 to defeat a Medicaid reimbursement suit by the
State against cigarette manufacturers.
614 The state brought a common law
indemnity claim, alleging that it had sustained substantial costs in providing
health care and other services to smokers who suffered from tobacco-related
injuries, diseases, and illnesses.615 The trial court dismissed a number of the
state's claims on remoteness grounds and this decision was affirmed 
on appeal. 616
The Iowa Supreme Court declared that the remoteness doctrine is not based on
factual considerations like foreseeability, but rather on "public policy
considerations. '" 617 In this case, the court concluded that allowing employers or
health insurers to recover health-related smoking costs from tobacco companies
would open the door to unlimited liability.
618 Likewise, the court determined




In the words of one court, "Standing is the legal right to set judicial
machinery in motion." 620 A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court
unless he or she has some real interest in the case or controversy.
621 Thus, lack
609. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part, 503 U.S. 258
(1992).
610. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268.
611. Id. at269.
612. Id. at 274.
613. 577 N.W.2d 401 (Iowa 1998).
614. Philip Morris, 577 N.W.2d at 406-07.
615. Id. at 403.
616. Id. at 406.
617. Id.
618. Id. at 407.
619. Philip Morris, 577 N.W.2d at 407.
620. Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 119 (Conn. 2001).
621. Ganim, 780 A.2d 98 at 119.
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of standing could be a problem for government entities that wish to sue productsellers for indirect economic injuries.622  So far, one court dismissed a
government suit on standing grounds, while two others concluded -that the
government plaintiff had standing to sue product manufacturers. 623
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio refused to dismiss
a lawsuit against handgun manufacturers by the City of Cleveland in White v.Smith & Wesson.62 4 The defendants in that case moved to dismiss on grounds of"remoteness," without specifically mentioning either standing or proximate
cause.625 The court decided to treat the matter as a standing issue.626 The court
identified three conditions that must be met in order to satisfy the constitutional
requirements for standing: (1) the plaintiff must suffer an "injury in fact"-that is,
an invasion of a "concrete and particularized" legal interest; (2) the injury mustresult from the actions of the defendant and not be caused by the independent
action of a third party not before the court; and (3) it must be likely that the
injury can be "redressed by a favorable decision of the court. ' 627
First, the court determined that the City's loss of tax revenue and the
additional costs that it incurred for police protection, emergency services, policepension benefits, court and jail costs, and medical care were sufficiently concrete
and particularized to constitute an injury in fact.628 Second, the court found that
there was a causal connection between the injuries complained of and themanufacture and sale of handguns by the defendants. 629 Finally, the court
concluded that it was "likely that [the] [p]laintiff's injury could be redressed by a
favorable decision" in this case. 630
In addition to these three constitutional standing requirements, the courtdeclared that a plaintiff must satisfy three other "prudential standing
restrictions. ' 631 According to the court, a plaintiff must assert its own legal rightsand interests and could not rely on the rights or interests of others. 632 Inaddition, the claim asserted must be something more than a "generalized
grievance" shared by a large segment of the general public.633 Finally, where
622. See Dawson, supra note 585, at 1746 (declaring that "[t]he most powerful argument against
gun suits by governmental entities is lack of standing").
623. Compare White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 823-26 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (findingthat the City of Cleveland had standing to sue handgun manufacturers), and Cincinnati v. Beretta, 768N.E.2d at 1148 (holding that the City of Cincinnati had standing to sue handgun manufacturers); withGanim, 780 A.2d at 108 (concluding that the City of Bridgeport did not have standing to sue handgun
manufacturers).
624. 97 F. Supp. 2d 816 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
625. White, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 823.
626. Id.
627. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
628. Id. at 824-25.
629. Id. at 825.
630. White, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 825.
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statutory claims are involved, the plaintiff's claim must fall within the "zone of
interests" addressed by the legislature. 634 Applying these principles, the court
determined that the City of Cleveland's claims for nuisance abatement and
recoupment of economic losses were distinct from the personal injury claims of
gunshot victims.635 Furthermore, the court found that the City's economic loss
claims were not based on generalized grievances, but were unique to the City in
its governmental capacity.636 Finally, the court concluded that municipalities like
Cleveland were specifically protected by the Ohio Product Liability Act.
6 37
Consequently, the court refused to dismiss the City's lawsuit for lack of
standing.
638
The Ohio Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in City of Cincinnati
v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. In that case, the trial court dismissed the City of
Cincinnati's public nuisance, negligence, and products liability claims against
various handgun manufacturers. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court agreed
with the White court's analysis and concluded that the City had standing to sue to
recoup the economic costs of gun-related violence.
639 In the court's view, the
damages allegedly suffered by the City, "significant expenses for police,
emergency, health, corrections, prosecution and other services," were direct
injuries to it and not so remote or indirect as to preclude recovery (by the city) as
a matter of law.
64°
Handgun manufacturers were more successful in Ganim v. Smith & Wesson
Corp., where the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the City of
Bridgeport's lawsuit against handgun manufacturers for lack of standing.
641 The
City alleged that it was forced to provide increased public services as a result of
handgun violence and also claimed that its citizens' health, safety, and welfare
had been adversely affected by violent gun-related crime.
642 The court stated
that a plaintiff would not have standing to sue if his or her injuries are "remote,
indirect or derivative with respect to the defendant's conduct."
643 In particular,
injuries suffered by a third party are derivative and cannot be invoked by a
plaintiff to assert standing.644 Thus, for example, a life insurance company
cannot recover from a railroad for negligently causing the death of its insured.
645
At the same time, the court acknowledged that the question of whether a
plaintiff's injury is direct or indirect, remote or derivative involves essentially the
634. Id.
635. White, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 825
636. Id.
637. Id.
638. Id. at 825-26.
639. Cincinnati v. Beretta, 768 N.E.2d at 1148.
640. Id. at 1148-49.
641. Ganim, 780 A.2d at 108.
642. Id. at 118.
643. Id. at 119-20.
644. Id. at 120.
645. Id. (citing Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N.H.R. Co., 25 Conn. 265, 274-75
(1856)).
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same issue that courts traditionally considered in deciding whether a defendant
should be liable in tort to a plaintiff who is injured indirectly by a defendant,
namely at what point to cut off legal liability for the consequences of negligent
conduct. 646
The court in Ganim adopted an analysis of the standing issue that had
recently been applied by the Second Circuit of Appeals in Laborers Local 17
Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,647 which in turn relied on the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.648
In Laborers Local, the Second Circuit denied standing to a union health insurer
that had sued cigarette manufacturers to recover benefits paid to union members
for smoking-related medical costs.649
The Ganim court first looked at the causes of the plaintiff's injury and
observed that a whole host of social and economic factors besides handgun
violence contributed to the City's economic and quality of life problems.650 The
court also declared that it would have to "adopt complicated rules apportioning
damages among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violative
acts" if it allowed the City to recover damages for its economic losses.651 In
order to prevent double recoveries, damages would have to be apportioned
between the City and victims of fraudulent advertising and handgun violence. 652
In the court's view, apportionment of such damages "would present a daunting
question to any court. '"653 Finally, the court concluded that those who were
directly injured by handgun violence could remedy the harm more easily than
the City. 654 Damage claims by injured parties, if successful, would help to deter
tortious conduct by manufacturers and sellers of handguns and would avoid the
difficult causation and apportionment of damages issues that would arise in suits
by municipalities such as the City of Bridgeport. 655
The City argued that its injury was not derivative if it "would suffer harm to
some degree regardless of another's injuries. ' 656 The Ganim court construed this
to mean that the City would have standing to sue even if none of its residents
suffered personal injuries from handgun-related violence. 657 The court rejected
this argument for three reasons: first, it declared that the City's theory was
inconsistent with the allegations of social harm set forth in its complaint. 658
Second, the court declared that the remoteness issue did not depend solely on
646. Ganim, 780 A.2d at 120.
647. 191 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1080 (2000).
648. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
649. Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 239.
650. Ganim, 780 A.2d at 124-126.




655. Ganim, 780 A.2d at 126.
656. Id
657. Id. at 127.
658. Id.
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whether or not others suffered harm, but also depended on the length of the
chain of causation and other factors.659 Third, the court concluded that limiting
the City's standing to victimless crimes would lead to insurmountable causation
and apportionment problems.
66°
Recently, however, a New Jersey Superior Court in James v. Arms
Technology, Inc.661 rejected the Connecticut court's reasoning in Ganim. The
court in James observed that New Jersey traditionally took a liberal approach to
standing issues.662 According to the court, all that was required to satisfy the
state's standing requirement was that the party's concern with the subject matter
of the litigation must demonstrate "a sufficient stake and real adverseness. 
" 663
Under this standard, the court declared, a financial interest in the outcome was
sufficient to confer standing. 664 In this case, the City was not asserting the right
of a third party, such as an accident victim, but rather it was seeking to recoup
the financial costs imposed upon it by gun-related violence.
665 Accordingly, the




Some courts have denied liability on proximate cause grounds. For
example, in Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., the Third Circuit affirmed a lower court's dismissal of a public nuisance
action by Camden County against a number of handgun manufacturers.
667 The
plaintiff argued that "proximate cause, remoteness, and control" were not
essential to a public nuisance claim; however, the court concluded that the causal
chain between handgun manufacturers and the County was too attenuated.
668
A few months later, in City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,
669 the
Third Circuit also upheld the dismissal of negligence and negligent entrustment
claims by the City of Philadelphia and various community organizations against
handgun manufacturers. 670 Both the trial court and the appeals court looked at
six factors to determine whether the City's damages were too remote:
(1) the causal connection between the defendant's wrongdoing and the
plaintiff's harm; (2) the specific intent of the defendant to harm the
659. Id
660. Ganim, 780 A.2d at 127.
661. 820 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 2003).
662. James, 820 A.2d at 45.





667. 273 F.3d 536, 542 (3d Cir. 2001).
668. Camden v. Beretta, 273 F.3d at 541.
669. 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002).
670. Philadelphia v. Beretta, 277 F.3d at 426.
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plaintiff; (3) the nature of the plaintiff's ... injury .. .; (4) whether the
claim for damages is highly speculative; (5) the directness or
indirectness of the [plaintiff's] injury; and (6) the [need to keep
apportionment and other complex issues] within judicially manageable
limits. 671
Adopting the lower court's analysis, the Third Circuit concluded that most
of these factors supported the defendant's position on the proximate cause issue.
First, the court observed that the route that a gun takes from manufacturer to
the city streets was "long and tortuous," indicating that the causal connection
between plaintiffs and defendants was highly attenuated. 672 The court also found
that even the plaintiffs did not claim that the defendants intended to inflict injury
upon them; at most, it alleged that the defendants were aware of the existence of
a black market in illegal firearms. 673 In addition, the court determined that the
plaintiffs' injuries were largely derivative despite the fact that some of them, such
as educational and governmental expenses, were not suffered by individual
victims of handgun violence. 674  Furthermore, the court maintained that
individual victims of handgun-related violence are more appropriate parties to
recover from the defendants because their damages are more direct.675 The
court also declared that the plaintiffs' damages were speculative because it would
be impossible to determine how many injuries could have been prevented if
handgun manufacturers adopted more responsible marketing practices.676
Finally, the court concluded, it would require substantial judicial resources to
apportion damages fairly between the plaintiffs and individual victims. 677
Handgun manufacturers also raised the proximate cause issue in People ex
rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. 678 In this case, the State of New York had
argued that in order to advance a cognizable common-law public nuisance claim,
it need only allege and prove that defendants' business practices created or
contributed to the maintenance of a 'public nuisance."' 679 The New York
Superior Court, however, made it clear that principles of proximate cause
applied to nuisance claims just as they did to other tort claims. As the court
pointed out, "at some point, a party is simply too far removed from the nuisance
to be held responsible for it."680 The court then determined that the harm
complained of was indeed too remote from the defendants' commercial activity
to hold them accountable under principles of public nuisance law.681 In addition,
the court concluded that the harm was caused directly and principally by the
671. Id. at 423.
672. Id.
673. Id. at 424.
674. Id. at 424-25.
675. Philadelphia v. Beretta, 277 F.3d at 425.
676. Id.
677. Id.
678. 761 N.Y.S.2d 192,201 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
679. Spitzer, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
680. Id.
681. Id. at 201.
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criminal activities of intervening third parties and not by the manufacture and
distribution of firearms by the defendants.
682
Handgun sellers in City of Chicago v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp.,683 claimed that
the sale of firearms merely furnishes a condition by which the criminal acts of
others are made possible and, thus, are too remote to constitute the legal cause
of any nuisance that might have resulted from such criminal activity.
684
However, the Illinois Supreme Court declared that a defendant can be held
liable for damages caused by the criminal acts of third persons if such acts are
reasonably foreseeable. 685 In this case, the Illinois court, relying on the reasoning
in Spitzer, concluded that it was not foreseeable that handgun sales by dealers in
the Chicago area would create a public nuisance in Chicago.
686
However, more recently, a number of courts have reached a different result.
The first of these was the Ohio Supreme Court in City of Cincinnati v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp.687 Applying the three factors set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Holmes, the court concluded that the City's economic losses
from gun-related violence were sufficiently connected to the sale of handguns to
satisfy the requirements of proximate cause.6m The first factor, difficulty of
determining the plaintiffs damages, was easily satisfied, according to the court,
because the economic losses sustained by the City (as opposed to other victims)
could be accurately calculated. 689 The second factor in Holmes was also
established because the City was seeking to recover damages for losses suffered
by itself and no other; consequently, there was little danger of a double
recovery. 690 Finally, the court concluded that it was in the general interest for
the City to bring this suit, even though it was attempting to protect its citizens
from the effects of gun-related violence, because it was also suing on its own
behalf as well.
691
The New Jersey Superior Court in James v. Arms Technology, Inc. also
refused to dismiss a lawsuit against handgun manufacturers for lack of proximate
cause. 692 As part of its consideration of the proximate cause issue, the court
examined the six-factor analysis employed the lower court in Camden County v.
Beretta.693 These factors included cause-in-fact, the defendants' intent, the
nature of the plaintiffs injuries, the directness or indirectness of these injuries,
682. Id
683. 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Il. 2004).
684. Chicago v. Beretta, 821 N.E.2d at 1133.
685. Id. at 1134.
686. Id at 1136-38.
687. 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002).




692. 820 A.2d at 44.
693. Id at 37. See also Camden County Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123
F. Supp. 2d 245, 258-64 (D. N.J. 2000), afrd, 273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying the six factor
analysis).
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whether the plaintiff's damage claim was speculative, and whether the
recognition of the plaintiffs damage claim would result in duplicative recoveries
or require the court to develop complex apportionment formulas.694 After
considering these factors, the New Jersey court determined that the City's case
should not be dismissed on proximate cause grounds.695 The court noted that
other considerations of fairness and policy supported this conclusion. 696 In
particular, the court felt that allowing negligent parties to escape liability on
proximate cause grounds undermines the deterrent effect of tort law.697
The Indiana Supreme Court in City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp.69 8 also
refused to dismiss a case for lack of proximate cause. 699 As the court observed,
under Indiana law "liability may not be imposed on an original negligent actor
who sets into motion a chain of events if the ultimate injury was not reasonably
foreseeable as the natural and probable consequence of the act or omission. ' '7° °
The court expressed doubt that the City would be able to satisfy the proximate
cause requirement at trial. First, it observed that a significant amount of time
often passes between the sale of a handgun and the time that a crime is
committed with it.701 In addition, the court noted that guns that are lawfully sold
are often used in crimes as well. 7°2 Furthermore, the court observed, even when
unlawful sales contribute to handgun-related injuries, "the relationship of each
defendant to the sale may vary, and the vast majority of defendants will have no
relationship to the transaction that placed the gun in the hands of its user. ' 70 3
Nevertheless, despite these concerns, the court concluded that "[r]esolution of
these issues must await the proof offered to substantiate each claimed item. '704
C. Duty
One cannot be held liable for injuring another unless he or she owes a duty
to the victim to protect the victim from harm. Courts invoked this requirement
on numerous occasions to defeat "negligent marketing" claims against handgun
manufacturers by individual plaintiffs.70 5 The general approach adopted by
these courts is to classify handgun manufacturers' failure to discourage retail
694. James, 820 A.2d at 37-38.
695. Id. at 39-42.
696. Id. at 42-44.
697. Id. at 44.
698. 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003).
699. Gary v. Smith & Wesson, 801 N.E.2d at 1245.
700. Id. at 1244 (citing Control Techniques, Inc. v. Johnson, 762 N.E.2d 104, 108 (Ind. 2002);




704. Gary v. Smith & Wesson, 801 N.E.2d at 1245.
705. See Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for the Sale of Non-Defective Products: An Analysis
and Critique of the Concept of Negligent Marketing, 53 S.C. L. REv. 907, 918-930 (2002) (analyzing
cases where the court found no duty owed by handgun manufacturers).
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sales to criminals as nonfeasance rather than misfeasance. 0 6 If a manufacturer's
conduct is characterized as nonfeasance, it has no duty, in the absence of a
special relationship, to protect victims from the criminal acts of third parties.
707
Presumably, this reasoning would also apply to negligence-based claims by
government entities.
So far, only a few courts have discussed the duty issue in any significant way.
The Third Circuit's decision in City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.70 8 was
primarily concerned with standing issues, but the court also addressed the duty
issue. The district court in that case ruled that handgun manufacturers were
under no legal duty to protect individuals from the effects of gun-related
violence. 70 9 The Third Circuit agreed with this conclusion, declaring that
manufacturers ordinarily have no duty to prevent retail purchasers from
misusing their products.
710
The New York Superior Court based its dismissal of a public nuisance by
the State of New York in part on a duty analysis. 71' The court cited Hamilton v.
Beretta USA Corp.71 2 for the proposition that handgun manufacturers have no
duty to control the conduct of third parties in order to prevent them from
harming others even if they had the power to do so.713 The court went on to hold
that this principle applied to public nuisance actions brought by the state just as
it did to personal injury actions brought against handgun manufacturers by
private individuals.
714
However, the New Jersey Superior Court in James v. Arms Technology,
Inc.715 took a different view of the duty issue. The defendants maintained that
they owed no duty of care in the absence of a special relationship between them
and either the tortfeasors or the injured parties. 716 However, the court expressly
denied that a special relationship is required. 717 Instead, the court declared that
it must balance several factors in order to determine whether or not the
defendants owed a duty to the City, including: (1) the foreseeability and severity
of the risk, (2) the defendants' ability to prevent the harm through the exercise
of due care, (3) the relationship of the parties and (4) the public interest in the
706. See, e.g., Leslie v. U.S., 986 F. Supp. 900, 912 (D. N.J. 1997) (noting that gun manufacturers,
in general, have no duty to control the advertising and distribution of weapons, but that liability may
be imposed if advertisements contained false or misleading information).
707. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.2d 148, 157 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that, absent a
special relationship, manufacturers have no duty to protect and control the distribution of dangerous
products).
708. 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002).
709. City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882, 898-902 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
710. Philadelphia v. Beretta, 277 F.3d at 425.
711. People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 196 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
712. 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001).
713. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
714. Id. at 200-01.
715. 820 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
716. James, 820 A.2d at 46.
717. Id. at 47.
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proposed solution. 718 The court found that the City's pleadings charged that the
defendants were aware of the possibility that handguns might be misused and
that they were also aware of the resulting harm to the City from such misuse.7 19
The court also determined the pleadings charged that the defendants knew of
the existence of the illegal gun market and had the ability to prevent some of the
resulting harm by exercising greater control over the distribution and sale of its
products.720 Finally, the court observed, the public would benefit if tort liability
created an incentive for the defendants to reduce the risk of gun-related
violence.
721
D. The Economic Loss Rule
In most states, consumers cannot bring a strict liability action against a
manufacturer or product seller unless they sustain a "physical injury. '722 This
includes personal injuries as well as direct physical damage to a consumer's
property. 723 In other words, a plaintiff cannot recover for economic losses
alone.724 A similar rule applies to negligence actions725 and possibly to public
nuisance actions as well.726 Since most of the claims brought by government
entities involve purely economic losses rather than physical injury or property
damage, one would expect product manufacturers to invoke the economic loss
718. Id. at 46.
719. Id. at 47.
720. Id.
721. James, 820 A.2d at 47.
722. See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279,285-86 (Alaska 1976) (noting that
strict liability in tort extends only to physical damages and not economic loss); Seely v. White Motor
Co., 403 P.2d 145, 150-52 (Cal. 1965) (stating that a manufacturer may be held strictly liable for
physical injuries caused by defects in a product, but not for the level of performance of a product in a
consumer's business); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899, 902
(Fla. 1987) (holding that contract principles are more appropriate than tort principles for resolving
economic loss without an accompanying physical injury); Waggoner v. Town & Country Mobile
Homes, Inc., 808 P.2d 649, 653 (Okla. 1990) (holding that, because the loss suffered was solely
economic in nature, recovery must be based on the contractual relationship between the parties and
not on strict liability principles); Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 437
N.W.2d 213, 217-18 (Wis. 1989) (holding that physical damages constitute a tort claim, while economic
loss constitutes a contractual claim).
723. Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for Asbestos Removal Costs, 73 OR. L. REV. 505, 523
(1994).
724. Id. at 522-23.
725. See Consol. Edison Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 358, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(holding that New York does not allow recovery for economic loss in negligence actions); Moorman
Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 451 (Ill. 1982) (noting that the "vast majority" of courts do
not permit recovery for economic losses in negligence actions); Marcil v. John Deere Indus. Equip.
Co., 403 N.E.2d 430, 434 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that a plaintiff suffering only economic loss
cannot bring a negligence action).
726. See John G. Culhane & Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Defining a Proper Role for Public Nuisance
Law in Municipal Suits Against Gun Sellers: Beyond Rhetoric and Experience, 52 S.C. L. REV. 287, 328
(2001) (declaring that "[e]ven if recovery for economic loss is appropriate in municipal suits against
gun sellers, it should not be permitted under a public nuisance theory").
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rule whenever possible. In fact, the issue has only been raised in a few of the
handgun cases where municipal plaintiffs have avoided the impact of the
economic loss rule by alleging property damage as well as economic loss.
For example, the defendants in White v. Smith & Wesson, argued that the
Ohio Products Liability Act did not permit the City of Cleveland to recover for
economic losses allegedly caused by the defendants' sale of defectively designed
firearms.727  The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
acknowledged that the Ohio statute excludes recovery for "economic loss,"
728
but refused to dismiss the City's product liability claims because it declared that
it had suffered "physical damage." 729 The court concluded that if the City was
able to prove that it suffered some sort of physical harm, then it could recover
damages for any economic losses that proximately resulted from the defective
characteristics of the defendants' handguns.
730
The Ohio Supreme Court took another approach in City of Cincinnati v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp.731 In that case, the City charged various handgun
manufacturers with producing defectively designed firearms and with failure to
warn.732 The intermediate appellate court had upheld the lower court's dismissal
of the City's lawsuit because, among other things, it concluded that the Act did
not allow the City to recover for economic loss alone.
733 The Ohio Supreme
Court agreed with the intermediate appellate court that the City had alleged
only economic losses and, therefore, could not bring a statutory claim.
734
However, the court ruled that the Ohio Products Liability Act does not preclude
the City from basing its claims on negligent design and negligent failure to
warn. 735 Without citing any authority, the court concluded that these negligence-
based claims were valid even though the City's losses were entirely economic in
nature.
736
City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.737 appears to be the only case where
a court relied on the economic loss rule to deny recovery. In that case, the City
of Chicago argued that the economic loss doctrine does not apply in a public
nuisance action where a defendant breaches a duty to the general public.
738
However, the court determined that the damages sought by the City were
727. White, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 828.
728. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71 (G) (Anderson 2001) (excluding economic loss from
the statutory definition of "harm").
729. White, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 828.
730. Id
731. 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002).
732. Cincinnati v. Beretta, 768 N.E.2d at 1144.
733. Id. at 1145
734. Id. at 1146.
735. Id. at 1146-47.
736. Id. at 1147.
737. 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill 2004).
738. Chicago v. Beretta, 821 N.E.2d at 1141 (citing In re One Meridian Plaza Fire Litig., 820 F.
Supp. 1460, 1480 (E.D. Pa. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 12 F.3d 1270 (3d Cir. 1993) and People
Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 111 (N.J. 1985)).
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"'solely economic damages' in the sense that they represent costs incurred in the
absence of harm to a plaintiffs person or property" and held that the economic
loss rule prevents the recovery of such damages in public nuisance cases just as it
does in private nuisance cases.739
E. The Municipal Cost Recovery Rule
The municipal cost recovery rule is another potential barrier to efforts by
government entities to recover for the costs of providing certain government
services.740 The municipal cost recovery rule has its origins in the traditional
"fireman's rule," which provides that a landowner is not liable to police officers,
firefighters, or other government employees who are injured on the premises
even though the landowner's negligence caused the condition which required
them to enter.741 Under a somewhat similar rationale, the municipal cost
recovery rule bars government entities from suing tortfeasors to recover for the
costs of normal governmental services such as police and fire protection. The
municipal cost recovery rule itself can be traced to an opinion by Judge (later
Justice) Anthony Kennedy in City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry, decided in 1983.742 In that case, the City of Flagstaff sued a railroad to
recover approximately $42,000 that it spent to evacuate residents after four tank
cars carrying liquefied petroleum gas derailed. 743 These expenses included the
costs of overtime pay, emergency equipment, emergency medical personnel, and
the food provided to residents who had to be evacuated. 744 The lower court
dismissed the City's suit and this decision was affirmed on appeal. 745
The court in Atchison declared that the cost of government services is
traditionally spread among the public by taxes and that the reasonable
expectations of individuals, business entities, and liability insurers would be
upset if these costs are reallocated by a change in existing liability rules. 746
Moreover, the court reasoned, because "the governments has chosen to bear the
cost for reasons of economic efficiency, or even as a subsidy to the citizens and
their business, the decision implicates fiscal policy .... ,,747 In the court's view,
the legislature, rather than the courts, is the appropriate forum to address such
fiscal issues. 748 Furthermore, the court declared that the rule that it announced
739. Id. at 1143.
740. See Anne Giddings Kimball & Sarah L. Olson, Municipal Firearm Litigation: Ill Conceived
from Any Angle, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1277, 1296 (2000) (noting that without an authorizing statute,
municipalities cannot recover expenditures for government functions).
741. Andrew S. Cabana, Comment, Missing the Target-Municipal Litigation Against Handgun
Manufacturers: Abuse of the Civil Tort System, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1127, 1164 (2001).
742. 719 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1983).




747. Id. at 324.
748. Atchison, 719 F.2d at 324.
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did not depend on whether the City's claim was based on negligence or strict
liability, nor was it based on notions of remoteness or causation.
749 Finally, the
court observed that a government entity could recover the cost of government
services when authorized by statute or regulation, when required to carry out the
intent of a statute or to pay for the cost of abating a public 
nuisance. 750
According to the court, these exceptions to the "no recoupment" rule are
unrelated to normal police, fire protection, or emergency services.
7 5 1
At the present time, defendants have invoked the municipal cost recovery
doctrine in a number of cases, but without much success. For example, in White,
handgun manufacturers relied on Ohio's "firefighter's rule" and the municipal
cost recovery rule to avoid liability for gun-related violence.
75 2 The U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio concluded that the firefighter's rule is
concerned with premises liability and only bars claims against negligent
landowners by injured government employees (who are protected by workers
compensation laws) and does not apply to claims brought by government entities
against the manufacturers of dangerous products.
753 The defendants also argued
that the municipal cost recovery rule should prevent the City of Cleveland from
suing them to recover the costs of providing police, medical, fire protection, and
emergency services in cases of gun-related violence.
754  However, the court
concluded that the City had alleged willful, intentional, and purposeful conduct,
affirmative acts of negligence, and other facts to which the traditional rule did
not apply.
755
Handgun manufacturers also invoked the municipal cost recovery rule in
City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.
75 6 The City of Cincinnati sought to
recover for the cost of providing "police, emergency, health, corrections,
prosecution and other services" in gun-violence cases.
757 Citing the Atchison
case, the defendants argued that costs of these services were not recoverable
because the City was legally obligated to provide normal governmental
services.758 The Supreme Court of Ohio, however, distinguished between the
facts in Atchison, a single discrete event requiring a single emergency response,
749. See id. (explaining that the denial of recovery was not based on tort theory but rather "the
identity of the claimant and the nature of the cost").
750. Id.
751. 1d
752. White, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 821-22.
753. See id. at 822-23 (concluding that it would be a "deafening amplification" of the firefighter's
rule to use it to prevent recovery in claims by municipalities against manufacturers of dangerous
products).
754. See id. at 822 (indicating that the defendants argued the municipality could not recover the
cost of certain governmental functions because those functions are traditionally provided by the
government and cost is most efficiently spread to public).
755. Id at 823.
756. See Cincinnati v. Beretta, 768 N.E.2d at 1149 (noting appellees' argument that cost of public
services is not recoverable because the city has a duty to provide the services).
757. See id. (listing government expenses as damages from gun manufacturers' misconduct).
758. See id. (noting appellees' reliance on Flagstaff and summarizing court's holding).
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and the facts in the Cincinnati case, which involved an ongoing and persistent
condition.759  It concluded that the "no recoupment" policy articulated in
Atchison was not applicable to the continuing problem of gun violence that
afflicted the City of Cincinnati. 76° Finally, the court pointed out that even the
Atchison court had exempted public nuisance abatement claims from the
purview of the municipal cost recovery rule. 761
In an amicus brief, the Product Liability Advisory Council argued in James
v. Arms Tech., Inc. that the municipal cost recovery rule should preclude the City
of Newark from recovering damages against handgun manufacturers. 762 The
New Jersey Superior Court offered a number of reasons why the municipal cost
recovery rule is not applicable in a public nuisance case. First, the court did not
believe that the municipal cost recovery rule should be extended beyond single-
event accidents involving relatively small costs to situations where the
government might be required to expend substantial amounts of public funds on
a continuing basis to correct a problem.763 Second, the court expressed doubt
about whether the rule should apply where a municipality brought a public
nuisance action to recover abatement costs.764 Third, the court stated that it was
unfair to require taxpayers to subsidize the tortious conduct of product
manufacturers. 765 Finally, the court observed that if the municipal cost recovery
rule was applied, handgun manufacturers would be immunized from liability
and, therefore, have no incentive to reduce the risk of harm or to insure against
it.
766
Handgun manufacturers also invoked the municipal cost recovery rule in
City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp. The Indiana Supreme Court rejected a
per se rule that would prevent municipalities from recovering any emergency
response costs from tortfeasors.767 The court declared that some of these costs
could properly be shifted to the defendants. 768 At the same time, the court
acknowledged that some of the costs that the City was seeking to recoup might
be characterized as a general cost of government. 769
The one exception to this rejection of the municipal cost recovery rule
appears to be City of Chicago v. Beretta.770 In that case, the Illinois Supreme
759. Id.
760. See id. (distinguishing Flagstaff holding because misconduct in Cincinnati v. Beretta was
"ongoing and persistent").
761. Cincinnati v. Beretta, 768 N.E.2d at 1149-50.
762. James, 820 A.2d at 48 (citing Township of Cherry Hill v. Conti Constr. Co., 527 A.2d 921
(N.J. Super. App. Div. 1987)).
763. Id at 48-49.
764. Id. at 49.
765. Id
766. Id.
767. Gary v. Smith & Wesson, 801 N.E.2d at 1243.
768. Id.
769. See id. (explaining that some costs incurred by a municipality in responding to an incident
are not directly attributable to the particular incident).
770. 801 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2004).
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Court declared that "where a system already exists for the rational allocation of
costs, and where society as a whole relies upon that system, there is little reason
for a court to impose an entirely new system of allocation.
'" 771 Refusing to follow
the reasoning of the court in James, the Illinois court concluded that there is no
meaningful distinction between single, discrete disasters, such as fires and
explosions, and everyday occurrences, such as handgun violence.
772 In addition,
the court declared that the legislature could enact cost-recovery legislation if it
believes that handgun manufacturers and sellers, rather than taxpayers, should
pay for the cost of handgun-related violence.
773 Furthermore, because the
damages claimed by the City did not necessarily represent the costs of
abatement, the exception recognized in City of Flagstaff to the municipal costs
recovery rule for that purpose did not apply in this case.
774 Finally, the court
expressed doubts about whether awarding damages to the City would provide




Product manufacturers can defend themselves against public tort litigation
in a number of ways. Probably the most effective strategy is to obtain a
legislative ban on such lawsuits. For example, preemptive state legislation
sidetracked municipal lawsuits against handgun manufacturers in Louisiana
776
and Georgia.777 Of course, Congress could also preempt public tort lawsuits by
state and local governments as well. Manufacturers can also take advantage of a
formidable array of common-law doctrines to defend against lawsuits by
government entities. However, some of these doctrines have proved more useful
than others. Defendants have raised standing as an issue in a number of cases.
The Connecticut Supreme Court dismissed a lawsuit by the City of Bridgeport
on standing grounds in Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp.
778 However, standing
challenges by defendants were rejected in a number of other cases.
779
Proximate cause arguments have been somewhat more successful. Courts
dismissed public tort suits on proximate grounds in Camden County Board of
771. Chicago v. Beretta, 801 N.E.2d at 1145.




776. See Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1, 6 (La. 2001) (holding that a Louisiana
statute abolished the city's right to bring public tort claims and transferred authority to the state).
777. See Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 543 S.E.2d 16, 21 (Ga. 2001) (Fletcher, J.,
concurring) (concluding that Georgia law precludes the City of Atlanta's action against firearm
manufacturers, while noting that this issue was not reached by the majority).
778. 780 A.2d at 123.
779. White, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 826; James, 820 A.2d at 45. See Cincinnati v. Beretta, 768 N.E.2d at
1148-49 (concluding that appellants satisfied the two requirements for standing identified in handgun
cases).
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Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,780 City of Philadelphia v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp.,781 and People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc.782 On the
other hand, proximate cause arguments failed to persuade the courts in
Cincinnati v. Beretta,783 James,784 and Gary v. Smith & Wesson. 785 Thus, it
appears that proximate cause is only a moderately effective defense.
Duty is somewhat problematic. The Third Circuit in Philadelphia v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp. mentioned duty786 as well as standing787 as the basis for upholding
the dismissal of a lawsuit by the City of Philadelphia. 788 A New York state
intermediate appellate court also determined in People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm,
Ruger & Co., Inc. that handgun manufacturers do not have a duty to protect the
government from harm caused by the intervening actions of third parties. 789 On
the other hand, the New Jersey Superior Court in City of Gary v. Smith &
Wesson Corp. rejected the special relationship rule proposed by the defendants
and concluded that they do have a duty to exercise reasonable care.79°
Very few courts have discussed the economic loss rule. In White v. Smith &
Wesson, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio declared that
Ohio's product liability statute does not allow the City of Cleveland to recover
for purely economic losses, but concluded that the losses the City alleged also
included property damage.791  Later, the Ohio Supreme Court in City of
Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. concluded that the Ohio statute's restriction
on economic losses does not apply to negligence claims.792 In view of these
mixed results, it is difficult to predict whether products manufacturers will rely
upon the economic loss rule to any great extent in the future.
780. See Camden v. Beretta, 273 F.3d at 541 (concluding that the causal chain linking
manufacture of handguns and municipal crime-fighting costs is too attenuated to sustain public
nuisance claim).
781. See Cincinnati v. Beretta, 277 F.3d at 423-24 (discussing the causal chain from gun
manufacturers to commission of a crime and concluding that it is too remote to establish proximate
causation).
782. See Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d at 201-02 (concluding that the harm alleged is far too
remote from the defendant's lawful commercial activity to support a finding of liability).
783. See Cincinnati v. Beretta, 768 N.E.2d at 1149 (concluding that the city's claim was not too
remote to permit recovery).
784. See James, 820 A.2d at 44 (finding proximate cause based on conclusion that insulating gun
manufacturers from liability would undermine strong public interest in protection from social costs
associated with criminal misuse of firearms).
785. Gary v. Smith & Wesson, 801 N.E.2d at 1245 (noting that, although there may be an issue
regarding whether or not the unlawful sale of a gun was the proximate cause of a crime involving the
gun, it cannot be stated as a matter of law that no recovery is allowed).
786. Philadelphia v. Beretta, 277 F.3d at 419 n.3, 425.
787. Id at 425.
788. Id
789. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d at 200-01
790. Gary v. Smith & Wesson, 820 A.2d at 46-47.
791. See supra notes 727-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the economic loss rule in
White.
792. Cincinnati v. Beretta, 768 N.E.2d at 1146 (Ohio 2002).
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Product manufacturers have also invoked the municipal cost recovery rule
in several cases, but these efforts have yet to be successful. Thus, in White v.
Smith & Wesson Corp., handgun manufacturers attempted to avoid liability by
raising the municipal cost recovery rule as a defense. 79
3 The court, however,
side-stepped the issue by finding that the rule does not apply to intentional
acts.794 Other cases, such as City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. and City of
Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp. have discussed the municipal cost recovery rule
on its merits and concluded that it should not apply to claims arising from
continuing activities or conditions.
IV. CONCERNS ABOUT PUBLIC TORT LAWSUITS
Commentators have offered many justifications for government-sponsored
lawsuits. One popular rationale emphasizes accident cost avoidance or
"deterrence." Conventional wisdom assumes that manufacturers are unlikely to
invest sufficiently in safety if product-related accident costs are externalized to
the public, but that they will have an incentive to make their products safer if
they are held liable to injured consumers. 79' Arguably, this principle provides
support for public tort lawsuits as well.79 Successful public tort lawsuits help to
internalize product-related health costs by ensuring that they are borne by the
manufacturer.79
Another benefit of cost internalization is that it encourages efficient levels
of consumption. When these costs are internalized, consumers can make
efficient decisions about consumption even though they have no specific
information about a product's social costs because the price they must pay for
the product fully reflects these costs.
798 On the other hand, if accident costs are
not internalized, but are externalized to third parties, the price charged to
consumers will be too low and they will over-consume the product.
799 This
appears to be true in the case of cigarettes because Medicaid and other social
793. See supra notes 752-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the municipal cost
recovery rule in White.
794. See id (noting that rule does not apply to circumstances of intentional negligence).
795. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment
of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 765, 768 (1983) (discussing how liability encourages
manufacturers to invest in safety regardless of whether the liability rule is negligence or strict liability).
796. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the Public Tort, 58
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1019, 1020-21 (2001) (arguing that the use of public torts provides incentives to
invest in safety).
797. See Jon S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, A Public Health Approach to Regulating Firearms as
Consumer Products, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1193, 1206 (2000) (explaining that costs of public tort
litigation give manufacturers incentive to create safer products).
798. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government
Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1281, 1289-90 (1980) (stating that price consumers pay for product
incorporates all costs necessary to make product).
799. See Raymond E. Gangarosa et al., Suits by Public Hospitals to Recover Expenditures for the
Treatment of Disease, Injury and Disability Caused by Tobacco and Alcohol, 22 FoRDHAM URB. L.J.
81, 104 (1994) (providing as an example that the price of tobacco is low because third parties like
society and public hospitals incur cost of treating cancer).
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welfare programs pay for a large part of the health costs of smoking.sn° If
government entities were able to recover some of these costs from tobacco
companies, the cost of cigarettes would rise and consumption would presumably
fall.8°1 This same rationale could presumably be invoked to justify public tort
lawsuits against manufacturers of handguns, alcoholic beverages, and other
dangerous products.8
Tort liability can also achieve greater corrective justice by forcing product
manufacturers to compensate victims who have been injured by the sale or
marketing of defective products or other wrongdoing. Principles of corrective
justice require that one who has obtained property from another by theft or
fraud be compelled to return this property to the victim. 8°  If product
manufacturers have been unjustly enriched by shifting the costs of product-
related injuries to the government, then public tort lawsuits arguably serve a
corrective justice function by forcing them to compensate the public for the cost
of treating injuries caused by their products °4
Notwithstanding these apparent benefits, government-sponsored lawsuits
raise a number of concerns. First, public tort litigation may interfere with the
operation of government and encourage undesirable conduct by governmental
entities. Second, government-sponsored lawsuits may harm the legal system and
the legal profession. Finally, public tort lawsuits threaten the economic well-
being of product manufacturers and their employees and suppliers, as well that
of retail sellers and other businesses.
A. Impact Upon Government Institutions
Public tort suits arguably have a detrimental effect upon existing
government institutions. For example, because they resemble regulation and
taxation, the settlement agreements that result from public tort litigation may
usurp the powers of the legislative branch by implementing policy choices that
should be made by the legislative branch of government. In addition, because of
800. See Richard C. Ausness, Product Category Liability: A Critical Analysis, 24 N. KY. L. REv.
423, 442-43 (1997) (noting that the price of cigarettes does not incorporate true cost because third
parties like society, rather than tobacco companies, bear a share of the costs); Donald W. Garner,
Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability A Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1423, 1462 (1980)
(stating that society incurs a large share of the true cost of smoking).
801. See Frank J. Vandall, Reallocating the Costs of Smoking: The Application of Absolute
Liability to Cigarette Manufacturers, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 405, 415 (1991) (arguing that imposing liability
on tobacco companies will result in higher prices for cigarettes and decreased sale of cigarettes).
802. See Andrew 0. Smith, Comment, The Manufacture and Distribution of Handguns as an
Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 369, 376 (1987) (explaining that imposing liability
costs on handgun manufacturers will result in higher prices for handguns and decreased sales of
handguns).
803. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., From Cigarettes to Alcohol: The Next Step in Hedonic Product
Liability?, 27 PEPP. L. REv. 701, 716 (1999) (explaining that corrective justice seeks to put parities in
the place they were in prior to their wrongful loss).
804. See Galligan, supra note 796, at 1031 (arguing that permitting government entities to recover
in suits against tobacco companies promotes goals of corrective justice).
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the way public tort litigation is financed, government officials can often avoid
political accountability for the decisions they make. Moreover, because
settlement agreements are not "legislation" in a formal sense, government
officials may be tempted to use them as a means of imposing unconstitutional
restrictions and requirements on product sellers. Finally, public tort litigation
sometimes causes governmental entities to act in ways that are not consistent
with principles of morality or good government.
1. Interference with Legislative Powers
Some government officials seem to view litigation as an alternative to the
existing legislative process."5 Settlement agreements which attempt to regulate
product design and marketing practices are the primary mechanism for
bypassing the legislature.6 For example, the 1998 Master Settlement
Agreement between the states and the tobacco industry prohibited cigarette
companies from "targeting youth in ads and marketing," banned the use of
cartoon characters like Joe Camel in cigarette advertising, proscribed cigarette
advertising on billboards, buses and taxicabs, forbade'the sponsorship of
concerts and sporting events, and prohibited tobacco companies from selling or
distributing any clothing or other merchandise which bore their 
logos.807
The federal government also sought to achieve its regulatory goals through
litigation instead of through legislation. Thus, in its lawsuit against the tobacco
industry, the Department of Justice asked for a permanent injunction to prohibit
cigarette companies from misrepresenting the health risks of smoking in the
future.88  It also tried to force the tobacco companies to fund various anti-
smoking campaigns, to disclose documents relating to the targeting of children,
and to make corrective statements regarding the health risks of smoking and the
addictive qualities of nicotine.0 9
The federal government used the same tactics in its attempt to impose
restrictions and affirmative duties on handgun manufacturers. For example, the
settlement agreement between Smith & Wesson and HUD mandated significant• 810
changes in the manufacturer's marketing and distribution practices. The
manufacturer was required to place a second set of hidden serial numbers on its
805. See Tyrone Hughes, Note, Hamilton v. AccuTek: Potential Collective Liability of the
Handgun Industry for Negligent Marketing, 13 ToURO L. REV. 287, 304 (1996) (cautioning that judicial
imposition of liability could be construed as judicial legislation).
806. Amber E. Dean, Comment, Lead Paint Public Entity Lawsuits: Has the Broad Stroke of
Tobacco and Firearms Litigation Painted a Troubling Picture for Lead Paint Manufacturers?, 28 PEPP.
L. REV. 915, 936 (2001) (stating that lawsuits by government entities are means to ensure courts,
rather than legislatures, determine policy and compel limits on advertising).
807. Michael DeBow, The State Tobacco Litigation and the Separation of Power in State
Governments: Repairing the Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 563, 569 (2001) (citations omitted).
808. United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 134 (D. D.C. 2000).
809. See Philip Morris, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 138 (noting that government argued tobacco companies
aimed advertising at children and were untruthful about health effects of cigarettes).
810. David Kairys, The Government Handgun Cases and the Elements and Underlying Policies of
Public Nuisance Law, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1175, 1186 (2000).
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products to deter criminals from erasing serial numbers, to equip new handguns
with trigger locks, and to develop smart-gun technology within three years."s
Local government litigants have also relied on litigation as an alternative to
legislation in their efforts to impose controls over the manufacture and sale of
handguns. s 2
Settlement agreements also sometimes require manufacturers to make
periodic payments that resemble excise taxes to government plaintiffs. The most
elaborate payment regime was embodied in the 1998 Master Settlement
Agreement which set up a complex formula for the payment of $206 billion to
813the states over a twenty-five year period. Almost all of the settlement's costs
8114were directly passed on to consumers. In practical terms, cigarette users were
forced to pay an additional 45-cents per pack to the state governments for the
privilege of smoking."5 However, unlike a normal tax measure enacted by the
legislature, the settlement process did not offer an opportunity for public
discussion about the merits of financing government health care programs by
means of a "tax" on smoking.
One can argue that it is improper for government officials to implement
regulatory policies that would normally require the assent of the legislative
branch. Under our American system of government, each branch' exercises
power within its assigned area of responsibility. Although agencies of the
executive branch sometimes carry out legislative and judicial functions, this is
done pursuant to legislative authorization. In general, the separation of powers
doctrine requires each branch of government to respect the prerogative of the
other branches and to refrain from encroaching upon the functions of another
branch. Public tort litigation, particularly when its goal is to implement a
regulatory agenda by means of a settlement, amounts to an interference by
members of the executive branch with the legislature's powers. Bypassing the
legislature in this way not only encroaches upon the legislature's constitutional
role, it also undermines the democratic process by depriving popularly elected
representatives of any control over regulatory policy.
2. Avoidance of Political Accountability
Public tort litigation sometimes enables government officials to avoid
accountability for actions that may impose significant regulatory and financial
811. Ed Dawson, Note, Legigation, 79 TEx. L. REV. 1727, 1748-49 (2001).
812. See Part I.B for a discussion of cases brought by local government entities against handgun
manufacturers.
813. Bryce A. Jensen, Note, From Tobacco to Health Care and Beyond - A Critique of Lawsuits
Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1334, 1335 (2001).
814. See DeBow, supra note 807, at 569 (pointing out that tobacco companies increased cigarette
prices as way to transfer cost of settlement agreement to public); Edward Winter Trapolin, Comment,
Sued into Submission: Judicial Creation of Standards in the Manufacture and Distribution of Lawful
Products - The New Orleans Lawsuit Against Gun Manufacturers, 46 Loy. L. REV. 1275, 1300 (2000)
(explaining that tobacco companies, as a result of settlement, have passed costs onto consumers in the
form of increased cigarette prices).
815. Dawson, supra note 811, at 1759.
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costs on producers or consumers. When the legislature increases regulatory
burdens or raises taxes, the process is open to public scrutiny and constituents
who are adversely affected by such decisions can try to hold legislators
accountable by replacing them with others in the next election. There are no
such guarantees when regulatory and taxation measures are formulated by
unelected government officials and trial lawyers. One reason for this lack of
political accountability is the fact that government-sponsored litigation is usually
privately financed. In most of the tobacco cases, for example, state officials
entered into contingent fee arrangements with private lawyers.
816 Because they
did not have to seek public funding, these officials were largely exempted from
any legislative oversight.8 7  Many of the lawsuits that were brought against
handgun manufacturers seem to have been financed in this fashion as well.
Obviously, it is more difficult for legislative bodies to control the activities of the
executive through the "power of the purse" when the cost of public tort litigation
is largely off the books.
Secrecy also enables public officials to avoid accountability. Lawyers and
their clients do not discuss litigation strategies in public. Consequently, decisions
about who to sue, what kinds of claims to make, and what kind of relief to seek
are not openly debated, nor is there any provision for public comment at this, or
any other, stage of the process. Likewise, settlement negotiations between
plaintiff and defense lawyers are held in private and are usually not subject to
public scrutiny until a final agreement has been reached.8",
The secrecy associated with the litigation and settlement process also leaves
affected third parties without any influence or input. For example, negotiations
between state officials and representatives of the tobacco industry during the
1997 settlement would have had a significant impact on tobacco farmers and
smokers. Had the settlement been approved by Congress, the price of cigarettes
would have increased substantially, the right of injured smokers to sue tobacco
companies would have been circumscribed, and tobacco farmers would have
suffered financial losses from reduced tobacco sales to cigarette companies as the
numbers of smokers decreased. However, the interests of smokers and tobacco
farmers were not adequately represented because they had no serious role in the
settlement process.
3. Unconstitutional Restrictions and Requirements
Manufacturers may be forced to accept settlement provisions that subject
them to regulations that would be considered unconstitutional if they were
imposed by legislation. This is particularly true of attempts to restrict
816. Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the
Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 1, 17 (2000).
817. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., State Medical Reimbursement Lawsuits after Tobacco: Is the
Domino Effect for Lead Paint Manufacturers and Others Fair Game?, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 685, 695 (2000)
(explaining that entering into contingency fee agreements with private lawyers meant that state
officials did not have to ask legislature for funding).
818. Trapolin, supra note 814, at 1299.
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commercial speech by manufacturers. Although commercial speech is not
treated like other forms of expression, it is entitled to some protection under the
First Amendment."1 9 According to the Supreme Court, the government can
regulate commercial speech only if it is deceptive, intended to serve an illegal
purpose, or: (1) the regulation in question is necessary to advance a substantial
governmental interest; (2) the regulation directly advances that interest; and (3)
the regulation is no broader than necessary to advance that interest.820
However, the Master Settlement Agreement contained a number of
content-based restrictions on marketing and advertising that arguably would
have violated the tobacco companies' right to commercial speech if they had
been imposed by law.821 One such measure was the prohibition against cartoon
characters such as "Joe Camel." This restriction on advertising, if enacted by
the legislature, might have been held invalid because it was content-based even
though the cartoon characters in question were allegedly designed to encourage
children to smoke." 3  The Master Settlement Agreement also regulated
advertising at concerts and sporting events. 84  Once again, such a sweeping
restriction on commercial speech would probably be held unconstitutional if it
were implemented directly by the government.m
Proponents of tobacco regulation would no doubt argue that the tobacco
companies "waived" their constitutional rights when they agreed to the
Settlement's advertising and marketing restrictions. As a technical matter that is
correct in the sense that the tobacco companies might be estopped from
subsequently challenging these restrictions in court. However, concerns about
restrictions on basic constitutional rights go beyond the interests of the
contracting parties. The public has a strong interest in upholding and supporting
constitutional rights even when the immediate beneficiaries of these rights are
willing to waive them. As the cases involving unconstitutional conditions
illustrate, the courts have imposed limits on the "voluntary" waiver of
constitutional rights. This is particularly true when there is an element of
coercion involved. Although the advertising and marketing restrictions that
were imposed by the tobacco settlement might not be invalid as unconstitutional
819. See Lars Noah, Authors, Publishers, and Products Liability: Remedies for Defective
Information in Books, 77 OR. L. REv. 1195, 1224-25 (1998) (noting that the Supreme Court has
distinguished between commercial and non-commercial speech if it withstands intermediate scrutiny).
820. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (setting forth the analysis in commercial speech cases).
821. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (setting forth the analysis in commercial speech cases).
822. DeBow, supra note 807, at 569 (citations omitted).
823. See Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 589,
627-31 (1996) (discussing limitations on use of cartoons in advertising because they arguably target
children).
824. See DeBow, supra note 807, at 569 (stating that agreement imposed limitations on
marketing).
825. See Redish, supra note 823, at 632-35 (arguing that a ban on tobacco advertising raises
constitutional questions).
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826conditions, they do raise legitimate concerns about the impact of public tort
litigation on free expression and other constitutional rights.
4. Encouragement of Bad Government
The experience to date suggests that government-sponsored litigation
encourages government officials to act in ways that are not always consistent
with the best interests of the public. For example, the payment structure
established by the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement made the states
financially dependent upon the continued sale of tobacco products. The more
cigarettes are sold, the more money that the states will receive.828  Obviously,
states that have become accustomed to a steady flow of tobacco revenue will be
reluctant to implement policies that substantially reduce smoking. This same
concern will be present with any settlement agreement that government officials
negotiate in the future with purveyors of alcohol, fast food, or other unhealthy
products.
Public tort litigation has also given rise to a "litigation lottery" mentality
among states and municipalities as government entities are encouraged to
compete with one another in order to get a share of the spoils when a
manufacturer or industry starts to lose or settle cases.82 9 A "race to the
courthouse" occurred in both the tobacco and the handgun litigation. For
example, when it began to look like the cigarette companies were going to reach
multi-billion dollar settlements with Mississippi, Florida, and Minnesota, more
than forty states jumped on the litigation bandwagon within a year.82 0 This also
occurred in connection with the handgun litigation. History is now repeating
itself as a number of government entities have followed the lead of Rhode Island
and begun to bring suits against the lead paint industry.""
This phenomenon is a reflection of the fact that product sellers have only so
much money to pay claims. Once these funds are exhausted, the defendants will
probably have to seek bankruptcy protection. Consequently, those government
entities who win judgments or settle their cases early are likely to get paid in full,
while latecomers may have to settle for much less. Of course, when one state or
city obtains a large judgment or settlement against a particular defendant or
group of defendants, one would expect other government entities to also bring
826. See generally Richard Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of
Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988) (discussing the analysis of unconstitutional conditions)
827. Trapolin, supra note 814, at 1298.
828. See Jonathan Turley, A Crisis of Faith: Tobacco and the Madisonian Democracy, 37 HARV. J.
ON LEGIs. 433, 448 (2000) (pointing out that states, ironically rely on consumers to continue smoking
in order to ensure tobacco companies are able to pay settlement award).
829. Id. at 468.
830. See Maria Gabriela Bianchini, The Tobacco Agreement that Went Up in Smoke: Defining the
Limits of Congressional Intervention into Ongoing Mass Tort Litigation, 87 CAL. L. REV. 703, 711-12
(1999) (noting that after Mississippi brought suit against cigarette companies, most other states
followed).
831. See Jensen, supra note 813, at 1370 (indicating that other cities have begun suits similar to
Rhode Island's against the lead paint makers).
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suit. So to some extent this process is perfectly normal. However, as the
discussion below will show, when the financial stakes are high and the
competition among government litigants is intense, it can lead to questionable
behavior.
For example, public tort litigation puts pressure on courts and legislatures
to change their procedural rules and substantive liability doctrines in order to
make it easier for government litigants to gain an advantage. Unlike the case,
discussed above, where one branch of government bypasses another, this
typically requires cooperation among two or more branches of government. This
occurred when several states enacted legislation to allow recoupment, actions
against tobacco companies, while at the same time stripping them of many of
their traditional defenses. 2 In one instance, the Florida Legislature amended
the state's Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, allowing the state to sue tobacco
companies for aggregate health care costs rather than requiring it to identify
8133individual smokers. The amendments also allowed the state to prove causation
and damages by means of statistical evidence 834 and also eliminated the defenses
of comparative default, assumption of risk, and the statute of repose. 35
Massachusetts also passed Medicaid recoupment legislation that eliminated
836 837many affirmative defenses and Maryland enacted a statute to authorize
Medicaid recoupment suits against tobacco companies after a state judge ruled
that the state did not have a non-statutory right to proceed against the tobacco
companies.8 38  This sort of self-serving behavior on the part of government
litigants erodes public confidence in the integrity of governmental institutions.
Another problem is that public tort lawsuits encourage government entities
to engage in extortion. Of course, any party to a lawsuit has some degree of
leverage and government litigants typically have more bargaining power than
private parties. As in other litigation scenarios, one would expect parties with a
great deal of leverage to take advantage of their strength in dealing with
adversaries. However, government litigants may have gone too far, at least in
some cases, in public tort litigation. For example, because virtually all public tort
lawsuits are based on questionable legal grounds, government plaintiffs, with
good reason do not want to go to trial when it is safer and less expensive to bully
their adversaries into a settlement. To achieve this objective, government
entities are not shy about employing heavy-handed tactics. Taking advantage of
their credibility, moral stature, and access to the media, government officials
wage relentless public relations campaigns against product manufacturers in
832. See Dawson, supra note 811, at 1731 (stating that three states enacted laws permitting states
to directly bring claims against tobacco companies and denying companies typical defenses).
833. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910 (9)(a) (West 1998).
834. Id. § 409.910 (9).
835. Id. §§ 409.910 (1), (12)(h).
836. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118E § 16 (West 2003).
837. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN §15-120 (2000).
838. David A. Hyman, Tobacco Litigation's Third Wave: Has Justice Gone Up in Smoke?, 2 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 34,37 (1998).
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order to force them to settle.839 They have also made free use of the discovery
process to disseminate and publicize embarrassing information about the
defendants and have frequently shared confidential information with other
litigants.i For example, the state of Minnesota made public more than 35
million pages of material that it had obtained from tobacco companies through
the discovery process. 41 Another instance of questionable behavior was HUD's
threat to bring a class action against the handgun industry unless it settled with
municipal litigants and agreed to accept changes in product design and
marketing activity.8
2
Finally, the prospect of recovering millions, or even billions, of dollars from
product sellers and others in public tort litigation is turning state and local
governments from public servants into predators. Because the reasoning
employed in the tobacco and handgun cases can potentially be applied to almost
any unhealthy or dangerous product,84 3 government entities will be constantly
tempted to seek out new parties to sue.8" Moreover, since these types of lawsuits
are usually brought on a contingent fee basis, government entities have much to
gain, and nothing to lose, by suing any product manufacturer they can find with a
deep pocket.
B. Impact on Courts and the Legal Profession
Public tort litigation affects courts, lawyers, and the legal system in general.
More specifically, this type of litigation creates pressure on courts to distort
traditional legal principles and it enables some lawyers to collect grossly
excessive fees.
1. Effect on the Judicial System
Because government plaintiffs often have weak cases if courts adhere to
traditional liability rules, they must persuade courts to expand these rules in
order to make out a cause of action. For example, in the early days of the
tobacco litigation, most of the states based their claims on an unjust enrichment
theory even though recovery should not have been allowed under this theory.8 45
839. See Jensen, supra note 813, at 1384 (arguing that the plethora of lawsuits by government
entities against manufacturers forces them to settle).
840. See Erichson, supra note 816, at 11-12 (noting that Minnesota established a publicly
accessible website containing documents discovered in the tobacco suit).
841. Michael V. Ciresi et al., Decades of Deceit: Document Discovery in the Minnesota Tobacco
Litigation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 477,489 (1999).
842. See Dawson, supra note 811, at 1727 (explaining that the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development threatened to bring suit if gunmakers did not accept new
regulations).
843. See Cupp, supra note 817, at 690 (pointing out that other industries facing lawsuits "may
become caught in the same trap" as tobacco companies).
844. Erichson, supra note 816, at 21.
845. See, e.g., White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 829 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (allowing
plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim to go forward); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 117,
129-30 (Conn. 2001) (rejecting plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim).
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Negligent entrustment is another theory that the government plaintiffs tried to
expand in some of the handgun cases. Plaintiffs' lawyers in both Camden County
Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., and the City of
Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 87 relied upon that doctrine to support
claims against handgun manufacturers even though no "entrustment" existed
within the traditional meaning of that term.w
Similar overreaching occurred in Penelas v. Arms Technology, Inc., 849 where
Miami-Dade County tried to argue that the manufacture and sale of handguns is
an ultrahazardous activity, notwithstanding the fact that this doctrine had always
been restricted to activities on the land that endanger other landowners and are
not matters of common usage.80 This attempt to expand the principle of strict
liability for abnormally dangerous activities did not succeed either. 5'
Arguably, this same sort of distortion has occurred with respect to public
nuisance. Public nuisance is normally limited to activities involving the use of
land, and, until recently, was not applied to the manufacture and sale of legal and
nondefective products."2 Nevertheless, municipal plaintiffs have relied upon it
853extensively in their lawsuits against handgun manufacturers. Although the use
of public nuisance in public tort cases recently received a serious setback by the
Illinois Supreme Court in City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,5 4 this liability
theory has been accepted by a number of courts despite the fact that it is entirely
inappropriate in the context of products liability.
One of the reasons why government plaintiffs are so willing to base their
claims on questionable legal theories is that they apparently do not expect their
cases to actually go to trial. If they can survive a motion to dismiss, government
plaintiffs feel that the defendant will settle the case and, therefore, the doctrinal
soundness of their position will never be truly evaluated. This strategy worked
quite well in the tobacco litigation where the states obtained billions of dollars
without ever having to defend their dubious and novel liability theories in court.
While there is nothing unethical about litigants proposing innovative
846. 123 F. Supp. 2d 245 (D. N.J. 2000).
847. 126 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
848. Camden v. Beretta, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 252; Philadelphia v. Beretta, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 902-
03.
849. 778 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
850. Penelas, 778 So. 2d at 1044-45.
851. Id.
852. See William H. Pryor, Jr., A Comparison of Abuses and Reforms of Class Actions and
Multigovernment Lawsuits, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1885, 1907 (2000) (distinguishing sale of tobacco from
inappropriate uses of property under a theory of public nuisance) (citing Report of the Task Force on
Tobacco Litigation Submitted to Governor James and Attorney General Sessions, 27 CUMB. L. REV.
577,631 (1996-1997)).
853. See John G. Culhane & Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Defining a Proper Role for Public Nuisance
Law in Municipal Suits against Gun Sellers: Beyond Rhetoric and Expedience, 52 S.C. L. REV. 287,288-
89 (2001) (explaining that one ground for lawsuits by government entities against gun manufacturers is
public nuisance).
854. 213 Ill. 2d 351, 432 (2004) (holding that plaintiffs did not state a claim for public nuisance in
gun violence case).
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theories in order to overcome problems with conventional legal doctrines,8
5 this
practice may have some adverse effects on the legal system. First, there is the
possibility that courts will eventually accept questionable legal theories because
they are proposed by government entities and implicitly are backed by the moral
authority of the government. It is interesting to note that some courts seem to
be more receptive to dubious legal theories when they are proposed by
government entities than when they are proffered by private parties.
856
An even greater concern is that questionable legal theories will gain
legitimacy through the settlement process. The accepted way for new legal
doctrines to become incorporated into the common law is through written
opinions by appellate courts. In this way, the policies that underlie new
doctrines are disclosed so that they can be evaluated and critiqued. However,
novel legal theories are now finding their way into the legal system through the
settlement process without any formal evaluation by the judiciary. Thus, when a
lawsuit is based on a questionable legal theory and the defendant settles the case,
it gives some legitimacy to that theory and encourages other plaintiffs to rely
upon it. This may have happened in connection with the government entities'
use of unjust enrichment theory in the tobacco cases to assert an independent
claim for compensation. It could happen as well with public nuisance if handgun
and lead paint manufacturers begin to settle cases that have been brought
against them under that theory.
2. Effect on the Legal Profession
Although some attorneys have profited mightily from their involvement in
public tort litigation, the practice of financing this type of litigation by means of
contingent fees has not been so good for the legal profession as a whole."" First,
there are questions about how attorneys are selected. Unlike private class
actions, where there is some opportunity for the trial court to evaluate the
competence of legal counsel, in public tort cases, selection of the government's
attorney is entirely within the discretion of politicians such as the attorney
general. In some cases, government officials have chosen friends and political
cronies to act as their lawyers instead of selecting them through competitive
bidding or some other visible process."' For example, there were serious
scandals in Mississippi, Kansas, and Texas over the hiring of private attorneys to
855. See Frank J. Vandall, The Legal Theory and the Visionaries that Led to the Proposed $368.5
Billion Tobacco Settlement, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 473, 478, 483 (1998) (recognizing that development of
new legal theory led to tobacco settlement).
856. E.g., White, 97 F. Supp. at 828 (waiving the economic loss rule); City of Chicago v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., 785 N.E.2d 16, 26-27 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (distinguishing cases involving private plaintiffs
that held that defendants did not have a duty to protect individuals from the criminal acts of third
parties), rev'd, 213 Ill. 2d 351 (2004); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1146
(Ohio 2002) (waiving the economic loss rule).
857. Erichson, supra note 816, at 35-38.
858. See Cupp, supra note 817, at 688-89 (noting that state officials resort to "back-room deals"
to hire private attorneys).
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represent these states in tobacco litigation."'
Another concern is that a relatively small group of attorneys have
dominated public interest litigation. One of the most significant network of
lawyers is the Castano Group. ° This consortium of law firms joined together in
1994 to represent many of the states in their lawsuits against the tobacco
industry861 Many members of the Castano Group also participated in lawsuits
against handgun manufacturers, and the legal fees earned by the Castano Group
in the tobacco cases helped to finance the handgun litigation. 86 Of course, it is
natural for government entities to choose attorneys who have handled similar
cases in the past and have the necessary experience, expertise, and resources.
Nevertheless, it is somewhat disturbing that a small number of attorneys exercise
a virtual monopoly over public tort litigation, while the rest of the plaintiffs' bar
is effectively foreclosed from participating.
An even greater concern is that those attorneys who represent government
clients in public tort litigation have received vast amounts of money as a result.m
Because this litigation is usually handled on a contingent fee basis, the attorneys
may receive millions of dollars when a case is settled. For example, the
attorneys who handled the tobacco litigation for the states recovered an
estimated $13.75 billion in legal fees and some individual law firms made more
than a billion dollars from the tobacco litigation8 66 This level of compensation
seems grossly excessive for the amount of work involved and members of the
public, who indirectly pay for this largesse, are not likely to have positive
thoughts about the legal profession.
C. Adverse Economic Effects
Public tort litigation imposes economic costs upon manufacturers and their
shareholders, as well as upon employees, suppliers, retail sellers, consumers, and
the general public. Obviously, the most immediate economic burden falls upon
those manufacturers who are sued by government plaintiffs. Litigation costs
make up a large part of this economic burden. Even when they win, product
manufacturers incur enormous legal expenses to defend themselves. Public tort
litigation may impose other costs on manufacturers in addition to legal fees.
Because these are usually high-profile cases, efforts by government plaintiffs and
859. Pryor, supra note 852, at 1912-13.
860. Carl T. Bogus, Gun Litigation and Societal Values, 32 CONN. L. REv. 1353, 1361 (2000).
861. Id.
862. Id. at 1362.
863. See Pryor, supra note 852, at 1912 (discussing the high fees obtained by trial lawyers in
tobacco litigation).
864. Cupp, supra note 817, at 688.
865. Debow, supra note 807, at 563-64.
866. See Daniel J. Capra et al., The Tobacco Litigation and Attorneys' Fees, 67 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2827, 2827 (1999) (observing that one law firm would have made $1.5 billion under its contingent
fee contract, but eventually settled for less).
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their allies to embarrass or demonize defendants may result in lower sales,
profits, or stock prices. In addition, threats of further government regulation,
which are sometimes used to force a favorable settlement, can also make a
company's stock less attractive to investors.
The greatest cost for manufacturers, however, may be the damage award or
settlement itself. Even if the manufacturer can pass these costs on to consumers,
the resulting price increase will normally reduce sales of the product. In
addition, settlement agreements often contain provisions that restrict the sale
and marketing of the defendant's product, thereby reducing revenue even
further. Thus, a settlement may create financial problems for a manufacturer, or
even an entire industry, by siphoning off economic resources and reducing
opportunities for future growth and product development. Companies that face
such economic stagnation will be less able to pay competitive dividends to
shareholders, hire new employees, or purchase goods from suppliers.
Public tort litigation may have adverse economic effects on consumers as
well. For example, when manufacturers must obtain the money to make the
payments mandated by the settlement, they are often forced to charge higher
prices for goods, thereby shifting much of the economic burden of public tort
litigation onto consumers. Moreover, settlement agreements may indirectly
increase the costs of goods by reducing competition and establishing barriers to
market entry, thereby keeping the price of goods higher than they might be
otherwise. In addition, tort victims may be disadvantaged by public tort
litigation to the extent that payments to government entities reduces the amount
of money available to pay individual tort claims.
Finally, public tort litigation may be economically inefficient because it
requires the public to pay more to finance government services. To illustrate,
assume that public health care is largely financed by taxes that yield $1 million.
This involves a transfer of $1 million from taxpayers to the government. 
6
'
Assume further that the government recovers an additional $1 million from
product manufacturers, but must pay 40% for litigation costs and contingent
fees. However, the public, or those members of the public who consume the
defendant's product, must pay $1 million to the defendant in higher prices to pay
for the cost of the settlement. This process involves additional transfers: the
manufacturer transfers money to the government and then consumers transfer
money to the manufacturer. Even if taxes are reduced by $600,000 because of
the settlement, the public still public pays a total of $1.4 million in taxes and
higher prices, but still only receives $1 million worth of health care. In the above
hypothetical, public tort litigation has added an additional $400,000 to the cost of
providing the public with $1 million worth of health care.
867. There may be additional transfers if the federal government imposes the tax and then
transfers money to state or local governments.
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
D. Proposed Solutions
There are a number of steps that courts and legislatures can take to address
the concerns associated with public tort litigation. The most drastic solution is to
prohibit such litigation altogether. For example, Congress could amend the
Medicaid statute to prohibit the states from recovering Medicaid costs from
product manufacturers. Likewise, the states could prohibit local governments
from bringing public tort suits.
Even if public tort lawsuits are not prohibited, there a number of reforms
that could be implemented to reduce their harmful impact. One problem with
public tort litigation is that it bypasses the legislature and, therefore, interferes
with the legislative process. This problem could be reduced if state officials are
required to obtain legislative approval and funding before initiating government-
sponsored litigation. Settlement agreements should also be subjected to
legislative oversight and approval. This would provide greater openness and
political accountability. Moreover, if settlement agreements are embodied in
formal legislation, it would become more difficult for government plaintiffs to
impose unconstitutional conditions upon manufacturers.
Certain measures might also reduce the temptation for state and local
governments to engage in morally questionable conduct. For example, requiring
legislative approval would require state officials to persuade a disinterested third
party that their decision to bring suit against a product manufacturer is
appropriate and necessary. Prohibiting contingent fees and requiring state
officials to finance public tort litigation would force them to internalize the costs
of litigation and might discourage them from bringing lawsuits based on dubious
or radical legal theories.
Courts could do their part to discourage unwarranted public tort litigation
by dismissing claims that are not consistent with existing legal doctrines. In
particular, trial courts should reject government claims based on distorted
versions of unjust enrichment and public nuisance and appellate courts should
reverse trial courts that fail to act responsibly. In addition, the courts should
require government plaintiffs to plead and prove the elements of their case
according to the same rules that apply to other litigants. Courts should also
carefully review settlement agreements and reject provisions that adversely
affect third parties or the interests of the public.
Courts and legislatures could also do more to prevent overreaching by trial
lawyers. First of all, legislatures could exercise oversight over the selection and
compensation of lawyers in public tort cases. One way to do this is to establish
statutory procedures for the selection of outside legal counsel. Another reform
would be to prohibit contingent fees in public tort cases and to require that
outside legal work for the government be billed at fixed hourly rates. If
necessary, the legislature could also authorize trial courts to regulate contingent
fees in public tort cases. Finally, the legislature could increase opportunities for
more lawyers by requiring that contracts for legal services be awarded on the
basis of competitive bidding.
In its present form, the costs of public tort litigation probably outweigh its
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benefits. The reforms suggested above address some, but not all, of the
problems associated with this form of litigation. For example, it will be difficult
to change the litigation lottery mentality of state officials or to discourage them
from engaging in predatory behavior. It is also difficult to control the
development of a "shadow legal system" by the use of settlements instead of
conventional adjudication. Nevertheless, if public tort litigation is retained,
changes, as suggested above, should be implemented.
